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PREFACE
As the CGIAR, formerly the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, marked its 40th 
anniversary last year, much attention was paid to the profound benefi ts its collaborative research has 
generated for millions of poor people in developing countries over the past 4 decades. Behind these 
well-documented scientifi c achievements lies another, little-known story of the CGIAR’s institutional 
evolution. As we embark on our 5th decade, this timely book chronicles that history in the hope that 
lessons can be drawn from that experience, just as important lessons have been drawn from our 
accomplishments on the ground.
I cannot be alone in wishing that this account of the CGIAR had been available sooner. In my case, 
I needed it 8 years ago when I became responsible for United Kingdom investments in the CGIAR. 
Although what the CGIAR does has been amply described by a large and growing literature on CGIAR 
impacts on poverty, hunger, malnutrition and the environment, the same could not be said prior to 
this book for what the CGIAR is, how it works or the means by which it brings about its remarkable 
achievements. Yet these are precisely the questions that are asked when proposals to invest tens of 
millions of dollars are submitted for approval, a young scientist considers dedicating his or her career 
to the CGIAR, or a partner organization contemplates conducting joint research. Even after speak-
ing to dozens of venerable CGIAR associates (many of whom have seen this text and confi rmed its 
veracity), I found that the full picture remained elusive — like trying to put together a jig-saw puzzle 
without all of the pieces or the original box and further wondering if some extraneous pieces had 
crept into the pile. Thanks to this book, the picture is now clear and complete.
This volume traces the organic evolution of an organization so complex that no single individual had 
the full story, which had to be assembled from the knowledge and experiences of many people. It will 
be very benefi cial to anyone wanting to understand how the CGIAR became what it is today. More 
importantly, the book provides insights and lessons for comprehending its future direction. From a 
more generic perspective, it will prove valuable to students and scholars of public institutional devel-
opment and to those planning similar global initiatives. 
It is instructive to recall the aspirations of Robert McNamara in 1969 when, as president of the 
World Bank, he wrote to the heads of the Food and Agriculture Organization and the United Nations 
Development Programme suggesting that they establish and administer a consortium, interna-
tional research fund or some other institutional mechanism to support international agricultural 
research. Only in 2011, more than 40 years later, did the CGIAR realize those prophetic sentiments 
by formally establishing the Consortium of International Agricultural Research Centers and the 
CGIAR Fund. The story documented here by Selçuk Özgediz both unravels and integrates some 
of the complex political, fi nancial and personal strengths and challenges that have characterized 
this institutional journey.
The accuracy of the narrative is supported by the voluminous and fully intact collection of CGIAR core 
documents. To avoid any unconscious tendency to rewrite history, we consulted with a number of major 
players in the CGIAR, many of whom have read and commented on successive drafts of this book. We 
are grateful for their clarifi cations, questions, personal perspectives and insider knowledge. Their contri-
butions should not be read as implying their endorsement of the entirety of this book. 
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One overriding lesson is that the pace of the CGIAR’s institutional evolution until 2008 was danger-
ously slow and constituted a very high risk for the CGIAR’s future. Only through a judicious injection of 
revolution to complement its evolution has the CGIAR transformed itself, greatly enhancing its fi tness for 
undertaking its vital role in the unprecedented challenge of sustainably achieving global food security 
in the fi rst half of the 21st Century. No one expects the CGIAR to be institutionally static; indeed, its 
dynamism has been its strength over the past 40 years and must continue to be its strength in the 
coming decades. The CGIAR’s adaptability will ensure not only its future relevance as an institution 
but also its ability to improve the lives of poor people. As Charles Darwin said, “If the misery of the 
poor be caused not by the laws of nature, but by our institutions, great is our sin.”1 These words aptly 
describe what the CGIAR stands for and embodies through its experiences outlined in this volume. 
The lessons distilled here will be invaluable in the future, as the CGIAR continues its inevitable adapta-
tion to a changing world and shifting priorities and problems.
Jonathan Wadsworth
Executive Secretary, CGIAR Fund Council 
Head, CGIAR Fund Offi ce
1 Darwin C. 1838. The Voyage of the Beagle: Journal of Researches into the Natural History and Geology of the Countries 
Visited During the Voyage of H.M.S. Beagle Round the World, 1832-1836. London.
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SUMMARY
The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) has 
been one of the most successful research-for-development organizations over the past 40 years. The 
$11 billion invested by CGIAR donor members in research conducted by the international Centers 
under its umbrella has yielded many multiples of that sum in economic benefi ts to developing and 
emerging countries. Annual economic benefi ts of research on rice in Asia alone are equivalent to the 
total investment made by CGIAR donors over 4 decades, leaving aside benefi ts in other continents 
and from other research conducted by CGIAR institutions.
The CGIAR‘s success is due in part to the way it was organized. The Group itself 
was an informal forum for dialogue among donor members about research priorities, investment 
options, and the continuing relevance and effectiveness of the institutions supported. The interna-
tional Centers constituted the core of the CGIAR. Each was (and still is) an autonomous international 
organization governed by an international board. The Group and the Centers were originally advised 
by the Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) of distinguished scientists from developing and developed 
countries, each appointed as an individual. The Group’s activities were facilitated by its Secretariat 
based at the World Bank in Washington, DC, and TAC’s activities by another secretariat based at the 
Food and Agriculture Organization in Rome. 
This historical account of the institutional evolution of the CGIAR system over the 
4 decades focuses on governance and organizational change at the system level. Developments 
at the Center level are covered only to the extent that they have major systemwide implications. As 
Warren Baum’s 1986 work on the CGIAR, Partners Against Hunger, provides a detailed account 
of the CGIAR’s evolution over its fi rst 15 years, this study covers that period more briefl y than it 
does the last 25 years. 
Roots of the CGIAR
The roots of the CGIAR go to the Mexico-Rockefeller Foundation International 
Agriculture Program, which was set up in 1943 to increase agricultural production, primarily of beans, 
maize, wheat and potatoes. Led by Norman Borlaug, program scientists were able to produce new 
higher-yielding, short-statured wheat varieties by incorporating semi-dwarfi ng genes that had originated 
in Japan. These new wheat varieties were distributed to farmers in 1961 and enabled the doubling of 
wheat yields in Mexico in 7 years, making Mexico self-suffi cient in wheat by 1969.
The Rockefeller Foundation was interested in broadening this scientifi c success 
in wheat in Mexico to Asia and to other crops such as rice, the main staple in most of Asia. But it 
did not have the resources to do so. This is when a partnership was formed between the Rockefeller 
Foundation and the Ford Foundation, as the latter had the resources and experience in Asia acquired 
through rural and community development projects it had been fi nancing. The Ford Foundation 
provided the capital and the Rockefeller Foundation the scientifi c know-how and operating funds 
to set up the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines in 1960. The success 
of IRRI in replicating the yield gains in wheat using short-statured rice varieties under the organiza-
tional setting of an international Center prompted the reorganization in 1966 of the Mexico wheat 
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program into a similar research Center, the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center 
(CIMMYT by its Spanish abbreviation). 
IRRI and CIMMYT worked with national agricultural research programs to develop 
modern high-yielding varieties, whose record harvests averted famine in Asia in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s in what was heralded as the Green Revolution. For this achievement, the two Centers 
shared the United Nations Education, Scientifi c and Cultural Organization prize for science, and 
Norman Borlaug was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1970. 
The successes of IRRI and CIMMYT prompted the Ford and Rockefeller founda-
tions to replicate the organizational model in two other regions — the humid tropics of Africa and the 
lowland tropics of the Americas — with associated research on several food crops and commodities. 
In 1967, the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture was established in Ibadan, Nigeria, and the 
International Center for Tropical Agriculture in Cali, Colombia. 
Within a few years the fi nancial needs of the four-Center network began to exceed 
the funding capacity of the two foundations. The donor community, already enthusiastic about the 
successes of IRRI and CIMMYT, saw this as an opportunity to scale up this scientifi c initiative. Robert 
McNamara, president of the World Bank, took the lead in organizing a donor support group for the 
four institutes and possibly others, with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO) and the United Nations Development Programme joining the World Bank as cosponsors.
Establishment and Growth
The CGIAR was established in 1971 to support investments in research and 
technology development geared toward increasing food production in the food-defi cit countries of 
the world. At the inaugural meeting held in Washington, DC, the CGIAR appointed TAC, with Sir John 
Crawford of Australia as its chair. The sponsorship of the existing four institutes was thus transferred 
from the two foundations to a larger group of investors. 
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From the beginning, the CGIAR’s governance model was based on four 
basic principles:
 ■ Informality and consensus decision-making. Throughout its history the Group 
operated as an informal body, making decisions by consensus. Consensus 
decision making was and remains the basic decision-making rule of the donors.
 ■ Donor sovereignty. Each donor was able to base its funding decisions purely 
on its own policies and evaluation. There were no system-enforced funding 
quotas, payment of overhead or pooling of funds. This attractive feature made 
the CGIAR a preferred investment option in development assistance. 
 ■ Center autonomy. The four original Centers and practically all others brought under 
the CGIAR umbrella were organized as independent entities, each with an interna-
tional legal personality and governed by an international board. Although they had 
managerial autonomy, the Centers were expected to adhere to the oversight and 
accountability measures installed by the CGIAR, the assembly of their primary donors. 
 ■ Independent technical advice. Donor representatives, most of whom were not 
scientists themselves, needed an authoritative scientifi c body to advise them 
on research priorities, investment opportunities and the quality of the science 
practiced at the Centers. TAC played a prominent role in the evolution of the 
system during its fi rst 2 decades. Its infl uence would weaken later when power 
balances in the system began to change. 
During its fi rst 5 years the CGIAR grew quickly, in part because of a favorable 
climate for support to agricultural development in the development assistance community. Strategic 
studies conducted by TAC guided the Group in identifying new areas for CGIAR investment. Seven 
new Centers were brought under the CGIAR umbrella between 1972 and 1975, starting with the Inter-
national Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics in India. This was followed in 1973 by the 
International Potato Center in Peru in 1973 and in 1974 two entities that were later transformed into 
autonomous Centers: the International Board for Plant Genetic Resources (IBPGR), not a research 
institution but a service organization to promote and assist in collecting and conserving plant genetic 
resources, and the research programs of the West Africa Rice Development Association (now the Africa 
Rice Center) in Liberia, later moved to Cote d’Ivoire and now headquartered in Benin. The establish-
ment of IBPGR illustrated the importance the CGIAR attached to genetic resources and their conser-
vation globally. IBPGR and its successors, the International Plant Genetic Resources Institute (IPGRI) 
and then Bioversity International, would play important roles globally in helping developing countries 
address genetic resource conservation and related intellectual property issues. 
Two of the remaining three early Centers researched livestock: the International 
Laboratory on Research on Animal Diseases established in 1973 and the International Livestock Center 
for Africa established in 1975. The remaining early Center was the International Center for Agricultural 
Research in Dry Areas, established in 1975 with headquarters in the Syrian Arab Republic.
Growth was slower during the second half of the decade. Two new Centers were 
added towards the end of the decade, neither of them dealing directly with technology development. 
The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), based in Washington, DC, was to conduct 
research on policy constraints on agricultural development and food security. The International Service 
for National Agricultural Research (ISNAR), headquartered in The Hague, aimed to strengthen national 
research systems in developing countries, thereby helping address one of the institutional constraints 
to agricultural development.
The CGIAR thus added nine new Centers to the initial four during its fi rst decade, 
bringing the total to 13. The number of donors increased from the 17 that attended the inaugural 
meeting in 1971 to 29 in 1980, bringing total investment in the Centers from $21 million in 1972 to 
$141 million by the end of the decade. 
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This rapid growth was possible because the ingredients needed for change were all 
present: the vision of the donors to build a global research network, strong leadership by TAC and its 
articulation of a compelling rationale for the type of research and institutions that were needed, and the 
willingness of donors to take responsibility for establishing new Centers. The fi nancial climate did not 
pose a major obstacle, as shown by the sevenfold increase in funding in nominal terms over 8 years. 
The growth years saw the CGIAR broaden its focus. While the initial focus on 
increasing food production through research on crop improvement remained the main focus, the 
research domain was expanded to include a farming systems approach to take into account the human 
and physical conditions within which production took place. In addition, the scope of research was 
expanded to include livestock problems (mainly in Africa) and institutional constraints on agricultural 
development. Further broadening of the original mission of the CGIAR would continue over time, bring-
ing with it fi nancial and coordination challenges. 
Stocktaking and Further Expansion
As the system grew, the need to clarify and systematize some corporate functions 
became clear. First, a program and budget review system was developed, followed by a monitoring 
and evaluation framework. A system of quinquennial external program reviews of Centers was initiated 
with evaluations of IRRI and CIMMYT by two distinguished panels. A process of reviewing the entire 
system every 5 years was started, with the fi rst such review taking place in 1976 and the second in 
1981. This disciplined schedule was abandoned in the 1980s, and the third review of the system 
would not take place until 1998. 
The second system review prompted the clarifi cation of corporate functions in the 
system. Centers began to prepare 5-year rolling plans, periodic management reviews of Centers were 
initiated, and attention focused on the roles and duties of trustees serving on Center boards, as well as on 
the nationality and gender composition of the boards. The corporate image of the CGIAR received atten-
tion, starting with the publication of a CGIAR annual report in 1984. Documenting the CGIAR’s impact 
was a priority. A major impact study showed that from 1970 to 1983 the use of modern varieties of wheat 
and rice had increased the production of these grains in developing countries by more than 40 million 
tons. More than 16,000 scientists had been trained in CGIAR institutions during the same period, and 
over one-third of the world’s collection of plant genetic resources were maintained in Center genebanks.
Globally, the development agenda was being shaped by independent commissions 
such as the Brandt Commission and the Brundtland Commission. The CGIAR research agenda was 
responsive to these trends. Both the Brandt Commission’s stress on reducing poverty, especially in the 
poverty belts of Asia and Africa, and the Brundtland Commission’s recommendation to shift to more 
sustainable forms of development received signifi cant attention during the review of system priori-
ties prepared by TAC. As redefi ned, the mission of the CGIAR was “through international agricultural 
research and related activities to contribute to increasing sustainable food production in developing 
countries in such a way that the nutritional level and general economic well-being of low-income people 
are improved.” The CGIAR’s main program thrusts were redefi ned as
 ■ enhancing sustainability through resource conservation and management,
 ■ increasing the productivity of commodity production systems,
 ■ improving the policy environment, and
 ■ strengthening national research capabilities.
Addressing new concerns associated with sustainability brought into question whether 
the CGIAR’s existing institutions had the capacity to meet this challenge. To address this question a 
new “expansion study” was initiated to examine the inclusion in the system of 10 existing research 
institutions or networks associated with resource management. In the end, the Group decided to admit 
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four existing centers or networks — the International Center for Living Aquatic Resources Manage-
ment, International Irrigation Management Institute, International Centre for Research in Agroforestry, 
and International Network for the Improvement of Banana and Plantain (INIBAP) — as well as a new 
forestry center that would later become the Center for International Forestry Research. (A sixth center, 
the Asian Vegetable Research and Development Center headquartered in Taiwan, was considered for 
inclusion in the CGIAR, but this was blocked by China for political reasons.)
The expansion process refl ected some changes taking place in the power structure 
of the CGIAR. Donors were beginning to exert greater infl uence vis-à-vis TAC, deciding to expand the 
mission of the CGIAR to include forestry before TAC completed the requested study on expansion. 
Donors disagreed strongly with the TAC recommendation to have a single forestry institute, preferring 
instead to have two institutes: one on forestry and the other on agroforestry. This marked the begin-
ning of a power shift that would continue throughout the past 2 decades.
Crisis and the Road to Recovery
The additional funding that was expected to accompany the addition of new Centers 
never materialized. Contributions to the original 13 Centers declined in real terms for several years 
in a row, while the new Centers saw their funding increase. There were calls in the system for a new 
systemwide strategy. The CGIAR’s total staff size had reached 12,000, 1,300 of them internationally 
recruited. Funding needs for 1992 reached $332 million, a third more than donors’ pledges totaling 
$251 million. A budgetary solution, such as decreasing each Center’s budget by a certain percentage, 
would not have been appropriate in the long term, as this would have ignored agreed priorities. Many 
in the system felt that more radical changes were needed to address the issue. TAC was asked to 
develop options for restructuring the Centers to address the funding shortfall. As a fi rst step toward 
streamlining, the Group agreed on two mergers, integrating the two livestock Centers in Africa into 
the International Livestock Research Institute and bringing INIBAP’s activities under the governance 
and administrative structure of IPGRI. Two standing donor committees were established, on oversight 
and on fi nance, to facilitate the Group’s decision-making on these issues.
TAC’s recommendations on restructuring were never made public because 
the new CGIAR chair, Ismail Serageldin, wanted fi rst to try making a special appeal to donors to 
raise additional funds and avoid a crisis. He succeeded in raising a one-time $20 million special 
grant from the World Bank, to be used as a 1:2 match against additional funding from other 
donors, which helped avert a major crisis, albeit only temporarily. The Centers took drastic action 
to streamline their programs and downsize staff. A redefi nition of the CGIAR’s research portfolio 
brought some Center projects previously outside the research agenda into the CGIAR-approved 
portfolio, enabling their funding to be added to overall CGIAR funding. These measures allowed 
the research agenda for 1994 to be funded in full.
Serageldin saw the need for the donor community to rededicate its commitment to 
the CGIAR. A ministerial-level meeting of CGIAR members was organized in Lucerne in 1995, which 
adopted the new mission statement “to contribute, through its research, to promoting sustainable 
agriculture for food security in the developing countries,” as well as measures to broaden partner-
ships, clarify the CGIAR’s research agenda and strengthen impact assessment. 
Efforts to open up the system were successful, as fi ve additional developing countries 
— Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Iran and Kenya — joined the CGIAR, bringing the Southern member-
ship to 13. In addition, the CGIAR helped convene the fi rst Global Forum on Agricultural Research in 
1996. The geographic coverage of the system was expanded after the break-up of the East Bloc, with 
new programs to assist former Soviet republics, particularly those in Central Asia and the Caucasus. 
The genetic resources collections of the CGIAR Centers were placed under the auspices of FAO’s 
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Commission on Plant Genetic Resources, as was called for by the International Undertaking on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture.
Steady progress was made on several policy fronts during this reform program. 
The newly started Gender & Diversity Program was proceeding on two tracks — gender analysis and 
gender staffi ng — to incorporate gender concerns more effectively into CGIAR research and improve 
organizational processes to attract more women scientists. The share of women among internation-
ally recruited staff increased from 11% in 1991 to 26% in 2008. Progress in another policy area saw 
the development of the much-needed policy framework on genetic resources, intellectual property 
and biotechnology issues. 
During this period the locus of power in the CGIAR had shifted from TAC to the 
CGIAR chair. The Center Directors Committee began exercising more infl uence once it started to operate 
more effectively as a team. The World Bank’s decision to change its funding modality from balancing 
donor to matching donor weakened the means to enforce TAC-recommended system priorities. The 
most popular activities began to receive the largest contributions, but these were not necessarily the 
highest priorities in the TAC-recommended CGIAR research agenda. 
Much had changed in the CGIAR since its expansion and fi nancial crisis. The tempo-
rary infusion of funds and the renewal of commitment by heads of donor agencies had helped but not 
to the extent of alleviating Centers’ concerns about the stability and sustainability of their funding. The 
answer to the discomfort felt throughout the system was to mount the long-awaited third system review. 
The review panel, chaired by Maurice Strong of Canada, observed that the $5.2 billion 
expended on the CGIAR between 1972 and 1997 had supported the near doubling of food production 
in developing countries. Strong called the CGIAR “the best single investment for ODA [offi cial devel-
opment assistance], bar none.” The panel observed that the two pillars of the CGIAR’s work should 
continue to be (1) integrated gene management and (2) integrated natural resources management. It 
recommended making the CGIAR a legally established corporation with a central board, an executive 
committee and a full-time chief executive offi cer. This recommendation met strong resistance from 
the Group, as had all earlier recommendations for centralizing power.
The system review had not provided a compelling new vision or associated 
change agenda for the CGIAR. Most of the recommendations, except the one on legalizing the 
CGIAR, refl ected marginal change from the status quo. TAC was tasked with developing a vision, 
but that, too, did not fi nd wide acceptance. There was renewed interest in identifying alternative 
governance and structure options. Electronic conferences of stakeholders organized by TAC yielded 
several options, ranging from establishing a single board to supervise all Centers to redefi ning the 
mandates of Centers as either global or regional. European donors offered alternative structural 
arrangements such as reorganizing the existing Centers into four regional programs servicing 
the needs of developing countries and establishing fl exible, time-limited task forces drawn from 
Centers, national agricultural research systems, nongovernmental organizations, the private sector 
and advanced research institutions to address specifi c research issues. The Centers proposed 
creating a legal entity called the Federation of Centers comprising the Centers, a board for the 
federation and a federation offi ce.
While these discussions were taking place, annual funding for the system was in 
the range of $330-340 million — insuffi cient to tackle a growing and increasingly complex research 
agenda, which now included new concerns such as climate change and nutritional health — and 
restricted funding was on the rise at the expense of core funding. In the midst of all these institutional 
and fi nancial concerns, new evidence was emerging on the impact of the CGIAR. One study showed 
that every dollar invested in CGIAR research meant $9 worth of additional food being produced in 
developing countries.
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A Decade Filled with Change 
The CGIAR’s 4th decade was essentially devoted to designing and managing change. 
The fi rst change effort aimed to begin shifting the fi nancing of CGIAR’s research from institutions 
(meaning Centers) to globally visible Challenge Programs (CPs). These programs were a way for the 
CGIAR to elevate its game, open up the system, strengthen partnerships with national agricultural 
research systems and other research actors, and mobilize additional funds. The change effort involved 
establishing an executive council to facilitate the work of the CGIAR. Other changes were to transform 
TAC into a science council, establish a CGIAR system offi ce to encompass all units providing services 
to the Centers or the CGIAR, adopt the Charter of the CGIAR System, establish a system to measure 
performance, reduce the number of CGIAR meetings from two to one per year, and invest in strategic 
communications. Paralleling these initiatives, the Centers advanced their capacity for working together 
and taking collective action by forming an informal alliance.
The introduction of CPs, with no restriction on who could submit proposals, was 
seen as a threat to the Centers. To ease concerns the fi rst three CPs were selected from among 
proposals submitted by Centers with themselves as lead institutions. These were Water and Food, to 
generate research-based knowledge on growing more food with less water; HarvestPlus, to reduce 
micronutrient malnutrition through research to breed staple foods rich in nutrients, in particular iron, 
zinc and vitamin A; and Generation, to use the latest advances in molecular biology to create a new 
generation of plants to meet farmers’ needs.
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Following the approval of these three pilot CPs, other institutions were permitted to 
submit proposals. The fourth CP emerged from this open process. Submitted by the Forum for Agricultural 
Research in Africa and called Improving Livelihoods and Natural Resource Management in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: Securing the Future for Africa’s Children, it involved intensive research at three “learning sites” 
across sub-Saharan Africa to identify successful and innovative practices. The fi nal CP approved by the 
CGIAR, following a few years of freeze, was on a much anticipated subject: climate change.
The CP experiment never achieved full traction, never coming close to the 
original intent of placing half of all CGIAR research under CPs within 5 years. The CPs did bring 
in some additional funding but also diverted some funding, including some from the World Bank, 
that would otherwise have gone to the core programs of the Centers. It created winners and 
losers among the Centers, as only a few coordinated CPs. The experiment had a major benefit, 
though, in demonstrating how the CGIAR system could run multi-institutional global research 
programs and helping prepare mindsets toward the even bolder application of this principle 
toward the end of the decade. 
Most of the other reforms initiated during the fi rst change effort helped improve 
CGIAR business processes. The Executive Council initiative showed how the donor Group, which 
had reached 62 members in 2002, could manage its affairs through delegation. Donors liked 
the Performance Measurement System because it focused on results and effi ciency, but Centers 
disliked it because of the additional burden of generating the data required. The “virtual” System 
Offi ce experiment did not generate much integration but helped inter-unit communication. The 
change made to TAC was not too dramatic. The new Science Council was able to develop a new 
set of priorities but unable to make headway with its new mandate to mobilize the scientifi c 
community toward the goals of the CGIAR. 
While these changes were being implemented, a meta evaluation of the CGIAR 
conducted by the World Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department concluded that the CGIAR was 
“less focused” than in earlier years because of the decline in the share of its resources devoted to 
increasing productivity in favor of research on natural resource management and biodiversity. The 
report was critical of the transformation of TAC into the Science Council, which was seen as reducing 
its role in setting priorities and allocating resources, and of initiating CPs before addressing fi rst the 
issues of funding. The evaluation cautioned against the steep rise in restricted funding.
The rise in restricted funding was recognized as a troubling sign by all components 
of the system, as it had reached close to 60% of all funding, from 36% in 1992, and some Centers 
were facing serious fi nancial diffi culty. ISNAR was also having performance problems. Its external 
review was unimpressed with its performance after 20 years of operations, as it had recorded only 
modest impact. The CGIAR agreed to phase out ISNAR, transferring its governance and more effec-
tive programs to IFPRI. The donor community was also deeply concerned about the CGIAR’s inability 
to address several issues regarding the alignment of funding with system priorities, of center programs 
with regional priorities, and of center activities with partner activities.
These concerns led the Group to initiate a facilitated change management process 
under the new CGIAR chair, Kathy Sierra, thus starting the second major change initiative of the 
decade. A change steering team was formed to lead consultations with all stakeholders over the next 
2 years on vision, partnerships, governance and funding, and the development of a comprehensive 
set of recommendations for restructuring the governance and fi nancing of the CGIAR. The building 
blocks of the new CGIAR became clear early in the process: a programmatic approach to research 
(funding programs instead of institutions), establishing a collective donor fund and assigning system-
level management responsibilities to a board. These views coincided with the recommendations of 
an independent review panel that the World Bank had charged with assessing the effectiveness and 
effi ciency of the CGIAR partnership.
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The CGIAR approved the recommended changes at its annual meeting in 
2008 and began a transition to the “New CGIAR.” A new vision was adopted (“to reduce poverty 
and hunger, improve human health and nutrition, and enhance ecosystem resilience through 
high-quality international agricultural research, partnership and leadership”) along with four 
strategic outcomes: 
 ■ reduced rural poverty,
 ■ improved food security,
 ■ improved nutrition and health, and
 ■ sustainably managed natural resources. 
The basic organizational principle underlying the New CGIAR was to separate 
those who implement CGIAR research (the “doers”) from those who fund it (the “funders”). This 
would be accomplished by having the Centers establish a separate international organization 
called the Consortium of International Agricultural Research Centers, with a board, chief execu-
tive offi cer and Consortium offi ce. The counterpart of the Consortium on the funders’ side would 
be a strategic fi nancing facility called the CGIAR Fund, with the Fund Council as its executive 
arm supported by the Fund Offi ce and advised by the reconstituted Independent Science and 
Partnership Council. The Funders Forum would bring together all funders, whether they contrib-
uted to the CGIAR Fund or not, every 2 years, and the biennial Global Conference on Agricultural 
Research for Development would help align the work of the CGIAR more closely with global and 
regional needs and activities. 
The Strategy and Results Framework (SRF) developed by the Consortium and 
endorsed by the Funders Forum would provide a roadmap to achieving the new vision and strategic 
outcomes. The Consortium would operationalize the SRF through a set of global programs called CGIAR 
Research Programs (CRPs) and request fi nancing for each CRP from the Fund. Binding results-based 
program performance agreements between the Fund and the Consortium would defi ne the funding 
and results-based operational dimensions of each CRP. In addition to results-based contracts, account-
ability would be ensured through a streamlined monitoring and evaluation mechanism, with a new 
independent evaluation mechanism set up by the Fund Council as its anchor.
The CGIAR endorsed these changes at its fi nal meeting in December 2009 by adopt-
ing a declaration that outlined the essential elements of reform, approving three founding documents 
and appointing the fi rst Fund Council to assume executive responsibility for the donor group. During 
the same meeting, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, which had been a major bilateral donor to 
Centers, joined the CGIAR. 
Thus began a new chapter in the CGIAR’s history, bringing to an end the Consul-
tative Group and the other system units that had served it over the 4 decades. Though the Consulta-
tive Group would no longer exist, the “CGIAR” name would continue to be used to refer to the new 
system. Financially, the CGIAR had ended its fi nal year of operation with $606 million in contributions 
in nominal terms, the highest in its history.
The New CGIAR
The New CGIAR became operational in 2010. The CGIAR Trust Fund was estab-
lished at the World Bank in January of that year, though contributions to the Fund would await the 
development of the legal instruments needed between individual donors and the World Bank and 
between the World Bank (acting as agent of the Fund Council) and the Consortium. This was followed 
by inaugural meetings of the Fund Council and the Consortium Board; the fi rst Global Conference 
on Agricultural Research for Development, held in Montpellier, France, in March 2010; and the fi rst 
Funders Forum, held at FAO headquarters in Rome in July.
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Though the New CGIAR became operational at the beginning of 2010, fi nan-
cial arrangements between donors and Centers would continue to follow the procedures of the old 
CGIAR until some CRPs were approved, which required prior approval of the SRF. As the develop-
ment and review of CRPs required a sequential process, a dual funding arrangement was used 
until all CRPs were approved, enabling the  Centers to continue to be funded under the old regime 
while CRP funding evolved. 
Although the original intent of the CGIAR Fund was to fi nance only the agreed CRPs 
through two funding windows, one for unrestricted (pooled) contributions to be allocated to CRPs by 
the Fund Council and the other for contributions targeting specifi c CRPs, donors preferred to have 
the option of channeling contributions directly to specifi c Centers through the CGIAR Fund. Thus, a 
third window was added to the Fund structure for this purpose, its continuation to be reviewed after 
a 2-year transitional period. The Fund Council was not to enter into any contractual relationships with 
the Consortium or the individual Centers with respect to the use of window 3 funds, as this window 
was essentially a pass-through mechanism to channel donor funds to individual Centers. 
To take advantage of funding from some donors that would be lost if not used during 
the 2010 calendar year, two CRPs at advanced stages of preparation were fast-tracked for approval 
in 2010, before the endorsement of the SRF: (1) the Global Rice Science Partnership and (2) Climate 
Change, Agriculture and Food Security. Their budgets were larger than those of Centers, being about 
$100 million annually for rice and $65 million for climate change. 
Early in 2011, the new Fund Council chair, Inger Andersen, and the Consortium 
Board chair, Carlos Pérez del Castillo, visited key donors to reaffi rm their support to the New CGIAR 
under the new arrangements. Receiving strong support from them, the Fund and the Consortium 
proceeded with the remaining steps toward making the New CGIAR fully operational. The Fund Council 
appointed Kenneth Cassman as the chair of the Independent Science and Partnership Council and 
Jonathan Wadsworth as the Fund Council executive secretary and head of the CGIAR Fund Offi ce. 
The Consortium agreed to have its headquarters located in Montpellier, France, and initiated it formal 
establishment as an international organization, in addition to advancing the preparation of the SRF 
and the development of CRP proposals on other subjects.
In 2011, the Fund Council fully approved four CRP proposals, approved fi ve proposals 
with required revisions, and approved a proposal to maintain the genebanks until a long-term fi nanc-
ing arrangement was developed. The nine CRPs were on
 ■ maize;
 ■ forests, trees and agroforestry;
 ■ wheat;
 ■ meat, milk and fi sh;
 ■ aquatic agricultural systems;
 ■ policies, institutions and markets;
 ■ roots, tubers and bananas; 
 ■ agriculture for improved nutrition and health; and
 ■ water, land and ecosystems.
The following CRP proposals were also approved subject to some revisions:
 ■ dryland systems,
 ■ grain legumes, and
 ■ dryland cereals.
The Fund Council requested the resubmission of the remaining CRP proposal, on 
humid tropics systems, for consideration in early 2012. The SRF would therefore be implemented 
through a portfolio of 15 CRPs, each led by a CGIAR Center. 
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Thus, by the end of 2011, most of the bricks that make up the New CGIAR had 
been laid. On the Fund front, all the legal pieces needed to make it fully operational were completed 
and contributions to the Fund from 24 donors had reached $332 million by November, with total 
infl ows for the year expected to reach $425 million. Also, the process for establishing an indepen-
dent evaluation arrangement was suffi ciently advanced. There would be a single mechanism for 
evaluation in the system, particularly for CRPs, reporting to the Fund Council and staffed by a 
small group of professionals based at FAO, most likely co-located with the Independent Science 
and Partnership Council Secretariat. A new chair, Rachel Kyte, took over from Inger Andersen, 
who had been appointed to another vice-presidency at the World Bank. On the Consortium front, 
the agreement establishing the Consortium as an international organization was signed on 13 
September 2011 by France and Hungary, opening the way for other countries to join in signing. 
Governance Principles in the New CGIAR
The New CGIAR is built on a different organizational model than the old CGIAR. 
Two of the four principles of the old CGIAR, donor sovereignty and independent technical advice, 
have become less pronounced under the new arrangements, and one principle, decision-making 
by consensus, remains in force in the Fund Council but does not have the signifi cance it did in 
the old CGIAR. The fourth principle, Center autonomy, remains intact as a feature of the New 
CGIAR, though it is still unclear how arrangements for oversight and accountability will differ from 
those of the old CGIAR. 
In addition to center autonomy, the governance model of the New CGIAR is based 
on three other founding principles:
 ■ the separation of funders and doers,
 ■ the harmonization of research funding and implementation, and
 ■ managing for results.
It is too early to tell how well the system will be able adjust to these principles and 
how effectively they will be able to guide the New CGIAR. 
Drivers of Change
Major change efforts in the CGIAR over the 4 decades can be examined by 
using a well-known change formula that predicts organizational change initiatives to succeed only if 
D × V × F > R, where D is dissatisfaction with the status quo, V is vision of what is possible, F is the 
fi rst concrete steps that can be taken toward realizing that vision, and R is resistance to the change. 
Examining the CGIAR’s fi rst decade using this model shows that growth was 
possible partly because there was little dissatisfaction with the status quo, broad agreement 
on the vision to expand the network, and, supported by robust analysis from TAC, a donor community 
ready to take the fi rst steps to implement individual growth initiatives. As funding did not present 
a problem, and the global policy environment was supportive of the changes, there was little 
resistance to growth.
The expansion of the CGIAR from 13 to 18 Centers took place primarily because 
of strong push from donors, who were dissatisfi ed with the existing institutional set up and prepared 
to take the fi rst steps of facilitating the establishment or entry of new Centers with additional 
funding. Resistance came from existing Centers but was not strong enough to overcome the 
drive toward change.
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The two major change efforts that have taken place since 2000 had similar 
beginnings, as dissatisfaction was strong and there was an agreed vision and readiness to take the 
necessary fi rst steps. But there was stronger resistance to change in the decade’s fi rst reform initia-
tive than in the second. Also, the change processes used in the two instances differed signifi cantly. 
The steps taken in the most recent change initiative were almost textbook perfect and, as a result, 
yielded the most signifi cant organizational change in the CGIAR’s history.
The change formula can be used to analyze why some reform attempts did not 
work. In general, some of them were too early or radical for the system to digest, such as shifting to 
a programmatic approach, or there was stiff resistance from Centers or infl uential donors, such as 
during the many attempts to consolidate Centers.
Lessons Learned
The 4-decade experience of the CGIAR in building and sustaining a global science 
network has generated a number of lessons for the donor and scientifi c communities alike:
 ■ Organization. Finding the right balance between the differentiation and the integra-
tion of research has presented perhaps the greatest organizational challenge. 
The donor community was interested in an integrated system and created 
several mechanisms to facilitate integration among Centers. The mechanisms 
expanded over time as the system’s mission became more and more complex. 
As a result, the Centers’ freedom to operate was increasingly constrained as 
new system requirements were imposed. 
 ■ Structure. The existence of as many as fi ve “axes” in its organizing framework 
(such as commodity, region, service, policy and natural resources) lies at the core 
of the diffi culties the CGIAR faced in trying to come up with an optimal struc-
ture. Any reorganization of the Centers required, fi rst, an agreement to reduce, 
preferably to no more than two, the axes on which the new structure would be 
based, but a consensus view never surfaced because the forces favoring the 
status quo always turned out to be greater than those against. 
 ■ Funding. As sources for funding were fi nite and known to all, and Centers 
bore the responsibility to raise their own funds, there was intense compe-
tition among them. When demands from the CGIAR for greater integration 
of Centers increased, compliance with the requests became diffi cult in the 
absence of new and additional incentives such as a “system fund” to fi nance 
system activities.
 ■ Accountability. The key lesson on accountability is the need to assess each 
new evaluation activity comparing the added value of the information it would 
generate with the value of the research output that would be foregone.
 ■ Advisory bodies. Notwithstanding the individuals who chaired it, the leader-
ship role played by TAC in the system was not the same during the past 
2 decades, partly because leadership by donors and Centers began to be felt 
more strongly, and partly because the previous fi nancing arrangements that 
backed TAC recommendations were no longer in place.
 ■ Corporate governance. The CGIAR system began to closely follow developments 
in thinking on corporate and nonprofi t governance during its third decade. As a 
result, there was a visible transformation of Center boards from being advisory 
bodies to becoming governing bodies with the full fi duciary responsibilities 
expected of autonomous organizations. 
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Conclusions
In terms of value for money, the CGIAR has been the best investment for international 
development over the past 40 years. The donor community has placed a bet on the potential effective-
ness of an innovative institutional model based on the belief that science should be left to scientists, 
and the scientists left as little encumbered as possible. This model worked well when the system was 
small but began to show strains when it grew larger and the mission got more and more complex. 
Several attempts at reform were made to “fi x” the CGIAR, but most of them were 
evolutionary and did not generate the revolutionary change that was desired. When a revolutionary 
suggestion was made, it was dismissed because forces favoring the status quo were stronger than 
those against it. 
The New CGIAR presents a much-needed revolutionary change in the CGIAR. It 
is too early to tell whether this new model will succeed or not. But, like the founders of the original 
CGIAR, it maintains as a core principle protecting the independence of the scientist and the scien-
tifi c network that has evolved over 40 years as the backbone of the new programmatic thrust. This 
elevates the chances for its success. 
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INTRODUCTION
By all accounts, the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 
(CGIAR) has been one of the most successful and innovative global scientifi c initiatives over the past 
half century. It has had signifi cant impact on food production and productivity in developing countries, 
helping to reduce poverty, hunger and malnutrition. In addition, it has helped develop farming and 
resource management practices to ensure the continued sustainability of natural resources, contrib-
uted signifi cantly to building human and institutional capacity in the agricultural research systems 
of developing countries, and helped expand and conserve the genetic resource base of the most 
important food crops. 
Much has been written about the scientifi c achievements of CGIAR Centers and 
the collective CGIAR system. Few know much, however, about the evolution of the CGIAR as a system 
and its institutional features, governance principles and organizational aspects, particularly over the 
past 25 years. Warren Baum’s 1986 work on the CGIAR, Partners Against Hunger,1 provides a detailed 
account of the CGIAR’s evolution in its fi rst 15 years, but nothing similar covers the evolution of the 
CGIAR beyond 1985. This book aims to fi ll that void.
As its title suggests, the main focus of this study is on the institutional evolution 
of the CGIAR. The subject is the entire system, not the individual Centers. “System” here means the 
main components that make up the CGIAR: the Consultative Group of donors, international research 
Centers, advisory bodies, and institutions in developed and developing countries that partner with 
Centers. Developments in individual Centers are covered only to the extent that they have major impli-
cations systemwide, such as addition of new Centers, mergers, closures and major Center crises.
The institutional evolution of the CGIAR is viewed in the context of global develop-
ments, particularly when they infl uence the work of the CGIAR. Major changes in CGIAR strategy are 
discussed along with their institutional implications. The fi ndings of key studies on the impact of the 
Centers are summarized chronologically as they were published. With these topics as a backdrop, the 
thrust of the study remains on governance and organizational change at the system level. 
The principal sources for the study were the offi cial records of the CGIAR, including 
agenda documents for the CGIAR and the Technical Advisory Committee, Science Council and other 
CGIAR committees; major studies on and evaluations of the CGIAR; system-related documents of 
the Centers; and the personal memoirs of individuals familiar with the founding of the CGIAR. Baum’s 
Partners Against Hunger has served as the main source for 1971-80. The materials in the annex 
were drawn from the records available at the former CGIAR Secretariat, now the CGIAR Fund Offi ce. 
As in other studies of history, the events covered and analysis provided are from 
the viewpoint of the author and not necessarily of the CGIAR Fund Offi ce.  
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ON OCTOBER 30 1969, ROBERT MCNAMARA, PRESIDENT OF THE 
WORLD BANK, SENT TWO IDENTICAL LETTERS TO ADDEKE H. BOERMA, 
DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION 
(FAO), AND PAUL G. HOFFMAN, ADMINISTRATOR OF UNITED NATIONS 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP).2 THE LETTERS BEGAN:
I AM WRITING TO PROPOSE THAT THE FAO, THE UNDP AND THE 
WORLD BANK JOINTLY UNDERTAKE TO ORGANIZE A LONG-TERM 
PROGRAM OF SUPPORT FOR REGIONAL AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH 
INSTITUTES. I HAVE IN MIND SUPPORT NOT ONLY FOR SOME OF 
THE EXISTING INSTITUTES, INCLUDING THE FOUR NOW BEING 
SUPPORTED BY THE FORD AND ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATIONS, 
BUT ALSO, AS OCCASION PERMITS, FOR A NUMBER OF NEW ONES. H
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McNamara noted that the future fi nancing needs of the four institutes — the Inter-
national Rice Research Institute (IRRI), International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT 
by its Spanish abbreviation), International Institute of Tropical Agriculture, and International Center 
for Tropical Agriculture — were climbing beyond the capacity of the private foundations that estab-
lished them, and that there were a number of other fi elds, such as water management and livestock, 
in which well-organized research institutes could make important contributions to development. He 
explained his vision of the roles FAO, UNDP and the World Bank could play:
“The role which I envisage for our three agencies would not extend to active partici-
pation in the design or management of international research, although I would 
expect that we might be able to identify country or regional needs and priorities for 
research projects. I suggest, rather, that our role should be primarily to organize and 
administer a consortium, an international research fund or some other institutional 
mechanism, through which we could mobilize, on a long-term continuing basis, the 
resources required to maintain the existing institutions we decide to support and to 
develop new ones. Although I would hope that each of our agencies could make a 
contribution, fi nancial or technical, to this effort, we would have to look primarily to 
interested donor governments and foundations for a major share of the funding.”
Boerma and Hoffman accepted McNamara’s proposal in principle, paving the way 
to establishing what later became the CGIAR, with FAO, UNDP and the World Bank as its cosponsors. 
McNamara’s ideas of a “consortium” and “an international research fund” would come to fruition 40 
years later, with decisions made by the CGIAR at its business meeting in 2009. The term “consulta-
tive group” was preferred over “consortium” then because it was seen as being less formal in terms 
of commitments by donors.3
McNamara’s invitation to Boerma and Hoffman refl ected the culmination of discus-
sions that had been taking place in their respective agencies following the enthusiasm generated at a 
conference on agricultural development all three had attended 6 months earlier at the Villa Serbelonni 
in Bellagio, Italy, hosted by the Rockefeller Foundation (later dubbed as the First Bellagio Conference). 
In addition to the three, the conference brought together top offi cials from major aid organizations, 
regional development banks, countries and private foundations. The focus was on agricultural devel-
opment and the need for fi nancial assistance for institutions at the international, regional and national 
level. The promise of new technologies was widely accepted and the achievements of the existing 
international institutes recognized. McNamara mentioned the possibility of forming a consortium to 
raise funds for new technologies, which was seconded by John Hannah, administrator of the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID), who added that the United States government 
would consider providing up to 25% of the amount that would be raised. The conference concluded 
with a decision to hold a follow-up conference a year later to consider background studies on promis-
ing approaches to be developed in the interim.
Three more Bellagio meetings preceded the establishment of the CGIAR. Bellagio II 
brought together technical specialists and offi cials of development assistance organizations and identi-
fi ed priority areas of research on which feasibility studies were to be conducted. The heads of agencies 
assembled a second time at Bellagio III, on 8-9 April 1970, to discuss and agree on the parameters 
of the consultative group. Bellagio IV, which actually took place in New York on 3-4 December 1970, 
discussed the fi ve feasibility studies commissioned at Bellagio III, four prepared by the foundations 
and one by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) of Canada. One of the studies, for 
an institute on semi-arid tropics in Asia, was found to be suffi ciently advanced to move forward. The 
other four needed more work, which the soon-to-be-established CGIAR later pursued.
Much debate and discussion were needed within the World Bank to convince its 
board of the role the institution could play in the consultative group and of the investments it would 
make from the World Bank’s net income. Similar debates took place within and among the other two 
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cosponsoring agencies and potential donors about governance arrangements for the new consulta-
tive group. The debated issues included whether the World Bank or FAO should take the leadership 
role, the cosponsoring agencies should serve as an “executive committee,” and donor funds should 
be pooled. Participants asked how a loose consultative group could ensure the policy and fi nancing 
stability needed for long-term research and developing countries could best participate in the new 
group. They considered what the role of the foundations should be in managing the institutes. At the 
end, within 2 years of the First Bellagio Conference, a consensus view on the way forward emerged 
and the scene was set for the fi rst consultative group meeting.
The First Meeting of the CGIAR
A preparatory meeting held at the World Bank in January 1971 preceded the 
formal fi rst meeting, held on 19 May 1971. The preparatory meeting considered the paper Possible 
Objectives, Composition, and Organizational Structure of an International Agricultural Research 
Consultative Group prepared by the World Bank and agreed to forward a revised version to the fi rst 
meeting. Six delegations, in addition to the three cosponsors, indicated that they were ready to join 
the soon-to-be-established Consultative Group: the United Kingdom, United States, IDRC, and Ford, 
Rockefeller and Kellogg foundations. 
The fi rst meeting was attended by 28 delegations, as had been the preparatory 
meeting, of which 17 expressed their readiness to become members of the Consultative Group, the newest 
expressions, following the January meeting, coming from Canada, Denmark, France, West Germany, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, the African Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. The 
remaining 9 delegations attended as observers. The Group considered the revised paper on the organi-
zation of the CGIAR and, at the end of the meeting, adopted a resolution on the objectives, composition 
and organizational structure of the CGIAR. The main objectives of the Group were to 
 ■ examine the agricultural research needs of developing countries and consider 
how they could be met;
 ■ attempt to ensure maximum complementarity in fi nancing and undertaking 
agricultural research through international, regional and national efforts;
 ■ consider fi nancing international and regional research it considered high priority;
 ■ undertake a continuing review of priorities for agricultural research related to 
the needs of developing countries; and
 ■ suggest feasibility studies of specifi c proposals and exchange information on 
the results.4
The chair and the secretary of the Group would be provided by the World Bank. 
In addition to the agencies agreeing to join the CGIAR as members, fi ve governments representing 
developing country regions of FAO would be designated to participate in the meetings of the Group 
as members for 2 years to ensure that the deliberations of the CGIAR included voices from develop-
ing countries. 
An independent technical advisory committee (TAC) would be created, with half 
its members from developed countries and the other half from developing countries. TAC would (1) 
advise the Group on gaps and priorities in agricultural research, (2) recommend to the Group feasibility 
studies, (3) recommend action to the Group based on the results of the feasibility studies, (4) advise 
the Group on the effectiveness of existing research programs, and (5) encourage the creation of an 
international network of research institutions. The chair and members of TAC would be appointed by 
the Group, and its secretary would be provided by FAO.
The Group accepted the proposed terms of reference and composition of TAC 
and selected Sir John Crawford as its fi rst chair. Crawford, an economist, was the vice-chancellor of 
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Australian National University in Canberra and had been serving as advisor to McNamara at the World 
Bank. He had a distinguished record of service in Australia for which he was knighted in 1959. The 
TAC led by Crawford would play a prominent role in shaping the rapid growth of the CGIAR in its fi rst 
5 years. Crawford would later serve also as the chair of the inaugural board of the International Food 
Policy Research Institute, which would become the 12th Center to be admitted to the CGIAR during 
the decade. 
Along with Crawford, 11 candidates nominated by the cosponsors were appointed 
by the Group: George Harrar, president of the Rockefeller Foundation and one of the founding fathers 
of the fi rst four research centers; David Hopper, president of the IDRC and later the fourth chair of 
the CGIAR; and MS Swaminathan, director of the Indian Agricultural Research Institute and known 
as the father of Green Revolution in India. Swaminathan would later serve the CGIAR in various other 
capacities: director general of IRRI, member of the Third System Review panel and chair of the 
CGIAR’s Genetic Resources Policy Committee. He received the World Food Prize in 1987 and was 
named among Time magazine’s 20 most infl uential Asians of the 20th Century.
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Children for Happiness
Several famines around the world during the period 1940-60 served as the backdrop to 
the creation of the CGIAR. The Rockefeller and Ford foundations’ establishment of IRRI 
in the Philippines and CIMMYT in Mexico presaged the birth of what was christened by 
William Gaud in 1968 as the Green Revolution. This led in turn to the organization of the 
CGIAR, which became a bright, affi rming fl ame in the midst of the sea of despair prevailing 
at that time. I was fortunate to have been associated from the beginning with this unique 
organization committed to applying the best of science to solving the problems of hunger 
and malnutrition. 
Much has been done during the past 40 years, but there is no time to relax, as new 
challenges like climate change threaten sustainable food security. Marquis de Condorcet, 
a contemporary of Thomas Malthus, expressed the view that the population would stabilize 
if children were born for happiness and not just for existence. As the fi rst requisite for child 
happiness is adequate nutrition, the CGIAR should have as its mandate during the next 40 
years the goals of achieving “children for happiness” and “food for all and forever.” This 
would fulfi ll the hopes of the CGIAR’s founders.
MS Swaminathan
Vice-Chair, CGIAR Technical Advisory Committee; Director General, International Rice Research Institute; 
Chair, CGIAR Genetic Resources Policy Committee and several study teams and review panels
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Norman Borlaug
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The Centers That Started It All
The establishment of the CGIAR entailed transferring nominal “ownership” of the 
four existing research institutes from the Ford and Rockefeller foundations to a larger investor group. 
The two foundations were in a sense “going public” with their investment, driven by fi nancial need. 
Each foundation was investing $3 million a year in the four institutes, but this fell way short of their 
funding needs. Their combined core budgets amounted to $10 million in 1971, projected to rise to 
$16 million by 1975.5 
The new donors had suffi cient evidence about the potential development payoff 
of their investments. In 1970, IRRI and CIMMYT had shared the United Nations Education, Scien-
tifi c and Cultural Organization prize for science. The same year Norman Borlaug, who led CIMMYT’s 
wheat program, had won the Nobel Peace Prize. These prizes recognized the achievements of IRRI 
and CIMMYT, together with their partners in developing countries, in developing higher-yielding crops 
that brought record harvests and averted famine in Asia in the late 1960s and early 1970s. New wheat 
varieties distributed to farmers in 1961 doubled Mexican wheat yields in 7 years, making Mexico self-
suffi cient in wheat by 1969.6 Wheat production in Pakistan rose from 3.9 tons in 1966 to 7.1 tons in 
1971. Within 10 years following their introduction, new wheat varieties covered 60% of the wheat area 
of India and Pakistan and enjoyed similar adoption rates in other wheat-growing countries. 
There were similar successes in rice. IR8, the fi rst short-statured, or semi-dwarf, 
high-yielding rice variety, released by IRRI in 1966, quickly spread throughout the rice-growing areas 
of Asia. “After fi ve years they [high-yielding varieties] were planted on 10 percent of the rice area in 
Indonesia and India, 25 percent in Pakistan and Malaysia and 43 percent in the Philippines,” reported 
the United States Department of Agriculture in 1978. “By 1974/75 they covered almost 30 percent 
of India’s rice land, 40 percent of Indonesia’s, Malaysia’s and Pakistan’s and about 65 percent of 
the Philippines.”7 CIMMYT, IRRI and their partners in the national programs of these countries were 
credited with launching the Green Revolution in Asia. 
The roots of CIMMYT go back to the Mexico-Rockefeller Foundation International 
Agriculture Program, set up in 1943. George Harrar, who later became president of the Rockefeller 
Foundation, led a team of scientists including Norman Borlaug and Edward Wellhausen in the Mexico 
program, which focused primarily on increasing the production of beans, maize, wheat and potatoes; 
soil management and crop protection; and improving the productivity of farm animals. Progress was 
slow at fi rst, but Borlaug’s persistence paid off. He and his colleagues were able to produce a new, 
short-statured wheat variety in 1955 by incorporating semi-dwarfi ng genes that had originated in 
Japan. This led to the release of the fi rst semi-dwarf Mexican wheat varieties 7 years later.
When Harrar moved to New York to take on new responsibilities for the foundation, 
he and his director, Warren Weaver, began exploring new ideas for agricultural development in Asia. 
One of them was to establish an international rice research institute. The original concept was for the 
foundation to provide the funds for building the institute and for the major rice-producing countries in 
Asia to meet its operating costs. When the latter proposition did not fi nd favor in Asia, Harrar began 
to explore other means of fi nancial support. 
This saw the entrance of the Ford Foundation, which had resources and had been 
active in Asia, mainly with rural- and community-development projects, not with biological science. 
Forest “Frosty” Hill, a Canadian economist at Cornell University, had joined Ford in 1955 as a vice 
president. Hill was convinced that a barrier to rural and community development in Asia was the lack 
of appropriate technology. As he had become acquainted with Harrar during their daily commute 
to New York on the same train, he knew of Rockefeller’s plans regarding rice and offered a partner-
ship in which the Rockefeller Foundation would provide operating funds and scientifi c expertise and 
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the Ford Foundation would provide capital. The boards of both foundations approved the proposal, 
and Robert Chandler, former president of the University of New Hampshire, was asked to set up the 
new institute in the Philippines. Both Harrar and Hill were on the fi rst board of IRRI, with Harrar as 
chair. The institute was recognized by Philippine authorities as an international organization in 1960. 
Chandler began to assemble the scientifi c staff and develop the research program that eventually 
produced IR8 and the varieties that succeeded it.
Although the international research effort on wheat and maize had existed long 
before that on rice, the programs had not been placed in a separate institutional setting, as was the 
case for rice and IRRI. The push to house the wheat and maize programs in an institute came from 
Mexican President Adolfo Lopez Mateos after he visited IRRI in 1962 and saw the product of the 
Rockefeller-Ford partnership. This catalyzed the founding of CIMMYT in 1963 as a cooperative program 
between the Rockefeller Foundation and the government of Mexico, which was reconstituted in 1966 
to make it an international center modeled on IRRI. The Rockefeller Foundation provided the funds 
for the new facilities and shared operating costs with the Ford Foundation. Rockefeller Foundation 
staff in Mexico, including Borlaug and Wellhausen, constituted the nucleus of the scientifi c team.
The successes in wheat and rice encouraged the Rockefeller and Ford foundations 
to expand their partnership to other commodities and regions of the world. Their next joint initiative 
was the establishment of the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) in Ibadan, Nigeria. 
Unlike the cases of IRRI and CIMMYT, this time the primary focus was on an ecological zone — the 
humid lowland tropics of Africa — with associated research on several food crops: cowpea, pigeon 
pea, sweet potato, yam, cassava, and, in cooperation with CIMMYT and IRRI, maize and rice. Financ-
ing arrangements were also somewhat different from those of IRRI and CIMMYT. This time, the Ford 
Foundation was to provide capital costs, with the two foundations sharing operating costs. IITA was 
formally established in 1967 by Nigerian government decree, and the research program got going in 
1970 under the directorship of Herbert Albrecht, former president of North Dakota State University.
The last pre-CGIAR institute established by the two foundations was the Interna-
tional Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT by its Spanish abbreviation) in Cali, Colombia. The concept 
for CIAT was similar to that of IITA, with the primary focus on the lowland tropics of the Americas and 
research on a number of commodities and subjects that were narrowed, over time, to beans, cassava, 
rice and tropical pasture. As the Rockefeller Foundation had been running a cooperative program in 
Colombia since 1950, it took responsibility for establishing the Center through an agreement with the 
Colombian government in 1967 and provided CIAT’s initial staff, with Ulysses Grant as its fi rst direc-
tor. The Rockefeller Foundation provided capital costs and operating costs from 1966 to 1969. The 
Ford Foundation began to share the fi nancing of CIAT’s operating costs in 1969. 
Thus, when the CGIAR was established in 1971, two of the four international insti-
tutes, CIMMYT and IRRI, had a considerable track record of achievements and the other two, IITA and 
CIAT, had barely gotten underway. The challenge for the new donor partnership was to broaden the 
research network to include other priority research initiatives in the context of an overall global vision.
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THE CGIAR’S FIRST DECADE WITNESSED GROWTH IN SEVERAL AREAS. 
NINE NEW CENTERS WERE ADDED TO THE INITIAL FOUR, BRINGING 
THE TOTAL TO 13. THE NUMBER OF DONORS INCREASED FROM 
THE 17 THAT ATTENDED THE INAUGURAL MEETING IN 1971 TO 29 
IN 1980, BRINGING TOTAL INVESTMENT IN THE CENTERS FROM 
$21 MILLION IN 1972 TO $141 MILLION BY THE END OF THE DECADE. 
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This fast growth of investment in agricultural research was boosted in part by 
favorable developments in support to agriculture within development assistance agencies. In his 
address to the Board of Governors of the World Bank at their meeting in Nairobi in 1973, McNamara 
had announced a major policy shift toward assisting smallholder farmers in developing countries 
through comprehensive rural development programs. The World Bank was to increase its lending 
to agriculture to $4.4 billion over 1974-79 from $3.1 billion during the previous 5 years, with 70% 
of loans for agriculture containing a smallholder component. McNamara had identifi ed support to 
agricultural research and the work of the CGIAR as essential to this new strategy.8
TAC played a key role in guiding the process of identifying new areas for CGIAR 
investment. At its fi rst meeting it took stock of other existing international agricultural research 
programs run by France, the United Kingdom and the United States or coordinated by the Organi-
zation of American States and FAO and identifi ed gaps in agricultural research geared toward 
developing countries: rainfed crops (including millet and sorghum), food legumes, animal health 
and animal production in tropical Africa, water use and management, rice development in West 
Africa, potato improvement in Latin America, and vegetable production in Asia. Also identifi ed as 
priorities were research on agricultural systems in arid and semi-arid areas, grassland and range 
management, livestock production in Southeast Asia and other regions of the wetter tropics, 
rodent control, multiple cropping, the socioeconomic and environmental implications of new 
agricultural technologies, and the development of an agricultural information system for develop-
ing countries.9 These topics were discussed in detail in successive meetings, using background 
studies conducted by top experts in each fi eld. Each proposal was reviewed with care to establish 
the value it would add to the existing set of institutions. For example, reports Baum, “aquacul-
ture (fi sheries) was considered eleven times, vegetables nine times, and the water buffalo seven 
times during the period 1971-76.”10
TAC prepared three strategy papers during the decade. The fi rst, endorsed 
by the Group in 1973, identifi ed as top priorities for the CGIAR the cereals rice, maize, wheat, 
barley and millet; food legumes beans, peas and lentils; and starchy crops potato and cassava. 
Ruminant livestock, in particular cattle, and rangeland improvement occupied the next rung down 
on the ladder of priorities. 
The number of Centers grew the most quickly during the CGIAR’s fi rst 5 years, 
which coincided with Crawford’s term as TAC chair. The fi rst new Center established by the CGIAR 
was the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT). A proposal for 
establishing it had been discussed at Bellagio III and considered ready to move forward. Follow-
ing endorsement from TAC, the Group appointed the Ford Foundation to act as the “executing 
agency” to establish ICRISAT. An advisory group mostly of donors interested in supporting the 
Center provided oversight on behalf of the Group and set up a fund to fi nance the establishment 
effort. A memorandum of understanding was signed with the government of India, which would 
be the host country, granting the Center recognition under the United Nations Immunities and 
Privileges Act. In addition, the constitution of the new Center was signed by representatives of 
the three cosponsoring agencies of the CGIAR11 in a process that differed from the establishment 
of the fi rst four institutes and refl ecting the added value of the international umbrella provided 
by the CGIAR’s cosponsors. 
Not all of the Centers brought under the CGIAR umbrella were established by 
the CGIAR. A center for researching potato was in early stages of development in Peru and added 
to the CGIAR in 1973. The International Potato Center (CIP by its Spanish abbreviation) had been 
built around the potato research program funded by USAID and carried out by North Carolina 
State University. As the board of CIP had only Peruvian and American members, TAC questioned 
its internationality. In response, CIP modifi ed its bylaws to enable the inclusion of three CGIAR-
nominated individuals on the board. Later, this practice became a norm in all CGIAR Centers.
Risk-taking Pledge
I was fortunate to be closely involved with the CGIAR system during its fi rst 35 years. This 
started in April 1972, when I was detailed from the International Agricultural Development 
Service of United States Department of Agriculture to the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) to serve as the agricultural economist in its Offi ce for Program and 
Policy Coordination. Matters relating to the new CGIAR came under my purview, and the 
more I saw, the more interested I became, leading to my move to the Offi ce of Agriculture.
The CGIAR was of great interest to the USAID at the highest levels, at which there were some 
remarkable and forward-looking individuals, starting with John Hannah, the USAID administrator; 
Joel Bernstein; and later Curtis Farrar. Years later, Robert McNamara stated in a conversation 
at the 2004 CGIAR meeting in Mexico City that he thought Hannah was the real risk-taker, 
having pledged that USAID would provide up to 25% of total funding for the Group. 
This proviso proved very useful in the halcyon early years of rapid growth, to the point that 
one worried USAID budget offi cer asked me if we would be willing to settle for a maximum 
contribution of $50 million. I said that it should be adequate. Subsequent administrations 
felt differently, though USAID remained the largest donor from 1971 to 1990, even leaving 
aside special projects sponsored separately by its regional bureaus and country missions. 
Over time, crises and shifting emphases made the funding of the CGIAR and special projects, 
particularly the latter, much more tenuous.
The World Bank has played a remarkable role in the CGIAR from the beginning, one that 
Jock Anderson and I reviewed in a 1999 report titled The World Bank, the Grant Program, 
and the CGIAR: A Retrospective Review 41.
Dana G. Dalrymple
Member, United States delegation to the CGIAR; Chair or member of several CGIAR study & review teams
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Addressing Germplasm Conservation
TAC was aware that successful crop improvement depended on the effective use 
of genetic diversity. This meant that the erosion of existing diversity should be prevented by conserv-
ing existing genetic material and adding to it. At its fi rst meeting, TAC asked the FAO to prepare a 
paper showing what was needed to preserve and disseminate information on existing seed collections 
around the world and a system of coordination and control to facilitate exchanges. Papers by Sir Otto 
Frankel; MS Swaminathan, member and vice-chair of TAC; and FAO guided the initial discussions. 
It was unclear whether this matter was within the purview of the CGIAR and not that of FAO. TAC 
recommended creating a working group of eminent plant geneticists and breeders to formulate recom-
mendations for international action. A similar sentiment was expressed at the United Nations Confer-
ence on the Human Environment in 1972, which called for an international program for conserving 
the germplasm of tropical and subtropical crops.12 A workshop convened under Frankel’s leadership 
proposed the creation of a “program” to (1) support regional and national institutions in locations of 
genetic diversity, (2) create nine regional genetic resources centers and a series of crop-specifi c centers 
(made up mainly of the international centers), and (3) appoint a coordinating committee and staff. 
TAC endorsed the main elements of the proposal. The sticky issue was whether this effort should be 
an expansion of FAO’s existing programs or pursued through an independent coordinating commit-
tee. FAO fi nally agreed to an arrangement whereby the program would be under CGIAR auspices but 
located at FAO headquarters.13 
Thus was born the International Board for Plant Genetic Resources (IBPGR), not 
a research organization but a service organization to promote and assist in the collection and conser-
vation of plant genetic resources. It consisted of a 14-member board supported by a small secretariat 
based at FAO in Rome. Richard Demuth, who had been instrumental in establishing the CGIAR and 
served as its fi rst chair in 1971-73, was appointed as the fi rst chair of IBPGR in 1974. 
The second organization added to the CGIAR in 1974 that was not a Center was 
the West Africa Rice Development Association (WARDA). This time, the CGIAR agreed to provide 
support to only the research activities of WARDA, consisting of coordinated fi eld trials in West Africa. 
The CGIAR support was for a program, not for the entire intergovernmental organization of 16 member 
states. Strongly advocated by Crawford, this support was seen as an effective means of transferring 
new rice technologies from IRRI, IITA and France’s Institute for Research in Tropical Agriculture to 
rice-growing countries in West Africa.
These two outlier models of support did not last. The “board with a secretariat” 
model of IBPGR was abandoned in favor of a freestanding international Center like the others, called 
the International Plant Genetic Resources Institute (IPGRI) and based in Rome, with a broadened 
mandate to conduct research as well as provide services. In the case of WARDA, the fi nancial diffi -
culties faced by the organization in the 1980s prompted the CGIAR to broaden its support from one 
program to the entire organization, with some major changes in its governance and management, but 
maintaining the intergovernmental nature of the apex body. IPGRI later adopted the name Bioversity 
International and WARDA became the Africa Rice Center.
The next three Centers established during the fi rst 5 years were the two livestock 
Centers — the International Laboratory on Research on Animal Diseases (ILRAD) and the Interna-
tional Livestock Center for Africa (ILCA) — and the regional International Center for Agriculture in the 
Dry Areas (ICARDA). ILRAD and ILCA were seen as a double-barreled attack on livestock problems 
in Africa: a laboratory working on key diseases and a center devoted to increasing the productivity of 
livestock production systems, to be managed by a single board. This did not work in practice. ILRAD 
was established quickly in Kenya by the Rockefeller Foundation in 1973. ILCA’s establishment faced 
many more hurdles, three key ones being an unclear concept, political upheaval in Ethiopia and the 
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World Bank’s inexperience as the executing agency for establishing a center. In the end, ILCA was 
established as a separate institution in 1975. It took the CGIAR close to 20 years to bring these two 
Centers under unifi ed management.
ICARDA’s establishment was also affected by political upheaval. It was originally 
intended to be established in Syria, Lebanon and Iran, but plans for the latter two countries had to 
be dropped because of civil war in Lebanon and the toppling of the government in Iran. The IDRC, 
acting as the executing agency, and the three cosponsors signed the ICARDA charter in 1975. The 
agreement with Syria was signed the following year. While a promising new CGIAR Center was born, 
the overlaps between its mandate and those of other CGIAR Centers, notably CIMMYT and ICRISAT, 
plagued the system for many years.
Establishing Mechanisms for Oversight 
In addition to establishing new Centers, the CGIAR was occupied with getting its 
house in order. With a new chair, Warren Baum, at the helm it began to examine how the Group could 
best provide oversight to the entire enterprise. David Bell, executive vice president of the Ford Founda-
tion, led a small task force to design a program-and-budget review and a monitoring-and-evaluation 
framework. This task force’s report, adopted by the Group in 1974, served as its basic review mecha-
nism, with minor modifi cations, throughout its history. The framework included annual discussion of 
the programs and budgets of each Center, internally commissioned reviews by the Centers themselves, 
periodic external reviews of Centers mounted by the Group, periodic reviews of the system as a whole, 
and special “stripe reviews” of activities across Centers.
Accordingly, TAC commissioned the fi rst external, quinquennial reviews of IRRI, led by 
MS Swaminathan, and CIMMYT, led by Ralph Riley, of the Plant Breeding Institute in Cambridge, United 
Kingdom. Both reviews confi rmed the excellence of the Centers’ work and made some recommenda-
tions. The Group devoted considerable time at its autumn 1976 meeting to the reviews. It became clear 
that, in addition to advice to the boards of the Centers, the reviews provided reassurance to donors that 
their investments were being used effectively by these institutions. With these two reviews, the CGIAR 
started its tradition of having external reviews of each Center conducted at 5-year intervals.
Another Bell task force recommendation called for periodic reviews of the CGIAR. 
Rather than appointing an external team, the Group chose to conduct the review through a commit-
tee refl ecting the views of donors, Centers and TAC, assisted by a full-time external study team. Alex 
McCalla, economist at the University of California Davis, was invited to serve as the director of the 
4-person study team. McCalla would later play other prominent roles in the CGIAR as member and 
chair of TAC, cosponsor representative, and board chair of CIMMYT.
The fi rst system review endorsed the CGIAR’s strategic directions but cautioned 
against further expansion and made a number of observations and recommendations on a few strate-
gic questions faced by the Group. It clarifi ed the Groups’ mission as being “to support research and 
technology development that can potentially increase food production in the food defi cit countries 
of the world.”14 Some recommendations of the study team, such as the creation of a Group “standby 
committee,” or executive committee, and the merger of the two secretariats into one, did not fi nd favor 
with the review committee or the Group.
Second Half of the Decade
The second half of the decade was much slower-paced than the fi rst. The Group 
approached the addition of new centers with a great deal of caution. Two Centers that were outside the 
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CGIAR umbrella, the Asian Vegetable Research and Development Center (AVRDC) and the International 
Fertilizer Development Center (IFDC) received associate status but no commitment for inclusion in the 
CGIAR. Similarly, there was reluctance in the Group to establish a new center on the much-needed 
topic of global food policy research, which did not stop three members, the IDRC and Rockefeller and 
Ford foundations, from proceeding with the establishment of an International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI), with Sir John Crawford as its fi rst board chair and its initial funding coming from the 
three sponsoring donors. The CGIAR provisionally gave IFPRI the same associate status as AVRDC 
and IFDC as TAC reviewed IFPRI’s application for admission to the CGIAR. IFPRI’s location in Washing-
ton, DC, was a major stumbling block for admission to the CGIAR, according to some donors, who 
preferred locating it in a developing country. In the end, the Group approved admission and IFPRI 
began receiving funding from the CGIAR in 1980, 2 years after its establishment.
The last Center the CGIAR established during its fi rst decade was the International 
Service for National Agricultural Research (ISNAR), which was promoted by a group of European donors 
with the aim of strengthening national research systems. A CGIAR task force led by Richard Demuth 
recommended creating such a service to work in partnership with FAO and other organizations. The 
German Agency for International Cooperation (GTZ by its German abbreviation) acted as the execut-
ing agency. A European city, The Hague in the Netherlands, was chosen as its headquarters, which 
balanced the North American location of IFPRI. The new Center began operations in 1980 and was 
phased out in 2004 because of performance problems.   
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Widening Focus of CGIAR Research
At its establishment, the CGIAR’s main focus was on increasing food production, 
and its research strategy was mainly to generate high-yielding crop varieties. The focus was thus on 
seed and the fi eld on which it was grown. While crop improvement remained the principal focus, 
attention began to be paid as well to the context of the farm on which the crop was to grow and the 
farmer who grew it. A farming systems approach meant examining production from the perspective 
of the farmer and the soil, water, climate, insect pest, disease and socioeconomic conditions under 
which the crop was produced. IRRI was the fi rst Center to take this holistic approach through its Asian 
Cropping Systems Network and on-farm studies. Similarly, IITA began to emphasize land manage-
ment systems to identify crops that could best take advantage of available land resources. Of its four 
programs, three focused on crop improvement and the fourth on farming systems research. ICRISAT, 
the fi rst Center to be established by the CGIAR, started with a mandate that was, in part, “to develop 
farming systems which will help increase and stabilize agricultural production through better use of 
natural, human and capital resources in the seasonally dry, semi-arid tropics.”15 As water is the most 
constraining factor for agriculture in ICRISAT’s region, watershed management and water harvesting 
were major pillars of its farming systems research. A TAC-commissioned review of farming systems 
research found that, aside from these three Centers, ICARDA and ILCA had a “center-wide commit-
ment to following a farming systems philosophy in all program activities.”16 An important by-product 
of the Centers’ heightened attention to research on crop management and farming systems was the 
transfer of these methodologies to partner research institutions in developing countries, as much of 
this research was done in collaboration with them.
In addition to the widening focus of Centers’ research, the decade witnessed the 
expansion of CGIAR-supported activities from crop-based research to research on livestock and to 
broader factors that could constrain agricultural production, such as misguided agricultural policies, 
undeveloped capacity in national agricultural research systems, and the unavailability and inaccessi-
bility of genetic resources. This was the approach the CGIAR used, led by robust analyses conducted 
by its TAC, to mount a frontal and multifaceted attack on problems constraining agricultural produc-
tion in developing countries.
Initial Findings on Impact
As the CGIAR neared the end of its fi rst decade, the impact of its work attracted 
growing interest. By this time, IRRI and CIMMYT had been in existence long enough to show impact, 
but it would have been premature to expect the same from the other Centers. A study by Grant 
Scobie of North Carolina State University showed that by 1978 over one-third of the area devoted to 
rice and wheat in developing countries was sown to high-yielding varieties, which amounted to 55 
million hectares. “Moreover, adoption of new varieties was continuing to expand at about 4.5 million 
hectares a year.”17 As these achievements began to be noticed globally, the CGIAR itself was also being 
recognized. In 1980 the Group was awarded the King Baudouin International Development Prize for 
its “contribution to the qualitative and quantitative improvement of food production in the world.” The 
prize included a cash award of $50,000, which the CGIAR used to present its own King Baudouin 
Award biannually to one of its Centers for outstanding research.
20
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AFTER RAPID GROWTH IN ITS FIRST DECADE, THE CGIAR STARTED 
ITS SECOND DECADE WITH A MAJOR STOCKTAKING EXERCISE IN THE 
FORM OF A SYSTEM REVIEW. THE GROUP WAS DISCOVERING HOW 
BEST TO OVERSEE A 13-CENTER RESEARCH SYSTEM AND FINE-TUNING 
ITS MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE, BUDGETING, MONITORING AND 
EVALUATION. AT THE SAME TIME, IT WAS KEEPING ABREAST OF GLOBAL 
DEVELOPMENTS AND, WITH THE GUIDANCE OF TAC, ADJUSTING ITS 
STRATEGY TO ENSURE THAT IT REMAINED RELEVANT AND EFFECTIVE. 
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mended by an independent commission on international development issues led by Willy Brandt, former 
chancellor of West Germany. Brandt had been called on by McNamara to lead what became known 
as the Brandt Commission or the North-South Commission. The report of 21-member commission 
offered a vision of a more interdependent world and called for a signifi cant transfer of resources from 
the North to the South. Rich countries were asked to increase their offi cial development assistance 
(ODA) to 0.7% of their gross national product by 1985 and to 1.0% by 2000 — goals that have proven 
to be elusive except in a few developed countries. Relevant to the mission of the CGIAR, the commis-
sion called for reducing absolute poverty in the poverty belts of Africa and Asia during the 1980s and 
increasing food output in low-income, food-importing developing countries during the 1980s.18 Later 
in the decade, these global priorities would be refl ected in the CGIAR agenda through, for example, 
the expansion of the system’s focus on sub-Saharan Africa. 
Another major development that affected the CGIAR was the creation of the Commis-
sion on Plant Genetic Resources by the FAO General Assembly in 1983 and the adoption of the Inter-
national Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (PGRFA). This nonbinding 
agreement, which later paved the way to an international treaty, recognized that PGRFA were the 
“common heritage” of humankind and called for creating a coordinated network of ex situ collec-
tions of PGRFA.19 FAO recognized the leading role of IBPGR on the scientifi c and technical aspects of 
plant genetic resources. Some countries did not subscribe to the undertaking because of ambiguities 
concerning intellectual property rights — an issue that would be clarifi ed later in the decade through 
further resolutions by the FAO Council providing interpretations of the undertaking and recognizing 
national sovereignty over PGRFA. 
The Second System Review
The second system review was conducted in 1981, true to the commitment made 
in 1976 to conduct reviews at 5-year intervals. As with the fi rst review, a special review committee 
headed by Warren Baum oversaw the effort, assisted by a study team. Michael Arnold of the Plant 
Breeding Institute in Cambridge led the team. As did his predecessor, Alex McCalla, who led the study 
team of the fi rst review, Arnold would later serve the system as a member of TAC and would make 
signifi cant contributions to thinking on the system’s evolution.
The second review did not suggest any major changes in strategy. It stressed 
the importance of training, networking and collaboration with national agricultural research systems 
(NARS) and encouraged the CGIAR to address research questions associated with factors of produc-
tion through multidisciplinary research on commodities, rather than by setting up new institutes on 
soils, fertilizer, water, etc. This was an important recommendation as it established a guiding principle 
on the appropriate mix of independent research centers under the CGIAR umbrella. 
The second review’s conservative approach to expanding the system to include 
institutes working on factors of production had been tested earlier by the Group in considering the 
membership application of the International Center for Insect Physiology and Ecology (ICIPE) based in 
Nairobi, which was funded by some of the same donors included in the CGIAR. The Group was split 
on the issue but, in the end, arrived at a solution that kept ICIPE outside the CGIAR as an associated 
center but provided it with some support through the World Bank, outside the CGIAR window. In a 
second case, involving irrigation management, the Group followed the advice of the second review, 
despite the high priority TAC accorded to water management. It encouraged interested donors to 
establish such an institute outside the CGIAR, which was done through the leadership of the Ford 
Foundation. The International Irrigation Management Institute (IIMI) began to operate in Sri Lanka in 
1984 (and was brought under the CGIAR umbrella in 1990).
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ment matters, such as preparing 5-year rolling plans, initiating periodic management reviews of Centers, 
and clarifying the roles and duties of trustees that serve on boards.
The CGIAR endorsed all of the review panel’s recommendations except one that 
called for establishing a “budget review committee.” Like similar recommendations brought before 
donors earlier, such as the cosponsors serving as an executive committee and creating a “standby 
committee,” the rejection of this recommendation refl ected, once again, donors’ unwillingness to 
delegate decision-making power to a smaller group.
The CGIAR’s longest-serving chair, Warren Baum, retired at the end of 1983. 
Over his 10-year chairmanship, the number of Centers increased from 7 to 13 and of donors from 
20 to 35, as their contributions increasing from $35 million to $165 million. The Group awarded him 
the title “chairman emeritus” at his retirement, recognizing his many contributions to the growth and 
stability of the system.
Focus on Governance, Finance and Communication
The next two chairs to follow Baum made their marks on the system in two differ-
ent spheres. Shahid Husain, a Pakistani who served from 1984 to 1987, aimed to bring clarity to 
the performance and accountability of Centers and their boards, which was a theme highlighted in 
the second system review. A team was tasked to develop guidelines for Center boards. The report of 
T
h
e
 C
G
IA
R
 a
t 
4
0
24
1
9
8
1
-9
0
: 
S
to
c
k
ta
k
in
g
 a
n
d
 A
d
ju
s
tm
e
n
t the team, prepared by Lowell Hardin, on the roles, responsibilities and accountability of the Center 
boards was endorsed by the Group. Although each Center board had its own bylaws and rules of 
procedure, this was the fi rst time the Group adopted a collective set of principles and guidelines. 
Husain repeatedly stressed that, although each Center was autonomous in terms of its governance, 
Centers should act as if they were accountable to the CGIAR. By now, attention was being paid to the 
composition of boards and their diversity in terms of gender and nationality, especially regarding their 
North-South balance. The newly started external management reviews of Centers reinforced attention 
to governance, management and fi nance. A study of budgeting in the CGIAR prompted a shift from 
annual to medium-term programming and budgeting. Coordinated by the CGIAR Secretariat, Center 
fi nance offi cers worked collectively to develop uniform accounting standards, followed by uniform 
auditing standards. In consultation with the Center directors, the CGIAR Secretariat initiated a series 
of management training courses for senior Center managers, including one for Center directors, and 
the program continued through 2010. 
Husain was also concerned with the corporate image of the CGIAR. Until his time 
the CGIAR had not published an annual report. Each year, the Group received an “integrative report” 
providing a summary of fi nances and an essay on a topic of strategic importance, such as international 
networking. This was mainly an internal document. With Husain’s encouragement, the Secretariat 
began in 1984 to publish a CGIAR annual report. A similar initiative was the start of an electronic data 
communication network, which led to the establishment of an electronic messaging system called 
CGNET within the CGIAR — the fi rst among international networks and organizations. CGNET enabled 
far-fl ung CGIAR locations around the globe to communicate electronically with their headquarters and 
other CGIAR locations using various forms of information and communication technology.20
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Documenting the CGIAR’s Impact 
In addition to improving accountability and corporate image, the CGIAR was concerned 
in the mid-1980s with Centers’ impact. A comprehensive impact study was directed by Jock Ander-
son of Australia and coordinated by Robert Herdt of the CGIAR Secretariat. Frank Press, president 
of the United States’ National Academy of Sciences, served as the chair of the advisory panel. The 
study showed the continuing impact of the advances made in wheat and rice and illustrated the initial 
outcomes of research in the newer areas. From 1970 to 1983, the use of modern varieties of wheat 
and rice had increased the production of these grains in developing countries by more than 40 million 
tons. It was conservatively estimated that the use of high-yielding varieties had increased yields by 
more than 0.5 tons per hectare over the increases attributable to the heightened use of inputs such 
as irrigation and fertilizer. The study documented the release by national authorities in developing 
countries of Center-based varieties of other crops through 1983, which included 238 varieties of 
maize, 96 of fi eld bean, 63 of cassava and 61 of potato. The impact of these releases on production 
and yields in farmer fi elds would be assessed in later years.
The impact study showed, in addition to the improvement of food crops, the CGIAR’s 
impact in other areas, as CGIAR institutions had trained more than 16,000 scientists by 1983, Center 
genebanks maintained more than one-third of the world’s collection of plant genetic resources, and 
Centers had produced more than 5,000 publications, in addition to the contributions of other aspects 
of agricultural technology such as farm machinery. Most importantly, the study showed that none of 
these impacts was attributable to the Centers alone but to close partnerships with counterpart insti-
tutions in developing countries.21
By this time, there was evidence that the industrialized world also benefi tted from the 
work of the Centers. The CGIAR Secretariat reported: “By 1983, about 75 percent of the wheat sown 
by farmers in two states of Australia contained genes from CIMMYT. In the USA, by the mid-1980s 
about 60 percent of the wheat and 25 percent of the rice-growing areas were planted to semi-dwarf 
varieties, many of which originated from material developed by CIMMYT and IRRI.”22
Adjusting Priorities
The impact study fi ndings served as inputs to TAC’s 1985 review of CGIAR priori-
ties and strategies. This was the most comprehensive strategy exercise undertaken by the CGIAR to 
date, taking into account the changes taking place in development thinking globally. The emphasis 
placed on food production during the initial years of the CGIAR, refl ected in the mission statement 
proposed in the fi rst review, was modifi ed to recognize the need for sustainability and focus on poor 
people, particularly in Africa. As redefi ned, the CGIAR’s mission was “through international agricul-
tural research and related activities to contribute to increasing sustainable food production in develop-
ing countries in such a way that the nutritional level and general economic well-being of low-income 
people are improved.”23 The review also identifi ed four major program thrusts for the work of the CGIAR: 
 ■ enhancing sustainability through resource conservation and management,
 ■ increasing the productivity of commodity production systems,
 ■ improving the policy environment, and
 ■ strengthening national research capabilities.
Thus, the CGIAR was to focus attention not only on food production but also on how 
that production affected the natural resource base used during production. As attention focused on 
rainfed and marginal areas, the fragility of the ecosystems had become more apparent and attention 
paid to the natural resource base had increased. The recent report by the Brundtland Commission 
had elevated the signifi cance of shifting to more sustainable forms of development.24
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dimension to the research that Centers would conduct. The expansion of the CGIAR’s focus from 
breeding to crop management and farming systems seen in the 1970s was being broadened further 
with the inclusion of the conservation and management of natural resources. TAC led the intellectual 
effort to clarify the issues involved and built the case for adjusting the CGIAR’s strategy.
When David Hopper took over as CGIAR chair from Husain in 1987, the system 
had started to shift its strategic direction. Besides sustainability, the CGIAR recognized the need for 
greater attention to the needs of Africa through a CGIAR task force headed by the previous TAC chair, 
Guy Camus. In addition, the potential of biotechnology to speed plant breeding was becoming more 
apparent. It was increasingly recognized that improving nutrition depended more on economic access 
to food than on its supply.
Hopper had been one of the founding fathers of the system from the Bellagio days, 
when he represented the IDRC; he later served as a member of the fi rst TAC under Crawford. He was 
a student of science, particularly agricultural science, and was deeply interested in understanding 
the interactions of soil, water, nutrition and other factors in crop growth. As he remarked at the 25th 
anniversary of the CGIAR, “The long term goal of the CGIAR scientists must be to unlock the many 
secrets of the sunlight-plant-water-nutrient-soil relations that are the fundamental blocks upon which 
agricultural science rests.”25
Governance and Sustenance
For half of 1973 I had the privilege of being half of the fl edgling Economics Program at 
CIMMYT, where I fi rst had the opportunity to refl ect on assessing the impact of CGIAR 
research. Being director of the mid-1980s study of the impact of the CGIAR21 gave me a 
special chance to observe the evolution of the CGIAR system to that point and to appreciate 
the value of documenting impact — nicely addressed in recent times by the Standing Panel 
on Impact Assessment under Jim Ryan and, later, Derek Byerlee — to help sustain support 
for the system’s generation of the global public goods, for which it is justifi ably proud. Later, 
from the vantage point of the World Bank, I welcomed occasions to see at fi rst hand41, 69 the 
importance of that institution in the governance and sustenance of the system, which is well 
charted in this new historical study. I regret that John L. Dillon, my friend and former colleague 
at the University of New England, is not around to share the excitement of the New CGIAR 
facing up to the challenges of its second 40 years.
Jock R. Anderson
Center staff, International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center & International Service for National Agricultural 
Research; Director, CGIAR Impact Study; Chair or member, several CGIAR external review panels
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tigate its need to further expand and thereby strengthen its capacity to address concerns related to 
sustainability. At the CGIAR midterm meeting in 1988 held at the Reichstag in Berlin, the agenda 
included reviewing the implications of the Brundtland Commission report, a paper by TAC on sustain-
ability and a paper on the CGIAR’s relationships with unassociated centers, meaning centers outside 
the CGIAR but supported mostly by the same donors. The discussions informed the Group’s decision 
to ask TAC, through its new chair, Alex McCalla, to examine the possible expansion of the CGIAR to 
include 10 additional centers: AVRDC, the International Board for Soil Research and Management, 
ICIPE, the International Center for Living Aquatic Resources Management (ICLARM), the International 
Centre for Research in Agroforestry (ICRAF), the IFDC, IIMI, the International Network for the Improve-
ment of Banana and Plantain (INIBAP), the International Union of Forest Research Organizations, and 
the International Trypanotolerance Centre. 
While discussions were going on in the CGIAR forum on the issues of sustainability 
and possible expansion, Africa was witnessing one of the CGIAR’s most spectacular research achieve-
ments since the Green Revolution: the biological control of a devastating insect pest of cassava. The 
cassava mealybug, a pest in cassava’s native South America, had reached Africa and was spreading 
rapidly because it had no natural enemies there and causing cassava losses of up to 80%. Scientists 
at the Commonwealth Institute of Biological Control discovered that there was a natural enemy of the 
mealybug in South America, the parasitic wasp Epidinocarcis lopezi. IITA staff brought the wasp to 
Africa, multiplied it and released it from the air at 150 locations over infested areas. By the late 1980s, 
cassava production in Africa had risen by 10.2 million tons per year. The economic returns from this 
research were estimated to reach $9 billion — far exceeding all CGIAR investment in Africa.26 The 
principal CGIAR scientist involved, Hans Herren, was later awarded the World Food Prize in 1995 for 
his work on mealybug control.
Expansion of the CGIAR
The TAC study on expanding the CGIAR remains one of the most elegant strategic 
analyses of the system ever undertaken. The exercise reviewed the role of the CGIAR in global research 
and development, developed a vision and a new goal, identifi ed the types of activities that could be 
supported to achieve that goal, and explored how they could be carried out by existing institutions 
and additional institutions or initiatives. During this exercise, the CGIAR’s 1989 midterm meeting in 
Canberra adopted, preemptively, its Declaration of Intent to expand its mandate to include research on 
renewable resources related to agriculture, specifi cally forest resources. TAC proposed a new CGIAR 
goal a year later to incorporate this decision: “through international research and related activities, 
and in partnership with national research systems, to contribute to sustainable improvements in the 
productivity of agriculture, forestry, and fi sheries in developing countries in ways that enhance nutri-
tion and well-being, especially among low income people.”
Along with the new goal, TAC defi ned two categories of activity for the CGIAR 
in the medium-term: (1) global, on commodities and selected subjects like policy, and (2) ecore-
gional, on agro-ecological zones and ecosystems that are defi ned regionally. It identifi ed high-priority 
activities under each category. Instead of focusing solely on Centers or institutions, TAC stressed 
the need to examine as well such global or ecoregional mechanisms as networks, consortia, joint 
ventures and programs.
After careful analysis, TAC recommended that (1) AVRDC, ICLARM and IIMI be 
included in the CGIAR, subject to some conditions; (2) the CGIAR start a new forestry and agroforestry 
initiative, with a modifi ed ICRAF as a component and support for the International Union of Forest 
Research Organizations considered later by this new initiative; (3) INIBAP become a component if 
IITA’s banana program; (4) ICIPE, the International Board for Soil Research and Management and the 
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IFDC remain outside the CGIAR but with programmatic links with CGIAR institutions, and possible 
links with the International Trypanotolerance Centre be decided later, following a study that was under 
way on livestock in Africa. 
These recommendations were discussed at the 1990 International Centers Week, 
the autumn meeting of the CGIAR, under the chairmanship of Wilfried Thalwitz, who had succeeded 
David Hopper upon the latter’s retirement earlier that year. After heated discussions, as well as sideline 
negotiations, the Group took issue with TAC’s recommendations on forestry and agroforestry and 
research on banana and plantain. Some donors, including Germany, were strongly convinced of the 
need for a separate forestry initiative and ready to support it. At the same time, ICRAF (and its support-
ers, led by Canada) were unwilling to make the change to ICRAF as recommended by TAC. The Group 
therefore decided to include ICRAF in the CGIAR and establish a new and separate center for forestry, 
which eventually became the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR). Australia agreed to 
help establish the new Center, with the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research as 
the implementing agency. Regarding INIBAP, the Group decided to maintain it as a separate innova-
tive network with programmatic links with IITA.
This meant that the Group was prepared to add six new centers or networks — 
AVRDC, ICLARM, IIMI, ICRAF, INIBAP and a new forestry center — to its existing 13 Centers. While 
all previous studies on CGIAR priorities, including the expansion study, had shown the importance of 
research on vegetables, the proposed admission to the CGIAR of AVRDC, headquartered in Taiwan, 
posed a political problem, as China had joined the CGIAR in 1984. Consequently, the CGIAR decided 
to delay a decision on AVRDC because it “appreciated the need for political developments to mature.”27
Thus, the 4-Center network that started in 1971 had become an 18-Center enter-
prise 2 decades later. Its initial focus on increasing food production through plant breeding had been 
broadened signifi cantly with new areas of research. The question that loomed in everyone’s mind 
was whether the Group would have adequate resources to support this enlarged network and greatly 
expanded research portfolio. 
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WILFRIED THALWITZ WAS CHAIR FOR 2 YEARS DURING THIS TIME 
OF ANALYSIS AND EXPANSION. IN HIS OPENING ADDRESS TO THE 
CGIAR AT HIS LAST MEETING, INTERNATIONAL CENTERS WEEK 
1991, HE REMINDED THE GROUP OF THE INTENSE COMPETITION 
FOR DEVELOPMENT FUNDS AND THE NEED FOR THE CGIAR TO 
ALLOCATE ITS RESOURCES EFFECTIVELY, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW 
OF ITS RECENT EXPANSION. IN HIS FAREWELL ADDRESS HE NOTED 
THAT HE SHARED THE SENTIMENTS OF WARREN BAUM, WHO HE 
REPORTED TO HAVE SAID, “OF ALL THE JOBS I HAVE HAD, THE ONE 
I ENJOYED THE MOST, THE ONE THAT WAS MOST REWARDING, WAS 
THE ONE OF CHAIRMAN OF THE CGIAR.”28 THIS WAS A SENTIMENT 
SHARED BY SEVERAL OTHER CHAIRS THAT SUCCEEDED THALWITZ.
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The next CGIAR chair, Visvanathan Rajagopalan, also served for 2 years 
(1991-93). By the time he took over as chair, the system had grown to 17 Centers, with the 18th, CIFOR, 
being established in Indonesia. The number of Center staff had reached 12,000 and of internationally 
recruited staff 1,300, 12% of the latter being women. But this growth was not being matched with a 
proportionate increase in fi nancial resources. For 1992 the Group had approved programs requiring 
the expenditure of $332 million, while the pledges of members came to only $251 million. Contribu-
tions to the original 13 Centers were declining in real terms for the third year in a row, while the new 
Centers sought increased funding. The system was heading toward a crisis. While endorsing the new 
priorities recommended by TAC, Center representatives — the Committee of Board Chairs (CBC) and 
the Center Directors Committee (CDC) — voiced deep concern and argued that the solution lay in 
coming up with a new, clear systemwide strategy.
Rajagopalan heeded the advice of the Centers. As his fi rst act he convened a 
consultation in February 1992 in London moderated by Walter Falcon, the board chair of IRRI and 
one of the strongest voices calling for change. The results of the consultation were reported at the 
midterm meeting in May in Istanbul. The major message was that “business as usual” was not accept-
able because of the following concerns: 
 ■ organizational issues: the lack of a committee structure to facilitate decision-
making, bureaucratization, excessive reliance on TAC, the length of CGIAR 
meetings and weak relations with the private sector;
 ■ funding issues: the mismatch between funding supply and demand for funding 
and inequitable resource allocation;
 ■ communication issues: weak communication internally and externally, the failure 
to tell success stories, and the need for more information on impact; 
 ■ substantive issues: the system losing its focus, clarity lacking on upstream-
downstream research and on ecoregional research, and the need to include 
the countries of the former East Bloc among the target countries of the CGIAR.
With this as a backdrop, the Group agreed with TAC that the priorities for research 
identifi ed during the most recent (and comprehensive) assessment should guide the allocation of 
resources. TAC had identifi ed resource envelopes for each Center that corresponded to the agreed 
priorities. In preparing their 5-year plans, the Centers were asked to assume that their “core” funding 
would remain unchanged over the 1994-98 planning period. In addition, the Group established a 
working group, headed by Robert Herdt, to examine the deliberation and decision-making processes 
of the CGIAR and offer recommendations for improving effectiveness and effi ciency. 
Business was not as usual in the CGIAR over the next 12 months. The Herdt 
working group’s recommendations led to the establishment, for the fi rst time in CGIAR history, of two 
standing committees, one on oversight and the other on fi nance. The work of two task forces, one 
on livestock and the other on banana and plantain, informed a decision at the midterm meeting in 
Puerto Rico to integrate ILCA and ILRAD into a single livestock Center and to bring INIBAP’s activities 
under the governance and administrative structure of IPGRI. The Centers rearranged their internal 
organization to generate the new Public Awareness and Resources Committee (PARC), which was 
to improve communication and fundraising in collaboration with the Secretariat. The newly formed 
CGIAR committees quickly identifi ed key areas to address. The Oversight Committee would tackle the 
system’s vision and strategy, central structure, and relations with developing countries. The Finance 
Committee would examine the role of the World Bank as a “balancing donor,” the resource-allocation 
mechanism and the resource-mobilization strategy.
While these changes appeared to be in the direction agreed at the London meeting, 
they were not likely to have an immediate impact. The research agenda of the CGIAR was getting more 
and more complex. In addition to grappling with the expansion of its mandate, the CGIAR was trying 
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to identify how best to organize its TAC-recommended ecoregional activities. Demand for additional 
activities were emanating from Agenda 21 of the Environment and Development Conference in Brazil, 
the “Earth Summit” as it was called, which brought home the message that economic and social 
development could not be addressed in isolation from the environment. Three of the global initia-
tives introduced at the summit would have continuing relevance to the CGIAR for years to come: the 
Convention on Biological Diversity,29 Convention to Combat Desertifi cation, and Forest Principles.
As for the funding outlook, it looked grim. The share of ODA going to international 
agricultural research had dropped from 0.6% in 1986 to 0.5% in 1991 and was expected to decrease 
further. The approved Center programs for 1998, on the other hand, required an annual increase 
in funding of 15% in real terms. A budgetary solution such as decreasing each Center’s budget by 
a certain percentage would not have been appropriate over the long term as it would have ignored 
priority differences among programs. Budgetary issues needed a scalpel, not a machete, and the 
Group asked TAC “to initiate a critical examination of the present coverage of activities, programs and 
regions because the current funding levels in the medium-term will require a repositioning of programs 
and institutions; and to present MTM94 [the 1994 midterm meeting] with options for restructuring.”30
T
h
e
 C
G
IA
R
 a
t 
4
0
35
1
9
9
1
-2
0
0
0
: 
C
ri
s
is
 a
n
d
 t
h
e
 R
o
a
d
 t
o
 R
e
c
o
v
e
ry
 
A New Chair with a New Vision
When he took over the chair from Rajagopalan the next January, in 1994, Ismail 
Serageldin knew that he had few options. Centers had been downsizing staff since the start of the 
fi nancial crisis, recruitment had come almost to a standstill, and expenses were under a tight rein. 
Attending scientifi c meetings, for example, had become a luxury. In short, because they were declin-
ing, budgets began to drive the CGIAR research agenda, not the other way around.
One option was to restructure the system so that it would operate at a lower budget 
by closing Centers or merging them into fewer operating units. As requested, TAC was already working 
on a plan for this. The other option was to agree on reform of the system from head to toe to induce 
donors to increase their funding. But reform would take time, and there was an immediate need for 
infusions of additional funds to avoid disrupting research any further. 
Serageldin chose the latter approach. He fi rst asked McCalla not to submit TAC’s 
restructuring proposals until he had a chance to discuss with the CGIAR community his ideas for 
reforming the system. He then consulted with donors, Centers, TAC, cosponsors and partners. Next, 
he sought and received help from the heads of the CGIAR’s cosponsoring agencies — Lewis Preston 
at the World Bank, Jacques Diouf at FAO and Gustave Speth at UNDP — in appealing to the heads of 
donor agencies for increased funding for the CGIAR. The World Bank subsequently agreed to provide 
to the CGIAR a one-time special grant of $20 million for 1994/1995 over and above its regular funding, 
to be used as a 1:2 match against similarly additional funding from other donors, provided that the 
Group was ready to implement a clear plan of reform. 
Serageldin’s reform plan, approved by the Group at its 1994 midterm meeting in 
Delhi, had the following features:
 ■ a new vision statement and refocused research agenda;
 ■ governance and management reforms to ensure predictability, transparency 
and accountability;
 ■ NARS perspectives fully integrated into the CGIAR’s policy framework;
 ■ more effective linkages with farmers’ groups (especially women’s groups) and 
nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and the private sector; and
 ■ a comprehensive plan of action based on the features above to be ratifi ed by 
senior offi cials at an international conference.
Work on some of these elements had already started during Rajagopalan’s term. 
A panel commissioned by the Oversight Committee and headed by Gordon Conway, vice chancel-
lor of Sussex University, had been preparing a new vision statement. This and the committee’s 
proposals for strengthening the CGIAR’s governance and organization were discussed extensively 
at the Delhi meeting. The Group’s consensus was in favor of a CGIAR (1) that would lead setting 
the global agenda regarding international agricultural research, (2) with the vision of eliminating 
poverty and hunger, (3) that was a more open and collaborative system, and (4) with a focus 
shifting toward programs.
Serageldin saw a need to consolidate the leadership of the system to steer changes 
more effectively during the planned reform program. He proposed, and the Group agreed to, forming 
a steering committee under his chairmanship and bringing together the members of the Finance 
and Oversight committees. This steering committee would later be transformed into a consultative 
council with the inclusion of representatives of cosponsors and other new units created during the 
transformation and continue throughout Serageldin’s 6-year term as chair. This enabled the chair 
and the World Bank to be fully in charge during the CGIAR’s fi rst major crisis. 
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Another of Serageldin’s contributions was to bring clarity to the CGIAR’s research 
agenda. Financing questions would be addressed more easily if the Group had an unambiguous 
research agenda. Serageldin proposed remapping the entire CGIAR program into a research agenda 
matrix with Centers in rows and programs in columns. Once agreement was reached with the help of 
TAC on the content of the columns, donors would be able to provide funding to either rows (Centers), 
columns (programs), cells (projects) or the entire matrix (the system). Center activities outside the 
matrix would not be considered part of the agreed research agenda and ineligible for World Bank 
funding. Once agreement was reached on a research agenda each year, the Centers and the Finance 
Committee would be able to develop fi nancing plans to have the agenda funded in full. 
The 1994 midterm meeting in New Delhi was a platform for initiating dialogue on 
ways of more fully integrating the concerns of developing countries into the formulation of global priori-
ties for research. Following a fervent statement made by the International Fund for Agricultural Devel-
opment (IFAD) about the critical role of NARS in the technology continuum, the chair asked IFAD to 
help organize a dialogue to strengthen the voices of NARS in setting and implementing the international 
agricultural research agenda. Accordingly, IFAD organized an international consultation, titled Towards 
a NARS’ Vision on International Agricultural Research, in Rome. Some 80 NARS leaders participated. 
The outcome of this event was one of the inputs to the Lucerne ministerial-level meeting in 1995.
The rest of 1994 was spent preparing other components of the reforms for endorse-
ment at the planned ministerial-level meeting. A panel headed by Klaus Winkel of Denmark developed 
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recommendations for improving system governance; another panel headed by MS Swaminathan 
prepared options for handling intellectual property rights; the Genetic Resources Policy Committee 
and a systemwide program on genetic resources were initiated; and task forces on sustainable agricul-
ture topics, including integrated pest management and ecoregional approaches, recommended future 
CGIAR strategy in their areas.
From a governance standpoint, a notable event in 1994 was the signing of a formal 
agreement between the CGIAR Centers and FAO during the annual meeting of the CGIAR, placing the 
genetic resource collections of the CGIAR Centers under the auspices of FAO’s Commission on Plant 
Genetic Resources, as was called for by the International Undertaking on PGRFA. On the CGIAR side, 
the signing was done not by individual Centers but by the CGIAR chair on behalf of the 12 Centers 
holding such collections, exercising signing powers delegated by the boards of these Centers. This 
was the fi rst (and only) formal delegation of authority from the Centers to the CGIAR chair. 
The new chair’s efforts appeared to be paying off. The research agenda for 1994 
was funded in full, and indications were the same for 1995. Questions remained, though, about the 
integrity of the research agenda and budget, as it now included some activities that were formerly 
classifi ed as “special projects” and not subject to TAC scrutiny. Classifying them as part of the research 
agenda, and counting their funding as new contributions to the CGIAR, meant that the one-time $20 
million in additional funding from the World Bank could be used in full because of the requirement to 
have a 1:2 match between its contribution and the additional funding provided by donors.31
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Ministerial-Level Meeting in Lucerne
A highlight of the decade was the ministerial-level meeting of the CGIAR in Lucerne, 
Switzerland, in February 1995, attended by ministers, heads of agencies and delegates represent-
ing 39 CGIAR members. The meeting adopted a declaration and action plan to kick-start a renewed 
CGIAR. Its main elements included
 ■ a new and shorter mission statement “to contribute, through its research, to 
promoting sustainable agriculture for food security in the developing countries;”
 ■ a broadened partnership with a larger number of developing countries partici-
pating as active members and improved dialogue with NGOs and the private 
sector through the establishment of NGO and private sector committees;
 ■ a research agenda concentrating on strategic and applied research for gener-
ating international public goods32 toward increasing productivity, protecting the 
environment, saving biodiversity, improving policies, and strengthening NARS 
in developing countries, particularly in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa;
 ■ a strengthened assessment of CGIAR’s performance and impact through a new 
independent evaluation function;
 ■ a negotiation-and-review process among all members to ensure the full funding 
of the agreed research agenda; and
 ■ the inclusion of the United Nations Environment Programme as a cosponsor 
of the CGIAR. 
Systemwide programs. The renewal of commitment to the CGIAR by the heads 
of its major donor agencies in Lucerne brought a new optimism to the system. The bleeding felt by 
most Centers had been stopped. New systemwide programs were being initiated after careful review 
by TAC, now chaired by Don Winkelmann, the former director general of CIMMYT, to integrate the 
work of Centers and partner organizations toward solving regional or global problems. These were 
the Rice-Wheat Program for the Indo-Gangetic Plains, Latin American Hillsides Program, Alterna-
tives to Slash and Burn Program, and Sustainable Mountain Agricultural Development Program, 
in addition to the existing Systemwide Genetic Resources Program. The system’s expansion and 
the redefi nition of the research agenda affected how resources were allocated among the CGIAR’s 
fi ve priorities, as “protecting the environment” had seen a 50% increase from 1992 to 1996, and 
“saving biodiversity” a 25% increase, at the expense of the other three priorities.33
Opening the system. Efforts to open up the system proceeded quickly. Five 
developing countries — Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Iran and Kenya — joined the CGIAR, bring-
ing the Southern membership to 13. Although their funding contributions were mostly the minimum 
$500,000 per year required for membership, this bought the opportunity to fully participate in CGIAR 
decision-making along with members contributing much more. Another new effort was to modify 
CGIAR planning processes to enable developing countries to participate in regional priority-setting 
through regional fora, as had been recommended by the Winkel panel in 1994. In addition, two 
new CGIAR committees were established to strengthen dialogue with NGOs and the private sector. 
The NGO Committee and the Private Sector Committee would become mainstays in the CGIAR 
landscape for at least 6 years, as perspectives from these communities contributed to the discus-
sion of the CGIAR business agenda. The NGO Committee would become dormant in 2002, but the 
Private Sector Committee would continue until the reforms of 2009.
Impact assessment and evaluation. Another important function initiated following 
Lucerne was the Impact Assessment and Evaluation Group (IAEG), with Jim Peacock of Australia as chair, 
to strengthen ex-post impact assessment and evaluation in the system. The IAEG was to work with the 
evaluation professionals in the Centers, help build a stronger impact culture in the system and commission 
studies to document CGIAR impact. It played an important catalytic role in elevating the importance of 
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impact studies and contributed to learning from experience and to accountability. Initially working along-
side TAC as an independent group reporting to the Consultative Group, it was later blended into the TAC 
structure as an independent standing panel and continues to operate under that framework to this day. 
Governance and fi nance. Reforms in governance and fi nance continued along 
the lines agreed in Lucerne. The Finance Committee began to play a critical role in balancing funding 
needs and availability, paying special attention to Centers that had been affected most by the funding 
shortages. As a result, agreed research agendas were funded in full in 1995 and 1996. The Oversight 
Committee helped monitor the implementation of actions agreed in Lucerne and advocated additional 
steps to improve governance. One of these was in Center governance. At the request of the commit-
tee, the CGIAR Secretariat prepared a new set of guidelines for Center boards, in cooperation with the 
CBC and the National Center for Nonprofi t Boards in Washington, DC, to refl ect current best practice 
in corporate governance. The committee began monitoring the composition of Center boards in terms 
of their gender and South-North nationality balance, to gently pressure boards with serious imbal-
ances in their composition. The committee recommended commissioning a system review, as there 
had been no comprehensive examination of the CGIAR since the second review in 1981. 
Public awareness and resource mobilization. The fi nancial crisis alerted the 
Centers and the Secretariat that, without a concerted and rigorous public-awareness and resource-
mobilization effort, the CGIAR would remain a little-known enterprise. The PARC, led by the CDC, 
took the lead in organizing various activities in selected countries such as high-level visits; producing 
customized publications, media campaigns, conferences and exhibits; forming “friends of the CGIAR” 
groups; and ensuring a presence at international meetings and scientifi c conferences. The United 
States, Canada, Japan, Spain and Germany were among the fi rst group of target countries, which 
expanded over the years to include practically all donor countries. Holding the midterm meeting in a 
different country each year provided an opportunity for a major public awareness campaign in that 
country — in the 1990s, France, Turkey, Puerto Rico, India, Kenya, Indonesia, Egypt, Brazil and China. 
The stronger emphasis on documenting the CGIAR’s impact provided, over time, convincing evidence 
of high returns on investments in agricultural research. The Centers created a new foundation called 
Future Harvest as a nonprofi t, tax-exempt organization in the United States to complement the work 
of PARC and the Secretariat, promote the system, and generate additional funds for Centers. Future 
Harvest and the Centers strongly advocated changing the “CGIAR” brand, but this did not fi nd favor 
with some members, especially developing countries. Nevertheless, the Centers decided to adopt the 
Future Harvest brand by calling themselves Future Harvest Centers of the CGIAR, which was endorsed 
by the Group at its midterm meeting in Dresden, Germany, in 2000.
The Future Harvest experience demonstrated the Centers’ collective will to assume 
greater ownership of the system. This was, in part, because they considered the chair’s and the Secre-
tariat’s public-awareness and fundraising efforts inadequate. Two parallel tracks operated simultaneously, 
often with little coordination as each reported to a different body. Various steps were taken to blend the 
two, such as through PARC and later the System Offi ce, and even co-locating the Future Harvest Founda-
tion in the Secretariat offi ces at the World Bank, but without much success. The foundation eventually 
became dormant, though the name and the organization still exist in the United States. 
Changing Power Structure 
During the CGIAR’s fi rst decade, TAC was undoubtedly the most powerful body 
in the system. Donors were prepared to invest in research, and the advice given by TAC largely 
determined where these investments should be channeled. TAC’s authority stemmed from the 
quality and thoroughness of its analysis and the personal stature of its members and chair. This 
situation continued through most of the second decade when the donors needed guidance on 
strategy as well as assurance that the science practiced by the Centers continued to be top quality.
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A Lot to Celebrate
As an individual whose career evolved from a position as temporary research technician to 
research scientist, and on to manager and ultimately to chief executive in the CGIAR system, 
I can very much appreciate the mission, work and evolution of the CGIAR as it reaches 
40 years. The CGIAR has achieved great things: new crop varieties, new approaches and 
instrumental policy advice. 
The CGIAR has been sustained over the past 4 decades thanks to those who believe that 
agricultural development cannot be achieved without the pulling effect orchestrated by research. 
The merit of the successes of the CGIAR lies in its commitment to improving the lives and 
income of those whose survival depends on agriculture. 
Having now become the head of an institution dedicated to improving the lives of the rural poor, 
I celebrate that CGIAR Centers have become important partners in the pro-poor development 
agenda of the International Fund for Agricultural Development. 
The CGIAR has a lot to celebrate: generating new technologies, building the capacity of 
partners in developing countries, training fi rst-class scientists and contributing to the debate 
on food policy. As the importance of food security receives prominence on the global agenda 
— be it articulated by the Group of Eight, Group of Twenty or United Nations — the work 
of the CGIAR has become more relevant than ever. I congratulate the Group on its work.
Kanayo Nwanze
Center staff, International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics; 
Director General, Africa Rice Center; President, International Fund for Agricultural Development
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Rarely did the Group disagree with the recommendations of TAC on scientifi c and technical matters. 
TAC’s advice on Center budgets was needed to ensure that Center activities accorded with the agreed 
priorities of the system and that the World Bank, serving as the balancing donor or donor of last 
resort, would allocate its contributions to the Centers to fi ll gaps in priority areas left unfunded by the 
contributions of other donors. This way, the World Bank would ensure that the TAC-approved budgets 
of Centers and, therefore, the activities identifi ed as priority would be fi nanced. 
This situation began to change toward the end of the second decade. Many donors 
in tune with the global development agenda were keen to have the CGIAR closely follow these trends, 
irrespective of any contrary advice from TAC. To maintain or increase their contribution to the CGIAR, 
donor representatives felt they needed to have evidence showing the CGIAR’s responsiveness to global 
developments. Thus, at the CGIAR midterm meeting in Canberra in 1989, the Group decided to expand 
the mission of the CGIAR to include forestry while TAC was still working on the CGIAR-requested study 
on expansion. When the study was completed a year later, donors chose not to follow TAC advice on 
research on forestry and agroforestry, deciding instead to have two separate institutes working in these two 
areas. In short, political considerations began to outweigh scientifi c and technical concerns in the CGIAR. 
When the CGIAR experienced a fi nancial crisis at the beginning of the third decade, 
in part because the expanded number of institutes was not matched by a similar increase in funding, 
the Group fi rst expected TAC to provide the answers for operating within its means but later, in response 
to the plea from Serageldin, decided to seek increased funding. One consequence, as noted above, was 
the dilution of the core research portfolio and the sidelining of TAC advice. With the arrival of Serageldin 
the locus of power in the CGIAR had shifted signifi cantly from TAC to the Group chair. A change in the 
manner in which the World Bank’s contributions to the Centers were allocated further weakened the 
Group’s resolve to channel its funding to the highest-priority activities. Instead of serving as a balancing 
donor, the World Bank decided to parallel the contributions of other donors according to a matching 
formula. This meant that the largest contributions fl owed to the most popular activities, which were not 
necessarily what TAC viewed as the highest-priority items on the CGIAR research agenda. 
As the power balance in the CGIAR shifted from TAC to donors, another group steadily 
gained more voice and infl uence. The CDC, which functioned somewhat as a social club during its 
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fi rst 2 decades, began to operate more effectively, conveying common concerns of the Centers to the 
CGIAR forum. Center directors became more aware of the benefi ts of collective action, and the CDC 
became better organized than in earlier years. While the CDC concerned itself with strategic issues 
such as collective Center policies on genetic resources, intellectual property rights and biotechnology, 
their deputies, who handled administrative and technical matters, formed a separate group. Thus, a 
new power balance began to emerge, with power more evenly spread among the fi nancing, advisory 
and operational arms of the CGIAR: donors, TAC and Centers. 
The First Global Forum
The Lucerne event generated momentum toward a group of members and Centers — 
led by IFAD and including the World Bank, FAO, Switzerland, the Netherlands and ISNAR — facilitating 
a series of meetings of NARS in Africa, Asia, Middle East and North Africa to explore the needs of and 
opportunities for agricultural research and identify practical means of collaboration. Following a 2-year 
consultative process, the fi rst Global Forum on Agricultural Research (GFAR) was convened just before 
the CGIAR’s 1996 business meeting. This marked the fi rst time that various components of the global 
agricultural research system came together. GFAR brought together representatives of four regional fora 
in (1) Asia and the Pacifi c, (2) Latin America and the Caribbean, (3) sub-Saharan Africa, and (4) West 
Asia and North Africa, as well as participants from advanced research institutions, NGOs, the private 
sector and the CGIAR. Chaired by Fawzi Al-Sultan, president of IFAD, GFAR adopted, after a day and a 
half of deliberations, its Declaration and Plan of Action for Global Partnership in Agricultural Research, 
which was later presented at the World Food Summit in Rome in November 1996.
In the declaration, the participants affi rmed their “strong commitment to contrib-
ute to the development of productive, sustainable and equitable agriculture” and urged that research 
partnerships be “governed by the principles of subsidiarity, participatory decision making, complemen-
tarity of efforts, adaptability, openness and, above all, a deep sense of commitment to the common 
purpose.” The plan of action called for mobilizing resources to strengthen NARS and the regional and 
subregional fora and for convening GFAR every 3 years.34 
The convening of GFAR underscored the interconnectedness of the global agricultural 
research system and the relatively small role played by the CGIAR, representing only 3% of the annual 
investment in research geared to agriculture in developing countries. A more connected and respon-
sive CGIAR would need to regard global developments more closely and act to maintain its relevance. 
The chair and the Centers already shared responsibility for representing the CGIAR in various global 
fora, as ICRISAT took the CGIAR lead at the Desertifi cation Conference in Paris in 1994 and IFPRI 
performed the same role at the Conference on Population and Development in Cairo the same year. 
Reaction to Global Developments
During the rest of the decade the CGIAR responded, in a deliberative manner, 
to three major global developments: the break-up of the East Bloc, the increased focus on genetic 
resources and intellectual property rights, and systematic attention to gender issues. 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The CGIAR had taken a cautious 
stance in Lucerne toward expanding its operations to Eastern Europe and the countries of the former 
Soviet Union because of funding constraints. A task force headed by Rudy Rabbinge of the Nether-
lands explored needs and opportunities and found compelling reasons for expanding the CGIAR 
mandate to encompass this region. Recognizing that the needs of the two subregions — Central and 
Eastern Europe, and Central Asia and the Caucasus — were quite different, the task force recom-
mended a two-pronged strategy calling for the CGIAR’s more engaged involvement in Central Asia 
Personalized and Unpoliticized
Sweden joined the CGIAR in 1973, and I joined the CGIAR in June 1981 at the European 
donors meeting, which was chaired by CGIAR Chair Warren Baum and attended by incoming 
TAC Chair Guy Camus. The issues covered were complex, expressed in strange language 
and an enormous number of acronyms. The second review of the CGIAR was on. Among 
the issues covered, following the revision of the International Union for the Protection of 
New Varieties of Plants 1962, were plant breeders’ rights, fi nished varieties and the role of 
the CGIAR. This was to me a new and extremely interesting topic, as my master’s and PhD 
theses dealt with biological matters, local farmers, states and markets. 
Over the years Sweden has been active, initiating several system activities: studying the role of 
national agricultural research 1977, the impact study of 1982-85, and formulating the CGIAR 
statement to the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, all led by Bo Bengtsson; the establishment of the 
Genetic Resources Policy Committee in 1994; CGIAR Chair Ismail Sergeldin’s statement to 
the Second Ordinary Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity in Jakarta in 1995; and several intellectual property and genetic resources studies 
during 2004-2009. Having been involved in the changes affecting the CGIAR over more 
than 3 decades, I am very proud to have been exposed to so much high-quality science; 
extremely innovative ways of doing business; and the personalized, unpoliticized way of doing 
business in the CGIAR. 
One sadly unresolved issue stemming from the mid-1990s is the lack of trust among donors 
to provide unrestricted funding to the CGIAR and its research programs. Another serious 
challenge is to slim down and rationalize the chain of command in the Consortium. I am sure 
we will meet these challenges. And I am proud and grateful for all the personal friendships 
and all the things I continue to learn through my involvement with the CGIAR.
Carl-Gustaf Thornström
Representative of Sweden to the CGIAR; Member, CGIAR Genetic Resources Policy Committee
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and the Caucasus, which exhibited conditions similar to those found in other developing countries. 
This opened the way for ICARDA to expand its region to include Central Asia and the Caucasus and 
for several other centers to start programs addressing the needs of these countries. 
Genetic resources and intellectual property rights. The Convention on Biological 
Diversity had come into force in 1993, but there were several unsettled issues such as the status of 
ex-situ collections that existed before the convention and the question of farmers’ rights. As FAO had 
the lead role in revising the International Undertaking on PGRFA to make it consistent with Conven-
tion on Biological Diversity, the Commission on PGRFA organized a series of negotiations to turn the 
undertaking into a treaty. The CGIAR, through its Systemwide Genetic Resources Program and IPGRI, 
worked closely with FAO on these negotiations. A major objective was to develop a standard material 
transfer agreement that underscored the fair and equitable sharing of benefi ts.
Meanwhile, the changing public-private sector balance in agricultural research 
investments worldwide had brought the use of biotechnology to the fore in all research enterprises 
like the CGIAR. In the early 1990s, the private sector was responsible for 80% of research on biotech-
nology worldwide; in the USA alone this amounted to $595 million in 1992.35 The private sector had 
become a major player in agricultural research, as the market potential for genetically modifi ed crops 
was high and the technology allowed private companies to capture returns on their investments. In 
contrast, CGIAR Centers spent about $30 million annually. The issues were complex, ranging from 
intellectual property and biosafety to the ethical and social dimensions of using this technology. One 
Center, ILRAD, had used molecular-level research from its beginning. The crop Centers also used 
some aspects of biotechnology alongside conventional breeding. In fact, IRRI had organized an inter-
Center conference on international agricultural research centers (IARCs) and biotechnology in as early 
as 1984. Now one Center, ISNAR, was hosting its Intermediary Biotechnology Service to assist NARS 
with managing their biotechnology programs.
What the system lacked were systemwide direction and a policy framework on intel-
lectual property and biotechnology issues, which Serageldin was determined to tackle. While the Private 
Sector and NGO committees were helpful in providing advice, their views were often contradictory, with 
the NGO Committee advocating greater reliance on conventional plant breeding and the Private Sector 
Committee arguing for larger CGIAR investments in biotechnology to avoid being left behind regarding 
this major change in agricultural research technology. The CGIAR sought additional advice from two 
panels of experts: one on general issues in biotechnology headed by Richard Flavell and the other on 
proprietary science and technology headed by Timothy Roberts. After much debate and discussion, 
the Group agreed to establish central advisory capacity on intellectual property; adopted a set of ethical 
principles related to genetic resources; asked Centers to conduct intellectual property audits of their 
work; and agreed to make public all Center and CGIAR policies on genetic resources, biotechnology and 
related issues. Center investments in biotechnology would be examined as part of the programs making 
up the research agenda. No system-level entity was created for holding patents. As a result, Centers 
adopted several policies and principles, including
 ■ Guiding Principles for the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 
Centers on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources (1996),
 ■ The CGIAR’s Ethical Principles Relating to Genetic Resources (1998),
 ■ CGIAR Policy Statement on Genetic Use Restriction Technologies (1998),
 ■ Principles Involving Center Interaction with the Private Sector and Others (1998), 
and
 ■ Centers’ Position Statement on Biotechnology (1998).
These policies would be modifi ed over time under guidance from the Genetic 
Resources Policy Committee. When the International Treaty on PGRFA came into force in 2006, the 
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Centers would sign new agreements with the Governing Body of the Treaty and begin using standard 
material transfer agreements under the treaty.36
Gender issues. The Centers had started a modest CGIAR gender program in 
1991 with backing from a handful of interested donors who acted as a donor support group for it. The 
program had a limited mandate to identify best practices in addressing gender concerns and sharing 
them with Centers. The ministerial-level meeting in Lucerne attached a high priority to gender issues, 
which was reinforced in the global arena by the 4th World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, 
where IFPRI and IPGRI represented the CGIAR, later sharing the outcome of the conference with the 
CGIAR community. The Group recognized that gender concerns needed to be fully integrated into 
Centers’ research and training. The Gender Program began to proceed along two tracks. The gender 
analysis track focused on user- and client-oriented research to identify technologies important for 
women; take the needs of women into account when setting priorities; view women as producers, 
income earners and food providers; and examine the gender implications of research proposals, with 
small grants provided by the program to fi nance the inclusion of gender analysis in Center projects. 
The gender staffi ng track focused on organizational processes and practices to ensure that Centers 
attracted high-quality men and women and created work conditions that enhanced the productivity 
and job satisfaction of both men and women. Surveys were undertaken and good practice notes were 
prepared and shared on numerous issues. One result was Centers and the system becoming aware 
that only a third of the Centers had policies on discrimination and sexual harassment in 1994. The 
program organized numerous management and leadership training courses for women at Centers 
and NARS. The gender analysis track eventually morphed into a systemwide program on participatory 
research. The gender staffi ng component broadened its focus to include all diversity issues and was 
renamed the Gender & Diversity Program, which continues to be a strong component of the CGIAR. 
In 1991 women were only 11% of all internationally recruited staff across the Centers.37 A 2008 survey 
showed this percentage more than doubling to 26% of all Center scientists, in part because of the 
contributions made by this program. Between 2003 and 2008, the number of women scientists in 
the system increased from 182 to 271, or by 49%, compared with a 2% increase for men. Similar 
improvements were observed regarding other aspects of diversity.38 
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Emerging Challenges
After 40 years it is appropriate to think about the CGIAR’s next 40 years, to the middle 
of the 21st century. The world population of about 9 billion will be more urban and richer 
but exposed to climate stress, with natural resources increasingly highly prized. The world 
will have a “bioeconomy” in which competition for natural and agricultural resources will 
increasingly pit feeding people against energy and industrial uses. Fighting food scarcity and 
hunger by increasing crop productivity will no longer work in isolation. The productivity and 
effi ciency of whole and interlinked value chains of foods, feeds, fi bers and other biomass-based 
materials need to be enhanced through technological and institutional innovations. Ending 
waste is part of the challenge. The food and nutrition security of the poor will increasingly 
be determined outside of agriculture, which means that nutritional defi ciencies need to be 
addressed more directly. 
In the past, the CGIAR has continuously adapted with foresight. To address emerging challenges 
to 2050 the CGIAR may need to reinvent itself and its research agenda at an even quicker 
pace. Providing research contexts with enough freedom to attract committed and excellent 
researchers remains essential to serving the CGIAR goals. 
Joachim von Braun
Member, CGIAR Technical Advisory Committee; Director General, International Food Policy Research Institute
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While addressing individual concerns such as the three noted above was seen 
as appropriate, there was growing concern in the Group that the CGIAR had delayed a comprehen-
sive examination of the system far too long. Some Centers faced new fi nancial diffi culties resulting 
mostly from the effects of repeated downsizing. For example, ICRISAT had depleted its reserves 
and needed $3.5 million in emergency support in 1997 to continue operations. 
Evidence was growing that the challenges ahead were serious and getting more 
so, as illustrated by a major program initiated by IFPRI called Vision 2020. It was estimated that 
there would be 150 million malnourished children by 2020, with 70% of them in sub-Saharan 
Africa and South Asia. Population was expected to grow by 35% between 1995 and 2020, with 
95% of that growth in developing countries and the population of sub-Saharan Africa doubling 
by 2020. As a result, by 2020 demand for cereals in developing countries would rise by 58%, 
for root and tubers by 56%, and for livestock products by 118%. Production increases would 
have to come from improved yields, as there was little arable land left on which to expand 
agriculture. Yet, cereal yield growth had slowed considerably in developing and developed 
countries alike. This meant that, unless science could help reverse the trends in yield growth, 
developing countries would increasingly rely on food imports, for which they would need higher 
income growth. While the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations had called for liberalizing trade 
in agricultural products, this had little impact on practices in industrialized countries, where 
domestic support of agriculture and price subsidies continued, robbing the developing countries 
of the opportunity to compete in a level playing field. Agricultural growth therefore continued to 
be an engine of economic growth in poor developing countries, elevating the role of agricultural 
research and the challenges it faced.39
The Third System Review
The Group mounted a third system review in 1997. Unlike the two previous two 
system reviews, this one was to be conducted by an external panel assisted by an external secre-
tariat. The chair was one of the original founders of the CGIAR, Maurice Strong of Canada, who had 
also served as secretary general of the Rio Earth Summit in 1992. The panel organized itself into 
two subpanels, one on science and strategy headed by Bruce Alberts of the USA and MS Swami-
nathan of India, and the other on governance, structure and fi nance headed by Whitney MacMillan 
of the USA and Emil Salim of Indonesia. The panel consulted extensively with internal and external 
stakeholders. Halfway through the review, at the 1998 midterm meeting, Strong observed that the 
$5.2 billion expended on the CGIAR between 1972 and 1997 accounted for the virtual doubling of 
food production in developing countries and called the CGIAR “the best single investment for ODA, 
bar none.” When presenting the panel’s report later that year at the autumn meeting of the CGIAR, 
he concluded that “there can be no long-term agenda for eradicating poverty, ending hunger and 
ensuring sustainable food security without the CGIAR.”40 
The panel recommended a new mission statement for the CGIAR:
 ■ To contribute to food security and poverty eradication through research promot-
ing sustainable agricultural development based on the environmentally sound 
management of natural resources. This mission will be achieved through research 
leadership, partnership, capacity building, and policy dialogue.
It endorsed the two pillars of CGIAR work as being integrated gene management 
and integrated natural resource management and recommended that the CGIAR launch global 
initiatives or networks in both areas. In gene management, the panel saw the need for a coordi-
nating unit on biosafety, bioethics and bio-surveillance and a legal entity that could hold patents. 
To strengthen partnerships, the review recommended a new collaborative program on building the 
capacity of NARS with the priority on sub-Saharan Africa. 
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The system review made 29 principal recommendations, of which more than half were 
on governance and fi nance; without doubt, these were among the most controversial. Concerned with 
the lack of synergy in the operations of the system, the panel saw the answer in shifting to a corporate 
model, with formal legal status as a nonprofi t organization, a central board, an executive committee, a 
full-time chief executive offi cer and a chair. It recommended eliminating cosponsors as a separate group; 
streamlining committees, management processes and meetings; and a concerted effort to mobilize funding 
from the private sector. While recognizing the need for greater synergy among Centers and convinced of 
the need for consolidation, the panel did not address the structure of the Center system — suggesting, 
instead, that the CGIAR commission a separate management review on this. 
The recommendation to legalize the CGIAR met strong resistance from the Group, 
as did the idea of an executive committee. Serageldin summed up the sentiment at the 1999 midterm 
meeting: “CG will not be incorporated into a legal persona and no central committee will be making 
decisions on behalf of the Group.” With these exceptions, the CGIAR endorsed the thrust of the panel’s 
recommendations on scientifi c direction, partnerships, and management and fi nance, and it assigned 
responsibility to various CGIAR groups to come up with action proposals for discussion. One recom-
mendation was to phase out the regional representatives selected from each FAO region to amplify the 
voice of the South in the CGIAR forum. The Group agreed with this recommendation, as the number 
of developing country members had grown substantially since the founding of the CGIAR and there 
was no longer a need for special representation from developing countries. The system was phased 
out as the terms of the existing representatives expired. 
The agenda of the CGIAR during the remaining 2 years of the decade was dominated 
by follow-up to the system review. The Group agreed to take a fresh look at its vision, strategy and 
structure. TAC, now under the chairmanship of Emil Javier of the Philippines, was asked to prepare 
a proposal on vision and strategy. TAC and the Centers were asked to jointly address institutional 
change issues.
TAC’s vision statement introduced no change in what the CGIAR does but highlighted 
seven priority planks and suggested shifting to a more collaborative mode of operation through task 
forces. Part of TAC’s vision exercise was an electronic conference of CGIAR stakeholders on gover-
nance and structure. Options suggested by the participants included reorganizing along the lines of 
global and regional centers, establishing a single board to supervise all Centers, funding programs 
open to participation by all, and merging or consolidating existing Centers.
Meanwhile, the Centers, which were now operating more effectively as a group, 
were discussing among themselves alternative structural options for the future. After much debate they 
proposed creating a legal entity called the Federation of Centers, comprising the Centers, a federation 
board and a federation offi ce. The federation would perform all systemwide corporate functions, provid-
ing services to Centers as well as to donors, and would report annually to the CBC, CDC and CGIAR. 
The European donors of the CGIAR were also discussing options for the future 
structure of the CGIAR. Their proposal was for four regional programs servicing the needs of devel-
oping countries; a single, centrally managed CGIAR research facility; and fl exible, time-limited task 
forces drawn from Centers, NARS, NGOs, the private sector and advanced research institutions to 
address specifi c research issues.
With several proposals on the table on strategy and structure, the CGIAR asked 
Oversight Committee Chair Andrew Bennett of the United Kingdom to convene a meeting of stakehold-
ers to synthesize the various recommendations. The synthesis group concluded that (1) “no change” 
was not an option for the CGIAR, (2) a change process with some “quick wins” followed by more 
radical changes was necessary, and (3) the best way to achieve this would be by empowering a change 
team to formulate and implement the needed changes. It recommended that the CGIAR strengthen 
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its agenda-setting process, particularly regionally. On the proposal that Centers form a federation, the 
synthesis group felt that the idea was worth having the recommended change team explore further. 
The issues before the Group were not just on strategy and structure, as there were 
internal and external changes the Group needed to attend to. One such issue was climate change. 
The chair of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Robert Watson, had alerted the Group 
at the 1998 midterm meeting on global warming projections and the possible implications for agricul-
ture and agricultural research. Each Center was exploring potential areas of new research that could 
help address climate change. Collectively they established the Inter-Center Working Group on Climate 
Change under the chairmanship of Pedro Sanchez, director general of ICRAF, to develop an integrated 
strategy. An inventory of ongoing Center research projects dealing with climate change was prepared, 
showing the contributions the Centers were already making toward adaptation and mitigation. However, 
the group was unable to develop a collective, integrated strategy because the competitive instincts of 
Centers overpowered a collective spirit. The resulting “strategy” was no more than a collation of the 
existing programs of each Center related to adaptation and mitigation. 
Another issue was public health. HIV/AIDS and its implications for agricultural 
development and agricultural research were key concerns, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. The 
World Health Organization released data showing that HIV/AIDS and a few other serious diseases 
were sapping the economic growth potential of poor developing countries. Agricultural research could 
help in several areas, especially nutrition. IFPRI had represented the CGIAR at the 1993 International 
Nutrition Conference organized by FAO and the World Health Organization and had been working with 
the other Centers to explore ways of addressing zinc, vitamin A and iron defi ciencies through plant 
breeding and other research. As with climate change, Centers faced diffi culty agreeing on a collective 
strategy. One was developed a few years later in 2002, when the CGIAR initiated a new vehicle for 
collaborative research among Centers and their partners called Challenge Programs, which included 
a program on biofortifi cation, or breeding crops with heightened nutrient content. 
As the 1990s drew to a close, the CGIAR had acquired a growing and increasingly 
complex research agenda, with new subjects such as climate change and nutrition demanding a share 
of the resources. Internally, annual funding was in the range of $330-340 million, which was insuffi -
cient to tackle the research agenda. The outlook for ODA remained uncertain, and there were worry-
ing signs in the mode of fi nance. Restricted funding had risen from 23% of all funding in 1994/95 to 
39% in 1998, limiting Centers’ freedom to allocate resources to high-priority projects. A retrospective 
review of the CGIAR conducted for the World Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department concluded 
that, despite its proven success, the CGIAR “is a rather fragile institution, especially in its funding. 
New ways need to be explored to ensure the CGIAR’s sustainability in the future.”41
Management Challenges Faced by Centers
It was a highly challenging task, to say the least, to lead one of the Centers during 
this time. The days of directors serving as intellectual leaders of the research program were long gone. 
Centers faced the perennial problem of running a long-term research program with annual funding 
that was increasingly uncertain. World Bank funding could no longer be relied on as a last resort. 
This meant that donor relations had to receive the top priority on a director general’s agenda. As the 
accountability (or bureaucratic) requirements of the system had increased over the years, the direc-
tors and their Center management staff had to attend to numerous requests from TAC and the CGIAR 
Secretariat, not to mention the individual donors, each of which had its own reporting requirements. 
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As shielding scientists from these administrative tasks was a priority, the time directors had available 
to spend on managing science steadily dwindled. 
Perhaps the hardest task of all for directors was responding to funding shortfalls. 
As the Centers had no way to borrow, other than through ad hoc arrangements with the CGIAR Secre-
tariat, a sharp drop in funding required immediate staff downsizing. Practically all Centers faced this 
reality through the decade. As each country had its own labor laws, the means and consequences 
of downsizing differed among Centers. Continuing funding shortfalls meant another wave of downsiz-
ing, affecting the morale of staff and roiling the climate of uncertainty. Successive downsizings were 
usually followed by reorganization, which also unsettled staff. Thus, the CGIAR’s third decade was not 
a happy time for Centers or their managers and staff. 
A New Chair and a New Reform Agenda
Ian Johnson of the United Kingdom took over as chair of the CGIAR from Serageldin 
in mid-2000, as the system was grappling with these challenges. Johnson had been involved in 
establishing the Global Environment Facility and was convinced that the CGIAR needed to “elevate its 
game” to be able to make a larger difference in poverty alleviation and food security. At his fi rst CGIAR 
meeting in the autumn of that year, the main agenda item was charting the future of the CGIAR. For 
this, he offered a two pronged approach: actions for a few “quick wins” in the short term and actions 
with a medium- to long-term perspective to be decided by the end of the next midterm meeting. The 
agreed quick wins included pooling common services to Centers, experimenting with bottom-up prior-
ity setting on a pilot basis in one region, and reducing the number of CGIAR meetings to one per year 
starting in 2002. For the longer term, the Group agreed to coordinate a change process through an 
ad hoc steering group facilitated by a change design and management team appointed by the chair. 
The team was to develop a
 ■ restructuring plan for the system,
 ■ governance plan that streamlined decision-making, and
 ■ business plan to improve effi ciency and reduce overheads.
Thus, the third decade of the CGIAR came to an end as did the preceding decade, 
with the Group exploring how it could become a better instrument for development. Despite the upheavals 
and diffi culties, there was no question whether the CGIAR was making an impact, as evidence of Centers’ 
accomplishments accumulated. The debate was on how to sustain and broaden impact. A major piece 
of evidence had just come from the IAEG. The fi rst major study it had commissioned, on the impact 
of the CGIAR’s crop-improvement research, had just been completed. Led by Robert Evenson of Yale 
University, the study covered research conducted on 10 crops by 8 CGIAR Centers over 1965-1998. 
Beyond rice, wheat and maize, which had the longest history of research, the data showed that crop-
improvement research on sorghum, millet, barley, lentil, bean, cassava and potato also had signifi cant 
impact where CGIAR germplasm was adopted. Overall, 65% of the total area planted to these 10 crops 
was sown to improved varieties, and 60% of this was occupied by many of the 7,000+ varieties result-
ing from Center research. For every dollar invested in CGIAR research, $9 worth of additional food was 
being produced in developing countries. The counterfactual scenario — how the global food system 
would have evolved without CGIAR research — was sobering:
 ■ Developing countries would be producing 7-8% less food.
 ■ Their cultivated area would be 11-13 million hectares greater, at the expense of 
forests and other fragile environments.
 ■ Their per capita food consumption would be 5% lower.
 ■ Some 13-15 million more children would be malnourished.42
T
h
e
 C
G
IA
R
 a
t 
4
0
53
1
9
9
1
-2
0
0
0
: 
C
ri
s
is
 a
n
d
 t
h
e
 R
o
a
d
 t
o
 R
e
c
o
v
e
ry
 
54
T
h
e
 C
G
IA
R
 a
t 
4
0
55
THE CGIAR STARTED ITS FOURTH DECADE UNDER THE LEADERSHIP 
OF A NEW TEAM. FRANCISCO REIFSCHNEIDER OF BRAZIL HAD BEEN 
APPOINTED CGIAR DIRECTOR, REPLACING ALEXANDER VON DER 
OSTEN OF GERMANY, WHO HAD SERVED AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 
OF THE CGIAR THROUGHOUT THE 1990S. REIFSCHNEIDER HAD 
BEEN REPRESENTING BRAZIL AS A DONOR IN THE CGIAR AND 
WAS AN EXPERIENCED SCIENTIST AND SCIENCE MANAGER IN THE 
BRAZILIAN AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH CORPORATION (EMBRAPA). 
WHEREAS VON DER OSTEN HAD SERVED AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 
REIFSCHNEIDER HAD ELEVATED MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES 
IN THE CGIAR THAT WERE AKIN TO THOSE OF A CHIEF EXECUTIVE 
OFFICER, IN PART BECAUSE THE NEW CHAIR, JOHNSON, WOULD 
NOT BE ABLE TO DEVOTE AS MUCH TIME TO CGIAR MATTERS 
AS HAD HIS IMMEDIATE PREDECESSOR, SERAGELDIN.
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A New Change Agenda
Johnson appointed Margaret Catley-Carlson as chair of the Change Design and 
Management Team (CDMT). Catley-Carlson had signifi cant executive experience in her native Canada 
and internationally and was serving as the chair of the Global Water Partnership, a global network 
patterned after the CGIAR. Her team included both insiders (two Center directors and the manage-
ment adviser in the Secretariat) and outside experts. The CDMT fi nished its work in 4 months, meeting 
with the Johnson-led steering group several times during this period. 
The CDMT’s vision of the future CGIAR was a system focusing “a major part of its 
efforts on large multi-institutional research programs which address specifi c problem areas….”43 In 
line with this vision, it recommended that “substantial elements of CGIAR work should shift decisively 
to a programmatic approach in defi ning, fi nancing and managing research activities.”44 It suggested 
that the shift to programs, called Challenge Programs (CPs), should be gradual, starting with 2-4 and 
over a period of 5 years bringing about half of the CGIAR research agenda under CPs. 
The shift to CPs was seen as a way for the CGIAR to elevate its game, in Johnson’s 
terms. It would open up the system and help strengthen partnerships with NARS and other research 
actors. The challenges addressed through CPs would be attractive to the development assistance 
community and could help mobilize additional funds for the CGIAR. 
The CDMT’s other key recommendations included the following:
 ■ Executive Council. Appointed by and reporting to the Group, the Executive 
Council (ExCo) would execute the functions of the CGIAR between its annual 
general meetings (AGMs). It would be primarily a shareholders’ committee, with 
some non-donor ex-offi cio members, such as the chairs of the private sector 
and NGO committees, Science Council, CDC, CBC and GFAR.
 ■ Science Council. TAC would be transformed into the Science Council, focus-
ing on major science policy questions and the quality and relevance of science 
practiced in the system. In addition, the Science Council should help mobilize 
global and regional scientifi c expertise to support the research conducted by 
Centers and their partners. 
 ■ CGIAR System Offi ce. This newly established entity would encompass the 
CGIAR Secretariat, Future Harvest and other units providing service to the 
Centers or the CGIAR. 
Like the third system review before it, the CDMT largely ignored the restructur-
ing of Centers, arguing that its recommendation to shift to a programmatic approach would induce 
restructuring over time through market mechanisms. It recommended that the CGIAR set aside funds 
to encourage voluntary restructuring such as mergers or the formation of clusters, with two or more 
Centers grouping themselves into a cluster with a common board. This was seen as an evolutionary 
approach to restructuring, as contrasted with a top-down approach.
The report of the CDMT was the principal item on the agenda discussed at the last 
CGIAR midterm meeting in Durban, South Africa, in 2001. The meeting was held against the backdrop 
of the Millennium Development Goals newly minted at the United Nations Millennium Summit the 
preceding year and international interest in livestock diseases because of outbreaks of foot-and-mouth 
disease and mad-cow disease in Europe. At the opening of the meeting, Johnson reminded members 
that the CGIAR — whose efforts directly or indirectly infl uenced the achievability of several Millennium 
Development Goals, including halving the number of people living in extreme poverty by 2015, ensur-
ing environmental sustainability and reducing child mortality — now faced an even greater challenge 
to improve its performance and strengthen its impact. 
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Invaluable Contributions
I have had the privilege of witnessing the CGIAR’s growth starting with the Green Revolution 
era in mid-1960s. Today, the CGIAR is well recognized the world over as an important inter-
national system of agricultural research for development that has made invaluable contribu-
tions to global food security. Its partnership with national agricultural research systems has 
generated relevant production technologies. The system has been a major player in building 
much-needed human resource capacity in many developing countries.
The CGIAR system has evolved over the past 4 decades and is still changing to meet emerg-
ing challenges and stakeholders’ new expectations. As it changes, the CGIAR should maintain 
its focus on productivity gains and benefi ting poor farmers. The New CGIAR has to guard 
against eroded autonomy, increased bureaucracy, and imbalance between basic and strategic 
research that has relevance to the needs of poor smallholder farmers and of consumers. A 
renewed focus on translational research and innovations for impact is now needed. Increased 
resources must ensure required core funding for scientists. Inter-institutional linkages for 
farming systems’ research through CRPs will deliver desired results. The new SRF of the 
CGIAR must therefore yield much better research outputs and impact the world over.
In brief, the global community has gained enormously from the CGIAR system. If not for 
those visionaries who established the system, we would have to create it now. As the CGIAR 
already exists, we need to nurture it to the best of our ability to ensure its continued growth 
and further progress toward food and nutrition security and environmental protection.
Raj Paroda
Director General, Indian Council of Agricultural Research; Representative of India to the CGIAR; 
Board Chair, International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics; 
Chair, Global Forum on Agricultural Research
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The CGIAR endorsed the four main recommendations of the CDMT with some 
modifi cations. These were to serve as the four pillars of reform implemented over the next few years. 
The Group quickly established its interim ExCo to oversee the operationalization of the reforms. This 
closed down three CGIAR committees: the Consultative Council, Oversight Committee and Finance 
Committee. The interim ExCo met immediately following the midterm meeting in Durban and estab-
lished four task forces to develop action proposals on each pillar of reform for discussion by the CGIAR 
at its fi rst AGM, to be held in Washington, DC, in the autumn. 
Unlike the international Centers weeks that it replaced, the fi rst AGM of the CGIAR 
clearly demarcated the business meeting of the CGIAR, now shorter and attended by invitation only, 
from the larger stakeholder meeting that preceded it. The CGIAR took concrete decisions on how 
the four-pillar reform was to be implemented:
 ■ The 21-member ExCo was appointed and held its fi rst meeting immediately 
following the business meeting. ExCo was a committee of stakeholders, not a 
shareholder council as recommended by the CDMT, with 13 rotating members 
and 8 permanent members. The latter included the three cosponsors, which 
now included IFAD and excluded the United Nations Environment Programme 
at the latter’s request. ExCo would have a program committee and a fi nance 
committee, which were later disbanded because discussions in the full council 
replicated much of what the committees had discussed.
 ■ The eight-member Science Council (SC) was to be established, with the exist-
ing TAC serving as the interim SC.
 ■ The virtual System Offi ce, akin to a corporate offi ce, was to be established, 
bringing together the CGIAR Secretariat, Science Council Secretariat, Future 
Harvest Foundation and other entities providing common services to Centers. 
 ■ CGIAR would identify and fund up to three CPs on agreed themes on a pilot basis 
during 2002. These would be selected from among the 10 proposals developed 
by Centers prior to and during the AGM, several of them based on existing system-
wide or ecoregional programs. Subsequent CPs would follow an agreed process 
ranging from the generation of ideas to pre-proposal and full-proposal develop-
ment in successive stages, based on reviews by the SC and ExCo.
As the CGIAR began to implement these reforms, the link between agricul-
ture and development became more widely acknowledged in international forums such as the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002 and United Nations Secretary 
General Kofi  Annan’s Water, Energy, Health, Agriculture and Biodiversity Initiative on biodiversity 
and ecosystem management. 
Some Troubling Signs 
By the time the new reforms started, membership in the CGIAR had jumped to 62, 
of which 24 were developing countries, 22 developed countries, and the rest international or regional 
organizations and foundations. Funding for the system had been stable in nominal terms at about $340 
million in 2001, with 39% coming from European donors and 43% directed to sub-Saharan Africa. 
But there were some troubling signs. One was the increase in restricted funding to 57% from 36% in 
1992. The other was that Centers did not enjoy stability across the board. One Center had asked for 
additional support from the CGIAR to help it cope with downsizing costs. Several others were short 
of working capital. WARDA was affected by political instability in its host country, Côte d’Ivoire, which 
affected movement in and out of the country and threatened the well-being of staff and their families. 
Several components of the system mobilized by WARDA and the Secretariat, including the UNDP, the 
World Bank and France, helped relocate staff and dependents from Bouaké initially to Abidjan and 
later to IITA facilities in Benin. 
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Another Center, ISNAR, had been judged to be performing below the expected 
standard, with only modest impact according to its own studies and the external program and 
management review (EPMR) panel that conducted the evaluation. By now ISNAR had a 20-year 
history but had not been able to develop itself into a successful research-based service insti-
tute. The panel saw three options for the future of ISNAR: (1) retooling and re-staffi ng the Center 
to build needed capacity, (2) turning it into a decentralized service-oriented entity operating in 
developing regions (the panel recommendation), or (3) phasing out the Center and transferring 
its most vital functions to other Centers. 
The CGIAR faced the possibility of phasing out one of its original 13 Centers. A 
task force called the ISNAR restructuring team was established to study all restructuring options. It 
recommended transferring the governance and programs of ISNAR to IFPRI, in effect following the 
panel’s third option.45 ExCo and the CGIAR agreed. This meant that the CGIAR, an entity without legal 
status, would need to convince an autonomous, legally established international institution to phase 
itself out. The actual decision of the CGIAR, at its 2003 AGM in Manila, read: “The CGIAR requests 
the ISNAR Board to adopt a resolution dissolving ISNAR and to submit [to] ExCo a plan for the dispo-
sition of ISNAR’s assets for approval by the CGIAR.”46 This was a prime example of how the power of 
the purse worked in an informal organization like the CGIAR. The costs of closing ISNAR were borne 
by a few donors led by the World Bank. ISNAR became a division of IFPRI and was relocated in Ethio-
pia, carrying out some functions of the former Center. The long-term effect of the CGIAR’s decision 
to close ISNAR has yet to be studied.
The World Bank Meta Evaluation of the CGIAR
At the 2002 AGM, the same at which the ISNAR EPMR was discussed, the Group 
was briefed by the World Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department, which had been conduct-
ing a meta evaluation of the CGIAR as part of an evaluation of all global programs it was involved 
with. Led by Uma Lele, a senior advisor in the Operations Evaluation Department and a former 
member of TAC, the meta evaluation turned into yet another review of the system. It made some 
recommendations internal to the World Bank on how to handle the CGIAR, such as eliminating 
confl icts of interest arising from the different roles played by the bank, and some recommenda-
tions on the strategic directions the CGIAR had been following in the aftermath of the third system 
review and the report of the CDMT. 
The report concluded that the CGIAR was “less focused” than in earlier years 
because of the decline in the share of its resources devoted to increasing productivity, which was a 
consequence of increased research investment in natural resource management and biodiversity. It 
argued that the CGIAR’s “current mix of activities refl ects neither its comparative advantage nor its 
core competence” and cautioned against the steep rise in restricted funding. It listed the following as 
key factors explaining the changes in research mix and type of funding: 
 ■ “the unpopularity of germplasm improvement research in the constituencies of 
some key donors due to negative perceptions of the Green Revolution initially 
and of biotechnology more recently, 
 ■ “the CGIAR’s justifi ed response to the second-generation environmental pressures 
on soils and water created by the radical changes in farming systems during 
the Green Revolution, 
 ■ “the rise of environmentalism and growing environmental advocacy in donor 
countries, and
 ■ “the weakening of many national agricultural research systems,” which had led 
donors to turn to Centers to fi ll the vacuum, thus shifting Centers’ focus away 
from creating global public goods toward contributing to the generation of local 
and national public goods.47 
T
h
e
 C
G
IA
R
 a
t 
4
0
61
2
0
0
1
-2
0
1
0
: 
T
o
w
a
rd
 a
 N
e
w
 C
G
IA
R
 
T
h
e
 C
G
IA
R
 a
t 
4
0
62
2
0
0
1
-2
0
1
0
: 
T
o
w
a
rd
 a
 N
e
w
 C
G
IA
R
 
The meta evaluation criticized the transformation of TAC into the SC because 
this was seen as weakening the role of this advisory body in setting priorities and monitoring the 
allocation and use of resources. It also criticized the initiation of CPs before fi rst addressing issues 
of systemwide funding, priority setting and governance. Finally, it recommended that the CGIAR 
adopt a written charter, which was already in an advanced stage of preparation.
At the next AGM, Ian Johnson briefed the Group on the reaction of the World 
Bank to the evaluation. The bank’s board had found the conclusion that the CGIAR was less focused 
“potentially too sweeping.”48 With regard to potential confl icts of interest in the handling of the CGIAR 
within the World Bank, the board separated management and oversight responsibilities vis-à-vis 
the CGIAR. The Group noted the analysis and observations of the meta evaluation, agreeing with 
several, such as reversing the trend towards restricted funding, but taking no steps toward chang-
ing the research mix or the responsibilities of the SC. 
Implementing Reform 
ExCo’s existence facilitated the implementation of the agreed reforms. While the 
four pillars constituted the core of the reform agenda, a few additional changes were introduced as 
well, following discussion and approval by the CGIAR. 
Challenge Programs. The CGIAR endorsed the implementation of two CPs a year. 
The fi rst was the multi-stakeholder Challenge Program on Water and Food, administratively coordinated 
by IWMI toward generating research-based knowledge on growing more food with less water. The 
second, HarvestPlus (initially titled Biofortifi ed Crops for Improved Human Nutrition), was co-convened 
by IFPRI and CIAT toward reducing micronutrient malnutrition through research to breed staple foods 
with heightened nutrient content, particularly of iron, zinc and vitamin A. The third was the Genera-
tion Challenge Programme (initially titled Unlocking Genetic Diversity in Crops for the Resource-Poor), 
jointly coordinated by CIMMYT, IRRI and IPGRI toward using the latest advances in molecular biology 
to create a new generation of crops to meet farmers’ needs. 
While these three pilot CPs proposed by the Centers were being identified, 
the CP process was opened to allow the public at large to submit CP ideas. One of these, called 
Improving Livelihoods and Natural Resource Management in Sub-Saharan Africa: Securing the 
Future for Africa’s Children (SSA CP) was approved for full proposal development. Unlike the 
three pilot CPs, this program was to be coordinated by an institution outside the CGIAR, the 
Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa, with CGIAR Centers and other institutions participat-
ing as partners. The program was to use an innovative methodology executed at three inten-
sive research “learning sites” across SSA. Following several iterations, the proposal was finally 
approved for 5 years.
The CP process was frozen for a few years in response to pressure from Centers 
and some donors. The CPs had created two classes of Centers: those who led CPs and those who 
did not. The ones leading CPs were satisfi ed with the additional funding they received. Those who 
did not argued that CPs were taking funding away from the Centers and weakening Center programs. 
While some donors were happy to provide funding to CPs, notably those who were unwilling to provide 
core funding to Centers, others criticized how CPs were identifi ed. No strategic framework provided 
a rationale for the selected CPs; an ad hoc process had been used for the pilot CPs, and a more 
robust framework for identifying the next group of CPs was needed. The process was unfrozen in 
2006, after a new set of priorities was identifi ed, but only one CP was introduced, the Challenge 
Program on Climate Change, Food Security and Agriculture, because a new reform program was 
being planned, initiated by the new chair, Kathy Sierra.
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Science Council. The CGIAR appointed a working group under the chairmanship 
of Mohammed Hassan, the Sudanese executive director of the Third World Academy of Sciences, to 
further defi ne the role of the new SC. Hassan and his team clarifi ed the mission of the new SC and 
recommended that it consist of six members plus the chair. The SC should also include, said the team, 
the chair of the Standing Panel on Impact Assessment, the successor to the IAEG. The SC should 
establish three standing panels on strategies and priorities, monitoring and evaluation, and mobilizing 
science, each chaired by an SC member and including two additional external members. In addition 
to the six new members, two members from the interim SC should continue for a year for continuity.
Hassan then chaired a search and nomination committee to identify potential 
members for the new SC. While the search continued, the interim SC met responsibilities under the 
leadership of Emil Javier of the Philippines. The Hassan committee recommended, and ExCo and 
the CGIAR agreed to, appointing Per Pinstrup-Andersen of Denmark as the SC chair. An economist, 
Pinstrup-Andersen had served as a member of TAC and later as director general of IFPRI for 10 years. 
One of the fi rst responsibilities of the new SC was to develop a new set of priorities for the CGIAR while 
strengthening scientifi c linkages between the CGIAR and the global scientifi c community. 
System Offi ce. The CGIAR was spending about $10 million annually on the provi-
sion of corporate services for the Group and the Centers. These services were provided by several 
units working in various locations with various supervision arrangements and little coordination. The 
objective of establishing the System Offi ce was to instill strategic coherence to the services through 
better planning, coordinated implementation and increased communication. 
Several of these units or services, such as the CGIAR Secretariat and the SC Secre-
tariat, had been in existence for a long time (the latter as the TAC Secretariat). Others had a shorter 
history, such as the Gender & Diversity Program, Internal Audit Unit, Central Advisory Service on Intel-
lectual Property and Future Harvest Foundation, but each had an established track record. Absent in the 
corporate service portfolio were three key functions: information and communication, human resource 
management and media support. The CGIAR director and the Center directors fi lled the void by estab-
lishing the position of chief information offi cer to plan and coordinate information technology, informa-
tion management and knowledge management; the Strategic Advisory Service for Human Resources 
to codify the human resources policies of participating Centers and provide advice on human resources 
policy and practice; and the Media Unit to develop and implement media strategies to garner coverage 
Change for Good
Saying that the international agricultural research system has changed since I joined CIAT 
in 1969 would be a gross understatement. This is clearly illustrated in this publication. I 
believe most of the change has been for the good of the system and for the people and 
natural environment that the system aims to serve. The transition from a system tolerating 
a few economists to the current outstanding contributions of the system’s economics and 
policy research is remarkable. So is the transition from a few single Centers, each pursuing 
its own priorities with great success, to a network of 15 Centers with increasing emphasis 
on collaboration on key system priorities. 
As the chair of the Science Council, I became convinced that the whole of CGIAR contribu-
tions would be much greater than the sum of each individual Center’s work if the Centers 
would emphasize collective action around a few key challenges facing food systems in devel-
oping countries. I am glad to see movement in that direction. Beginning at CIAT in 1969 and 
ending at IFPRI in 2003, with a couple of escapes in between, I have been privileged to be 
part of the most successful agricultural development effort the world has ever seen. It has 
been a tremendous tour de force. 
Per Pinstrup-Andersen
Center staff, International Center for Tropical Agriculture; Member, CGIAR Technical Advisory Committee; 
Director General, International Food Policy Research Institute; Chair, CGIAR Science Council
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of Centers’ achievements and impacts. To these was added the service unit of the CDC, which was later 
turned into the service offi ce of the Alliance of CGIAR Centers (described below).
Forming the virtual System Offi ce was an institutional experiment. Its design was 
based on advice from a prominent management consulting fi rm. In the absence of common supervi-
sion, the experiment had limited success in integrating functions, except perhaps in communications, 
for which the Centers, the Secretariat, the Future Harvest Foundation, and later the Media Unit began 
to conduct common campaigns. The System Offi ce experiment had modest impact, though, toward 
improving communication among the units under that umbrella with an annual planning workshop. 
CGIAR Charter. The establishment of ExCo, the SC and the virtual System Offi ce, 
and the elimination of some former CGIAR committees, had changed the institutional landscape of the 
CGIAR in signifi cant ways. Each of the new groups and units had its terms of reference and rules of 
procedure. Most importantly, the Consultative Group was increasingly recognized as the key decision-
making body in the system. Earlier papers on the roles and responsibilities of committees and units of 
the CGIAR had become obsolete and needed to be replaced by a more comprehensive and authori-
tative document. The void was fi lled by developing the CGIAR Charter with help from an advisory 
committee that included representatives of all components of the system. The Charter was adopted 
by acclamation at the 2004 AGM. The informal group established 33 years before had adopted, for 
the fi rst time, a formal charter.
Performance Measurement System. While for many organizations, including 
CGIAR member organizations, institutional performance is measured annually, Center performance 
was assessed in the CGIAR once every 5 years through EPMRs. ExCo provided the green light for 
building the Performance Measurement System for the CGIAR and appointed two of its members 
to chair a working group to guide its development. The Centers, the SC, the Secretariat and external 
experts were involved in its development.
The Performance Measurement System was seen to provide a tool to Centers for 
decision-making, a tool to donors for resource allocation, a tool for learning through benchmarking, 
and a means of demonstrating accountability. It would not replace any of existing planning or evaluation 
process, and each donor and Center would use the information as it saw fi t. The data would be provided 
by each Center annually and verifi ed externally, with assistance from the CGIAR’s Internal Audit Unit. 
The design of the system began in 2003 and continued as it was piloted in the 2004 
calendar year. It had two groups of indicators: (1) results measured by outputs, outcomes, impacts 
and stakeholder perceptions and (2) indicators refl ecting the Center’s potential to perform such as 
quality of staff, quality and relevance of programs, institutional health including the performance of 
the board, and fi nancial health. Each indicator was successively revised to improve its reliability, valid-
ity and practicality.49
ExCo paid special attention to the fi nancial performance indicators generated by 
the Performance Management System. Refl ecting both the short-term and the long-term fi nancial 
health of each Center annually, these indicators provided evidence of improvement or deterioration of 
Centers’ fi nancial status. The CGIAR chair sent letters to the board of a Center receiving “red fl ags” (an 
indicator refl ecting performance below an accepted standard) requesting the board to take corrective 
action to improve the Center’s fi nancial health. Several donors, led by the World Bank, paid attention 
to indicators they considered important to their resource-allocation decisions for each Center, such 
as on board performance, gender staffi ng and the quality of science. 
Strategic communications. An additional area of reform was system communi-
cation. A communications adviser position was created at the Secretariat, and a strategic, science-
based communications program was developed with strong collaboration from Centers. The program 
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planned and produced events and publications aimed at key constituencies, expanded the presence 
of the CGIAR on the web, strengthened the system’s and partners’ media culture, organized media 
workshops (some combined with leadership courses offered to senior managers in the system), and 
helped align communications across the system. 
Handling of meetings. Additional reforms covered the business processes of the 
CGIAR. Meetings became shorter (1½ days for ExCo meetings and 2 days for the business meeting 
portion of the AGM), with minutes of meetings circulated within a week. A digital voting system was 
used at the end of each agenda item to assess members’ satisfaction with the manner in which the 
item was handled and inform corrective action when required. The CGIAR membership was asked to 
assess ExCo’s performance each year, and ExCo was asked to assess the Secretariat’s performance. 
ExCo and the CGIAR experimented with virtual, or electronic, decision-making, with the process 
improved over time. These innovations helped enhance transparency and accountability in the Group. 
Center Consolidation Back on the Agenda
The CDMT’s recommendation to rely on market forces for structural change had 
not yielded any results, despite the modest incentives offered by the donor community. At the same 
time, the Group was frustrated by fragmented and disjointed actions to address common problems 
or problems particular to a region, in particular sub-Saharan Africa, where about half of the CGIAR’s 
resources were directed and repeated past attempts to align Centers’ operations had not borne any 
fruit. The structure issue surfaced again during discussion of the ICRISAT EPMR in 2003. The review 
panel had recommended moving ICRISAT’s headquarters and all its programs, except the strategic 
plant genetic resources program and the genebank, from India to Africa. It became clear during the 
discussion in ExCo that ICRISAT’s possible move to Africa could not be separated from the larger 
strategic and structural questions on how the entire system was organized in sub-Saharan Africa. 
At the 2003 AGM, the discussion of ICRISAT followed on the heels of the CGIAR 
decision on ISNAR, which involved basing part of the ISNAR program in sub-Saharan Africa. Passion-
ate and strong opposition from the delegate from India to moving ICRISAT’s headquarters to Africa 
showed that, after many years of hosting the Center, Indians considered it as much an asset to India 
as it was of the global community — a view shared by several other members. 
In the usual CGIAR fashion, the Group favored a comprehensive examination of 
CGIAR operations in sub-Saharan Africa and their issues and options. Two task forces were estab-
lished, one to examine options for the programmatic alignment of CGIAR operations in sub-Saharan 
Africa and the other on structural options and organizational alignment. ExCo discussed the reports of 
the task forces in two meetings in 2005, with interim decisions made by the Group on a virtual basis, 
followed by further discussion at the 2005 AGM. 
Not unlike the previous system review, the task forces saw the need for the CGIAR to 
agree to establish a process toward consolidating all CGIAR Centers and activities in one global corpo-
rate entity. They recommended that this principle guide regional restructuring, with the fi rst step being 
consolidating all Centers headquartered in sub-Saharan Africa into two entities, one for West and Central 
Africa and the other for East and Southern Africa. The two Centers located in West and Central Africa 
(IITA and WARDA) should operate under a single board, and a similar CGIAR corporate entity should be 
established in East and Southern Africa, with ILRI and ICRAF as its fi rst two constituent bodies. 
While the rationale behind these recommendations enjoyed support in the CGIAR, 
members questioned whether making such dramatic changes in structure would be wise without 
considering what should be done in other regions. Also, the recommendations faced serious hurdles: 
WARDA was an intergovernmental organization, and the CGIAR had no right to take decisions on 
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its behalf (leaving aside the practicality of blending the governance structures of IITA and WARDA); 
as ILRI and ICRAF had very little in common in terms of goals and activities, would it be prudent 
to have them governed by the same corporate entity? These and similar concerns led the CGIAR to 
agree on a more pragmatic and less revolutionary approach: separating the “alignment” question into 
three components: programmatic, administrative (corporate services), and governance. Programmati-
cally, Centers should align their plans and programs through medium-term plans to be prepared for 
each subregion. In terms of corporate services, the two Centers in each subregion should align their 
corporate service arrangements such as common purchasing, fi nance and human resource services. 
With respect to governance alignment, WARDA and IITA should aim to have a common board by the 
beginning of 2007, while ICRAF, ILRI, and other Centers operating in East and Southern Africa should 
prepare a “think piece” on structural options. 
This turned out to be yet another evolutionary approach to consolidation and struc-
tural change. Implementation was slow, as reported a year later at the 2006 AGM, and practically 
nonexistent on governance alignment. The Group began to ask whether the larger need was to develop 
a new vision for the system. 
Fine-Tuning Aspects of Governance 
Besides striving to address continuing challenges regarding its structure, the system 
was under pressure to fi ne-tune three aspects of governance: relations with civil society organizations 
(CSOs), the governance of individual centers and the governance of Centers collectively.
Relations with CSOs and the private sector. The need to reexamine relations 
with these sectors became apparent at the 2002 AGM in Manila, when the NGO Committee repre-
sentative informed the membership that the committee would freeze its relationship with the CGIAR 
and disengage “because of concerns that the CGIAR was following a corporate-led agenda.”50 This 
decision came as the CGIAR was considering how farmers’ organizations could best be represented 
in the CGIAR forum. The Group decided to commission a review of its partnership committees, and at 
the Group’s request ExCo appointed a panel headed by Keith Bezanson of Canada. The panel would 
examine how successful the partnership committees had been and whether there were more effi cient 
ways to achieve committees’ missions. 
The panel recommended that the CGIAR continue the Private Sector Committee for 
2-4 more years in a market-testing mode, to enable the committee to implement its recently planned 
partnership-strengthening strategy. Regarding the NGO Committee, the panel concluded that “the relation-
ship is seriously damaged and cannot be repaired in the absence of a new, constructive and clear 
basis for discourse”51 and recommended leaving the relationship frozen for the time being. The CGIAR 
agreed with the panel’s recommendation on the Private Sector Committee, which continued to function 
throughout the decade. Regarding relations with CSOs, the Group agreed to expand engagement activi-
ties already underway such as the Innovation Marketplace, Farmers Dialogue and Farmers Exchange; 
organize a CSO forum to precede the 2006 AGM; and further strengthen its relationship with GFAR. 
The CSO Forum in 2006 was a fi rst in CGIAR history. Attended by close to 400 
participants, the forum identifi ed several possible avenues for collaboration between CSOs and the 
CGIAR, including tapping regional fora and GFAR as opportunities for dialogue. Two immediate outcomes 
of the forum were the appointment of a farmers’ organization representative to ExCo to fi ll the vacant 
seat for CSOs and the closure of the dormant NGO Committee. 
Stripe review of Center board performance. The second area of governance for 
fi ne-tuning involved Centers and their boards. The CBC and the Secretariat commissioned in 2004 a 
stripe review of Center board performance in view of performance weaknesses reported in some EPMRs. 
Overlapping Interests
The CGIAR has made tremendous contributions to agriculture, food security and livelihood 
improvement. The view looking in from a private sector perspective showed the system to 
be extremely complex. The formation of the private sector committee marked the CGIAR’s 
formal engagement with the agriculture industry. While there are many overlapping areas of 
interest between the two groups, engaging with the industry was not a concept that came 
easily to most members of the CGIAR. There was great enthusiasm in the private sector 
to engage, as the ultimate objective of improving agriculture was a common platform, and 
great enthusiasm still exists regarding the many complementarities between the groups. This 
hesitation to engage with the industry did not allow for the strongest of bonds to be forged 
between the two groups. The need to have stronger ties with the industry is more urgent 
today than ever before, given the technological advances made and the benefi ts some of 
the technologies can bring to the marginalized and poor. 
Few of the diverse members of the Private Sector Committee could grasp the governance 
structure of the CGIAR, with its layers of reporting and decision-making. Restructuring in 
particular was daunting, and we could not always understand the logic behind it, especially 
when the outcomes of restructuring resulted in no quantum changes. 
The CGIAR is a unique body that is present in some of the world’s most physically and politi-
cally challenging environments. A stronger partnership would benefi t both the private sector 
and the system.  
Usha Barwale Zehr
Member & later Chair, CGIAR Private Sector Committee; Member, CGIAR Executive Council; 
Board Member, International Rice Research Institute & International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center. 
T
h
e
 C
G
IA
R
 a
t 
4
0
68
2
0
0
1
-2
0
1
0
: 
T
o
w
a
rd
 a
 N
e
w
 C
G
IA
R
 
T
h
e
 C
G
IA
R
 a
t 
4
0
69
2
0
0
1
-2
0
1
0
: 
T
o
w
a
rd
 a
 N
e
w
 C
G
IA
R
 
Samuel Paul of India was appointed chair of a three-person team. The review found the performance 
of Center boards to be “uneven,” particularly with respect to overseeing strategy and fi nance. It recom-
mended smaller boards numbering 9-11 members, with no more than one host country representa-
tive (some Centers had as many as three), two CGIAR nominees (several had more), and at least two 
members with experience in fi nance. It recommended more frequent board meetings and suggested 
several procedural changes.52
The CGIAR endorsed the recommendations of the stripe review and asked the 
Centers to implement them, reporting to ExCo on their progress. ExCo asked the Secretariat and 
CBC to update the existing CGIAR guidelines for Center boards, taking into account the recommen-
dations of the review. An immediate impact of the review was the inclusion of at least two individuals 
with fi nance experience on Center boards. A few Centers reduced the size of their boards, with one 
operating with only seven members. The recommendation on reducing the number of host country 
representatives to one was not found to be feasible on political grounds. The Secretariat issued an 
updated set of board guidelines in 2007. 
Collective organization of the Centers. The CBC and CDC had operated as two 
apex coordinating bodies on common affairs of the Centers for over 2 decades. Chairs of both partici-
pated in ExCo as full members and represented Centers’ views in CGIAR meetings. In 2006 the Centers 
agreed to form an alliance, in some ways similar to their earlier proposal to establish a federation, with 
the CDC becoming the alliance executive and the CBC the alliance board, both assisted by an alliance 
offi ce. The two main purposes of the Alliance of the CGIAR Centers were to facilitate and implement 
collective action and to enable Centers to speak with one voice. 
The CGIAR welcomed the establishment of the Alliance. The Charter was amended 
to incorporate the changes in the organization of the Centers. The Alliance Offi ce became a part of the 
CGIAR System Offi ce. As the Alliance had enabled the Centers to speak with one voice, the Centers’ 
representation in ExCo and the CGIAR was reduced to one seat. 
The Centers’ formation of the Alliance coincided with the chairmanship of the 
CGIAR passing from Ian Johnson, who had decided to retire from the World Bank, to Kathy Sierra, 
an American who had replaced him as vice president in an expanded World Bank vice presidency.
Toward Deeper Reform
When Sierra took over as chair, total contributions to the CGIAR had reached $450 
million and the membership of the Group stood at 64. The top fi ve contributors were, in descending 
order, the United States, the World Bank, the United Kingdom, Canada and the European Commis-
sion, each contributing more than $30 million. The top developing country contributors were Nigeria, 
India, Brazil, China and Turkey, all contributing more than $1.0 million. CIAT was the largest Center in 
terms of expenditures, with a budget of $42 million, and WARDA the smallest, spending $11 million.53 
By this time the FAO Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
had completed negotiations to prepare the International Treaty on PGRFA, with regular support from 
IPGRI and the CGIAR Systemwide Genetic Resources Program. The treaty had come into force in 
2004, and the Centers had signed agreements with the Governing Body of the Treaty, placing about 
650,000 accessions of plant genetic resources under the purview of the treaty. The Centers began 
using the standard material transfer agreement of the treaty whenever transferring germplasm, using 
it not only for plants covered by the treaty.54
On the strategy front, the SC had developed and the CGIAR approved a new set of system 
priorities for the next 10 years. Following a comprehensive global analysis of needs and opportunities, the 
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SC had linked the CGIAR goal with fi ve priority areas, which together contained 20 priorities addressed 
by over 100 activities. The analysis showed the contribution of each priority to the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals. The fi ve priority areas were similar to the earlier classifi cations of CGIAR activities: 
 ■ sustaining biodiversity;
 ■ genetic improvement;
 ■ agricultural diversifi cation; 
 ■ management of land, water and forest resources; and
 ■ improving policies and facilitating institutional innovation.
While the new system priorities had strong rationale and the Group had endorsed 
them, they alone could not serve as a driver of change. Approval by the CGIAR was insuffi cient to 
encourage the Centers to align their programs with the new priorities. Unlike the old TAC, the SC did 
not have a “carrot” to offer the Centers for realigning their programs, and the CGIAR did not have a 
“stick” because it was only an informal consultative body, with no legal authority over Centers. One 
sure way the new priorities could be enforced was for each and every donor to agree to abide by them 
in making their grants to Centers. Some donors paid strong attention to SC recommendations when 
making their allocations. But all donors had their own priorities to consider fi rst. As a result, the SC’s 
efforts to generate buy-in for the priorities were quite premature.  
During her fi rst year as chair, Sierra faced the departure of two of her key associates, 
Francisco Reifschneider and Per Pinstrup-Andersen, both of whom decided to return to their research 
and academic posts in Brazil and the United States, respectively. They were replaced by Ren Wang 
of China, who became the CGIAR director, and Rudy Rabbinge of the Netherlands, who became the 
SC chair. Like their predecessors, they were both experienced in research and the CGIAR. Wang had 
served as vice president of the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Science and deputy director general 
of IRRI. Rabbinge had led CGIAR task forces on sustainability and served as the chair of the IRRI 
board. Thus, as in the fi rst half of the decade, the CGIAR was led by a new team in its second half. 
Although funding for the CGIAR had been increasing, there were several worry-
ing signs on the ODA front. The boom years of the 1970s and 80s, when agriculture was given high 
priority, were long gone, as demand for ODA funds came increasingly from other sectors like health, 
education and energy. ODA to agriculture had declined from $6.2 billion in 1980 to 2.3 billion in 2003 
(converted to 2002 dollars), and support to agriculture from the multilateral development agencies 
similarly declined from $3.4 billion to $0.5 billion over the same period.55 Consequently, the CGIAR 
had been taking an increasingly large share of agriculture ODA over time, which could not continue 
for too long. To complicate matters, new claims on donor funds were likely, as the previously dormant 
CP process had been restarted and ExCo had provided a green light for preparing proposals in three 
areas: climate change, high-value crops, and desertifi cation. In view of growing global concern over 
climate change, the Group agreed at the 2007 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali, 
Indonesia, to pursue as well a CGIAR strategic initiative on climate change and to double research 
related to climate change.
Also troubling were the distribution and composition of funding to the CGIAR. 
Funding growth was not shared equally among Centers, with a few Centers facing serious diffi culties, 
as refl ected with the “red fl ags” they received on fi nancial indicators of the Performance Measurement 
System. Regarding composition, the share of funding that was restricted continued to grow, reach-
ing for the system as a whole 64% in 2007. For some Centers it was over 70%, with several serious 
implications. Having less funding that was unrestricted meant that the Centers had less freedom to 
allocate funds to high-priority projects, leaving some unfunded. Also, restricted funds could, unless 
chosen with great care, introduce distortions to the program directions of a Center and of the system. 
The danger was that a Center could  turn into a consulting fi rm and lose the coherence of its research 
program. The CGIAR needed a coherent program not only at the system level but also at each Center. 
Knowledge Intensifi cation
The enormous increase of the world population since the middle of the 20th century has 
not caused an increase in famine or a decrease in the availability of food worldwide. The 
improved availability of food (leaving aside how it is used or how accessible it is to the poor) 
arises mainly from intensifi cation and much less from the expansion of cultivated area. This 
six- to eightfold higher productivity per hectare and per unit of labor — and, counterintuitively, 
per kilogram of external inputs such as fertilizer — mainly refl ects knowledge intensifi cation. 
The CGIAR has played a vital and pivotal role in this respect. It has contributed to the increase 
in intervention based on insight and technology, the establishment of new and up-to-date 
institutions, and the formulation of policies attuned to the possibilities and needs of the 
developing world. In its 40 years of existence, the CGIAR has gone through seven phases of 
development as defi ned by the research agenda and the involvement of outside partners. No 
other nonprofi t multilateral organization has had such enormous impact. The continuing and 
intensifying need for this informal, mission-driven and demand-oriented nonprofi t organization 
is the raison d’être of the CGIAR. The passion of CGIAR scientists; the CGIAR’s relentless 
battle for excellence, impact and relevance; and the willingness of the donor community to 
sponsor such a politically neutral but policy-relevant and irreplaceable organization cannot 
be debated. It is an honor and a privilege to be part of the organization and to help fulfi ll its 
honorable task for mankind.
Rudy Rabbinge
Board Chair, International Rice Research Institute; Chair, CGIAR Science Council
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There would be no problem if restricted projects were part of a coherent Center program and that 
program was aligned with system priorities. 
The CGIAR’s experience of a shift toward restricted funding was not unique. It was 
part of a trend in the donor community from funding institutions to funding programs and projects. 
New global initiatives were being structured mainly in program and project terms, such as the Global 
Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria; Fast Track Initiative for Education for All; Global Alliance 
for Vaccines and Immunizations; Cities Alliance; and Global Environment Facility. Program and project 
funding provided a more direct and transparent link between funding and results than could the more 
opaque funding of institutions. This is why the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation chose to support 
individual Center programs or projects instead of becoming a core donor to the CGIAR. Over time, 
the Gates Foundation became one of the largest fi nancial supporters of CGIAR programs, contributing 
$61 million in 2009 and $71 million in 2010, by selectively choosing the CGIAR activities it believed 
would make the greatest impact on agricultural development. 
Many donors were disturbed that the existing funding arrangements did not ensure 
the alignment of funding with the system’s agreed priorities. ExCo’s ad hoc Committee on Funding 
System Priorities, chaired by Jonathan Wadsworth of the United Kingdom, assessed this alignment 
question in a few sample cases and found that there were mismatches and gaps that left priorities 
unfunded. There was also concern the 20 system priorities were not ranked or otherwise distinguished, 
which exacerbated allocation decisions. 
The system faced not one but several alignment challenges, most notably aligning 
funding with system priorities, aligning Center programs with regional priorities, and aligning Center activi-
ties with partner activities. An alignment forum held before the ExCo meeting in Madrid in May 2007 
concluded that the CGIAR should initiate a facilitated change management process to address these and 
other alignment issues. This was very much in line with the thinking of the Alliance, which argued that 
the CGIAR needed to build on the reforms made at the beginning of the decade and reposition itself to 
address current and emerging challenges more effectively. ExCo and the CGIAR agreed. As a fi rst step 
a scoping team led by Peter Core of Australia was formed to shape the change management initiative.
A Second Change Management Initiative
The CGIAR started its second change management initiative in a decade when the 
importance of agricultural development was once again enjoying heightened recognition globally. The World 
Development Report 200856 called attention to expanding demand for food, feed and biofuels; the conse-
quences of climate change; rising energy prices; and the worsening scarcity of water and other natural 
resources. More sustainable production systems were needed, which the CGIAR could play a signifi cant 
role in providing, as well as higher government spending on agriculture in least-developed countries. The 
report also highlighted how agricultural subsidies in rich countries weakened the competitiveness and 
income potential of agriculture in developing countries and underscored the need to reform policies in 
both groups of countries. The World Bank advocated a new “agriculture for development” agenda, akin to 
McNamara’s call in the 1970s for a rural development agenda, and indicated it would continue increasing 
its lending to agriculture. This caught the attention of world leaders, and the Group of Eight declared its 
commitment to addressing this structural crisis at their 34th Summit in Hokkaido, Japan, on 7-9 July 2008.57
In retrospect, the timing of the World Development Report 2008 was very fortunate, 
as it pointed to solutions to problems in agriculture. The relevance of the report’s policy prescriptions 
became clearer, as did the role of investment in research, when severe food shortages began to be 
felt in poor developing countries and rising food prices sparked food riots. The Economist noted in 
its April 2008 issue that “the way to feed the world is not to bring more land under cultivation, but to 
increase yields, i.e., through science.”58
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Increasing yields through science had been demonstrated time and time again 
throughout the CGIAR’s history. But empirical evidence of the impact of research on natural resource 
management and policy advice was insuffi cient. Studies started by the CGIAR’s Standing Panel on 
Impact Assessment were now showing some results. A set of fi ve micro case studies of research projects 
on managing natural resources showed that their internal rates of return were comparable to rates of 
return typically achieved by many agricultural innovations, though they were not as high as returns on 
crop improvement research. These returns did not, however, take into account the less-measurable 
environmental benefi ts from the projects. Regarding policy-oriented research, eight studies provided 
some quantitative assessment of impacts in terms of benefi ts. These ranged from tens to hundreds 
of millions of dollars each, with internal rates of return over 60%. Clearly, measuring the impacts of 
either natural resource management or policy-oriented research is fraught with methodological diffi -
culties. Nevertheless, the limited evidence available suggested that the payoffs on investments in all 
types of agricultural research were signifi cant.59
Ironically, the start of the change management initiative coincided with a scheduled 
independent review of the CGIAR system that the World Bank required as part of its support to global 
programs. Led by Elizabeth McAllister, a Canadian and former director of the World Bank’s Operations 
Evaluation Department, the independent review would assess the effectiveness and effi ciency of the 
CGIAR partnership. The CGIAR agreed to have the scope of the review broadened to include other 
aspects such as governance. The panel would complete its work by September 2008.
The CGIAR endorsed the scoping team’s recommendations on next steps with 
minor modifi cations. The change management initiative would be led by the Change Steering Team 
co-chaired by Rodney Cooke, a Briton representing IFAD, and Jonathan Wadsworth, another Briton 
representing DFID, and assisted by four working groups on
1. visioning and development challenges, chaired by Jean Lebel of IDRC;
2. strategic partnerships, chaired by Martin Pineiro of Argentina;
3. governance at the Center and system levels, chaired by Peter Core of the 
Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research; and
4. funding mechanisms, chaired by Rob Bertram of USAID.
The chair of the independent review would be an external advisor to the Change 
Steering Team and help ensure synergy between the two initiatives. The entire process would be 
facilitated by external management consultants. The work on vision would precede the work on other 
topics so that the proposals on partnership, governance and funding arrangements could be made 
in view of the future vision and goals of the system. Each working group was composed of individuals 
from each major stakeholder group that made up the CGIAR.
Kathy Sierra guided the whole process and provided to the kickoff meeting of 
the Change Steering Team and the working groups her vision of change to be achieved through this 
initiative (Table 1).
Sierra had been uncomfortable since she became chair with the oversight and 
system management responsibilities of ExCo, the CGIAR and, by extension, herself. She wondered if 
this was the proper role for an informal donor support group. A few years previously the Group had 
decided to ask a Center to close. During her time another Center, CIAT, encountered fi nancial diffi cul-
ties despite CGIAR chairs’ repeated citing of red fl ags on fi nancial indicators year after year. Both the 
external review of CIAT and a paper commissioned by the Secretariat had found fault with the CIAT 
board’s failure to prevent a crisis.60 After a diffi cult discussion ExCo had requested Sierra, as CGIAR 
chair, to “discuss with the CIAT leadership a careful and deliberate plan to reconstitute the board and 
re-launch the search process for a new director general.” She did as requested and the board was 
reconstituted, but, as she told the Change Steering Team afterwards, she wondered if this was the 
best way to manage the CGIAR. 
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Sierra was familiar with other global funding mechanisms involving the World Bank, 
including the recently established Climate Change Funds, in which donors pooled their resources as 
stated in the Paris Declaration,61 an international agreement calling on countries and organizations 
to harmonize and align their actions and manage their aid for results. This had been talked about in 
the CGIAR for decades but never seriously attempted. Over the years, only the World Bank, whose 
contributions to the CGIAR had leveled off at $50 million a year, had served as an unselfi sh “system 
donor,” channeling its resources to the areas and Centers in the best interest of the system. 
The change management initiative consumed the energy of the entire CGIAR leader-
ship throughout 2008. The Change Steering Team and the working groups interacted frequently, holding 
at least four face-to-face meetings, a few of them overlapping with the meetings of the independent 
review panel. To solicit views from developing country stakeholders, the team held consultations in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America. The working groups and the independent review panel prepared their 
separate reports by mid-September 2008. These were synthesized by the Change Steering Team in 
an integrated reform proposal for discussion at the October ExCo meeting and later at the AGM in 
Maputo, Mozambique, in December.62
The building blocks of the new CGIAR became clear early on in the process: a 
programmatic approach, the establishment of a fund and assigning system management responsibility 
to a system-level board. There was convergence of views with the independent review on these and 
several other aspects of the needed changes. One major difference of opinion regarded the locus of 
the system-level board. The governance working group recommended having this board appointed 
by the donors contributing to the new fund, while the independent review and the Alliance preferred 
to have the board appointed by the Centers as the apex unit of a consortium of centers (an idea that 
had its roots in the federation proposal of 2000). Kathy Sierra and the Change Steering Team agreed 
with the latter approach.
At the 2008 AGM the CGIAR discussed the integrated reform proposal and the 
report of the independent review. The proposed vision of the new CGIAR was “to reduce poverty 
and hunger, improve human health and nutrition, and enhance ecosystem resilience through high-
quality international agricultural research, partnership and leadership.” Its strategic outcomes were 
reduced rural poverty, improved food security, improved nutrition and health, and sustainably 
managed natural resources.63 
TABLE 1: VISION OF CHANGE MANAGEMENT IN THE CGIAR
FROM TO
Mission creep and trying to do everything A clear vision with focused priorities that respond to global development challenges
Duplicative mandate of the Centers without a clear 
systemwide vision or strategy for impact
Centers that collaborate and work toward the system agenda and priorities and 
deliver impact
Complex and cumbersome governance and lack of 
accountability
Streamlined and effective system-level governance with clear accountability
Static partnerships that do not enable scalable 
impact and research adoption
Strong and innovative partnerships with NARS, the private sector and civil society 
that enable impact
Lack of coordination among investors Strengthened, coordinated funding mechanisms that are linked to the system 
agenda and priorities
Declining core resources Stabilization and growth of resource support
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One of the basic principles underpinning the proposed reform was the organizational 
separation of those who implement CGIAR research (the “doers”) from those who fund it (the “funders”). 
The Centers would establish a separate international organization called the Consortium of International 
Agricultural Research Centers, with a board, a chief executive offi cer (CEO) and the Consortium Offi ce. 
The Consortium would represent the Centers and the CGIAR system. The counterpart of the Consortium 
on the funders’ side would be a strategic fi nancing facility called the CGIAR Fund, with the Fund Council 
as its executive arm, supported by the Fund Offi ce. The Funders Forum would bring together all funders 
every 2 years, including those not actively contributing to the CGIAR Fund.
A second basic principle was to shift fi nancing through the CGIAR Fund increas-
ingly toward global programs, initially called mega programs but later called CGIAR Research Programs 
(CRPs), designed to contribute to the agreed Strategy and Results Framework (SRF), which provided 
a roadmap to achieving the new vision and strategic objectives. The SRF would be prepared by the 
Consortium in collaboration with stakeholders. Endorsement by donors at the Funders Forum would 
give license to the Consortium to develop CRPs that operationalized the SRF. These would be submit-
ted to the Fund Council for approval and fi nancing. 
A third principle was that the twin “pillars” of the system, the Consortium and the 
Fund, would be connected by four bridges to ensure the integration and connectedness of the entire 
system as a balanced partnership. Four key bridges were 
1. the SRF as the overarching strategic agenda to which both the funders and the 
doers subscribe;
2. the biennial Global Conference on Agricultural Research for Development, 
organized jointly by GFAR and the CGIAR to better align the work of the CGIAR 
with global and regional needs and activities;
3. binding program performance contracts for each CRP between the Fund and 
the Consortium and between the Consortium and the Centers; and
4. the SC reconstituted as the Independent Science and Partnership Council (ISPC) 
to conduct foresight studies, facilitate partnerships and provide core scientifi c 
advice to the Fund and, upon request, to the Consortium. 
A fourth principle was to strengthen accountability through results-based contracts, 
streamlined monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, and a new independent evaluation arrangement 
reporting to the Fund Council. The Centers, as institutions, would no longer be accountable to the 
donors as a group, as was the case in the old CGIAR. Their accountability would be ensured mainly 
through formal performance agreements with the Consortium and other Centers or with projects bilat-
erally funded by donors. An ad hoc evaluation arrangement would review the implementation of the 
SRF and the functioning of the system every 6 years.
The CGIAR approved these reform proposals and the recommendations of the 
independent review, which mirrored them, at the 2008 AGM in Maputo. As putting these reforms 
into action would require considerable effort, a transition management team (TMT) chaired by Sierra 
was established to coordinate the operationalization of reforms that Centers, donors and other stake-
holders had agreed on. The target date for beginning the new chapter in the CGIAR’s life was set as 
1 January 2010.
Transitioning to the New CGIAR
The Maputo decisions gave new momentum to reform. Work proceeded along 
several tracks coordinated by the TMT. GFAR was intimately involved, with its executive secretary 
serving as a member of the TMT, as were the Centers through the chair of the Alliance Executive. On 
the program side, as the entire process was driven by the SRF, Centers were busy drafting the new 
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strategy, while GFAR shaped the fi rst Global Conference on Agricultural Research for Development 
(GCARD), where the SRF would be discussed.
The Alliance developed a business plan for the Consortium, with help from an 
external consulting company. Besides the business plan, a draft constitution for the Consortium was 
being prepared. To have the Consortium up and running by the end of the year, its board would need 
to be appointed, which meant that the search and nomination effort would need to start as soon as 
a draft constitution was ready. 
Preparations on the Fund side progressed along two tracks. The Secretariat helped 
the donors prepare a framework document for the CGIAR Fund. The second track involved setting up 
a trust fund. Having been briefed by Sierra on the CGIAR reforms, the World Bank board agreed to 
have the bank serve as the trustee of the new Fund. World Bank staff involved with trust fund opera-
tions began devising procedures for establishing the Fund.
A third activity was to develop an accountability framework that came to be called 
the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Framework. The draft framework introduced two key concepts: 
(1) mutual accountability for outputs, with Centers and the Consortium held fully accountable for 
producing high-quality products, Fund donors responsible for the aligned provision of funds, and (2) 
shared responsibility for outcomes, with the Consortium, donors and partners sharing responsibility 
for managing toward outcomes.
The fi nal major activity was to transform the SC into the ISPC. The TMT took respon-
sibility for this and developed terms of reference for the ISPC, which were subsequently endorsed by 
ExCo. It was envisaged that the current SC would serve as the interim ISPC in 2010.
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ExCo met twice in 2009, holding its 17th and fi nal meeting at IFAD headquarters in 
Rome on 3-4 November. It identifi ed a number of issues that needed further clarifi cation in prepara-
tion for the AGM in Washington to be held a month later. The key sticky issues for discussion included
 ■ fi duciary responsibility for the use of funds,
 ■ the locus of oversight for the system,
 ■ bilateral funding and full cost recovery,
 ■ the roles of cosponsors,
 ■ the membership and composition of the Fund Council, and
 ■ the “windows” of the new Fund.
Some issues not fully resolved until 2010 were how to defi ne each window of the 
Fund, what the arrangements would be for full cost recovery and clarifying the fl ow of fi duciary respon-
sibilities and associated remedies. Agreement was reached on most other issues. There would be no 
single body overseeing the system as had the Consultative Group. A dispute-resolution mechanism 
would be established to handle possible confl icts. Cosponsors would no longer have special status. 
Bilateral funding would be allowed if the activities were consistent with the SRF. The Fund Council 
would maintain a North-South balance, and each constituency would be free to rotate its seats accord-
ing to its own rules. 
In addition to discussing these issues, ExCo developed a joint declaration to be 
proposed for adoption by the CGIAR community at the 2009 business meeting. The founding documents 
of the New CGIAR would be the Joint Declaration, Consortium Constitution, CGIAR Fund Governance 
Framework, and M&E Framework. The Joint Declaration was a nonbinding statement of aspiration 
and intent. It described the new vision and strategic objectives and the fundamental principles that 
underpinned reform, as well as the roles and responsibilities of donors, the Centers and the new CGIAR 
bodies as outlined in the other three founding documents. The core principles were
 ■ harmonization,
 ■ managing for results,
 ■ effective governance and effi cient operations, and
 ■ strong collaboration and partnership.
At the fi nal CGIAR meeting, members unanimously endorsed the Joint Declara-
tion and the other three founding documents. They adjusted the composition of the Fund Council 
to allow the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation to become a member in recognition of its increasingly 
signifi cant support for agricultural research through its bilateral funding of Centers and their research 
partners. At the AGM the Alliance announced the appointment of the leadership of the Consortium 
board, with Carlos Pérez del Castillo as chair and Bongiwe Nomandi Njobe and Carl Hausmann as 
co-vice chairs. Pérez del Castillo was from Uruguay and had a long and successful history of inter-
national and national public service, including serving as chair of the World Trade Organization panel 
established to examine the aircraft manufacturing dispute pitting the United States and Boeing against 
the European Commission and Airbus, chairing the World Trade Organization General Council, and 
serving as Uruguay’s vice-minister and acting minister of foreign affairs. 
Thus began a new chapter of CGIAR history, bringing to an end the Consultative 
Group and the other system units that had served it over the previous 4 decades. Financially, the 
CGIAR had ended its fi nal year of operations with $606 million in contributions, in nominal terms the 
highest amount in its history.
Critical Infl uence
The work of the CGIAR is critical to world food security and helping millions of smallholder 
farmers build better lives for their families. As such, it is also critical to the Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation’s mission of increasing sustainable productivity to reduce poverty and 
improve nutrition. 
The CGIAR has related to much of my career, either directly or indirectly, and so I have had 
the pleasure of a long and multifaceted relationship. I was the chief executive of a major 
seed company for a number of years, and our product lines benefi ted from CGIAR breeding 
materials — whether maize from CIMMYT or sorghum from ICRISAT — and were critical 
to our success. Now, as the director of agricultural development at the Gates Foundation, I 
work with a team that engages with the CGIAR as one of our most important grantees and 
valued partners. We work closely with many of the Centers, and as such we are one of the 
system’s major funders. As a member of the Fund Council, we’re also active in the current 
reform process. 
I have seen the CGIAR system change over the years and respond to shifts in technology 
and issues such as intellectual property. It is encouraging to see the CGIAR building stronger 
relationships with the private sector to develop public goods for smallholder farmers. My team 
and I look forward to seeing the positive changes continue and to working together to help 
millions of farming families pull themselves out of hunger and poverty.
Sam Dryden
Member & later Chair, CGIAR Private Sector Committee; Member, CGIAR Executive Council
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While agreement was reached on the major pieces of the New CGIAR, making 
them fully operational proved to be time consuming and painstaking. The World Bank board approved 
establishing the CGIAR Trust Fund on 12 January 2010. Inaugural meetings of the Fund Council and 
the Consortium board followed. Draft rules of procedure for the Fund Council prepared by the CGIAR 
Secretariat (which would become the Fund Offi ce) were adopted at the fi rst Fund Council meeting. The 
Fund Council received an update from Pérez del Castillo, who noted what the Centers expected from the 
Consortium: “To serve as facilitator of their work by contributing to fostering better international policy 
for agricultural research; to represent them in [the] international arena with [a] unifi ed voice; to contrib-
ute to the mobilization and expansion of resources for research; to simplify the organizational structure, 
decrease administration and transaction costs, and provide good governance.”64 The Fund Council 
agreed on a process for nominating and selecting the ISPC and handled other administrative matters.
At its fi rst meeting, the Consortium board addressed administrative tasks such as 
selecting a CEO and a headquarters location and substantive concerns such as the content of the 
SRF and the possible CRP portfolio to propose to the Fund Council. Because CRP proposals were not 
all at the same stage of development, it was decided at donors’ insistence to have three CRP propos-
als fast-tracked to get funding underway in 2010. The number was later cut to two: the Global Rice 
Science Partnership (GRiSP) and the CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and 
Food Security (CCAFS). There had been signifi cant advanced work on both. Preparations by the three 
CGIAR Centers researching rice — IRRI, AfricaRice and CIAT — to integrate their programs were well 
advanced. Regarding climate change, a CP had been designed after the freeze on CPs was lifted, and 
the CGIAR had begun playing a leading role in the global dialogue on agriculture and climate change, 
such as through its strong showing at the 15th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change in Copenhagen, Denmark, in December 2009. 
With the Fund Council and Consortium board in place, the CGIAR presented its 
new face at the fi rst GCARD, in Montpellier, France, in March 2010. Delays in developing the SRF 
prevented having it discussed at GCARD or the fi rst Funders Forum, held at the same time. However, 
T
h
e
 C
G
IA
R
 a
t 
4
0
85
T
h
e
 N
e
w
 C
G
IA
R
 
the early drafts of the SRF and the initial set of seven CRPs provided some insight regarding the align-
ment of regional priorities identifi ed during the year-long consultation processes organized by GFAR 
and those in the draft SRF. The team commissioned by GFAR to examine progress in transforming 
the global system of agricultural research and development concluded that “at the broad level there 
was no inconsistency between the regional priorities and the 7 CRPs…and that this broad level of 
convergence could lead to a signifi cant alignment of priorities.”65
Operating the New CGIAR required agreement on the formal arrangements of the 
partnership. The CGIAR had heretofore operated within a rather loose and informal architecture at the 
system level. Under the New CGIAR, the donor group would need to have the means to interact formally 
with the Consortium, and the same degree of formality was required in the Consortium’s relationships 
with Centers and other partners. This meant signifi cant work to get the legal framework of the new 
system constructed, in which consistency was critical. The key pieces of the legal framework included
 ■ the CGIAR Fund Governance Framework, based on the CGIAR-approved Fund 
framework paper;
 ■ an agreement on contributions to the CGIAR Fund between individual Fund 
donors and the World Bank as the trustee, describing respective responsibili-
ties and the operational modalities of the CGIAR Trust Fund;
 ■ the Joint Agreement between the Consortium and the World Bank (acting as the 
agent of the Fund Council), describing respective responsibilities, operational 
modalities and remedies that would apply to specifi c program performance 
and other agreements;
 ■ an establishment agreement to create the Consortium as an international organi-
zation, signed by countries and international organizations; and
 ■ a headquarters agreement between the Consortium and the country hosting 
its headquarters and describing conditions for operating in the country, includ-
ing privileges and immunities (with the Consortium operating under the legal 
umbrella of Bioversity until the headquarters agreement was signed).
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Having the donors agree with the governance framework and contribution agree-
ment was necessary for establishing the Trust Fund at the World Bank. The Joint Agreement needed 
to be fi nalized before any disbursements could be made from the Trust Fund. Donor concerns on 
issues like donor risk, responsibility and liability, as well as intellectual property rights, were clarifi ed 
in successive virtual meetings held throughout the year. In addition, progress was made on defi ning 
the operational aspects of the relationship between the entities. The Fund Council and the Consor-
tium jointly began to develop a common operational framework whose various chapters described 
specifi c operational areas such as planning, budgeting, proposal development, M&E and coverage 
of system costs. The Centers and the Consortium were to jointly develop procedures describing their 
contractual and operational relationships. 
The most debated aspect of reform was on how donors would be able to channel 
their contributions. The Fund was initially conceived as a vehicle for pooling contributions so that 
they could be allocated collectively to the highest-priority programs. However, the donors had their 
own priorities and were accustomed to targeting their funds to their preferred areas, increasingly so 
in recent years as shown by the rise in restricted contributions. The Fund was therefore designed to 
allow interested donors to target their contributions to approved CRPs. The thinking in the beginning 
was to have two windows, one for unrestricted, pooled contributions and the other for contributions 
to specifi c CRPs. Donors who preferred to channel their contributions directly to a Center, instead of 
through the CGIAR Fund, would still be able to do so bilaterally if the activities they supported contrib-
uted to the CGIAR SRF. 
However, some donors expressed strong preference to channel their contributions 
to specifi c Centers through the CGIAR Fund, especially during the transition to a full portfolio of CRPs. 
Thus, a third window was added to the Fund structure for a 2-year transition period before its possible 
continuation would be reviewed. The Fund Council would not enter into any contractual relationships 
with the Consortium with respect to the use of so-called window 3 funds. The trustee would simply 
transfer the funds to the Center at the donor’s request. How these funds were to be used would be 
decided bilaterally by the Center and donor, outside the CGIAR Fund architecture. 
Piece by piece, the bricks making up the New CGIAR were being laid. The fi rst 
Funders Forum, postponed from the spring of 2010, was held on 15 July at FAO headquarters in Rome. 
The key items on the agenda were the draft SRF and cost-sharing arrangements among donors to 
cover common system-related costs. The donors found the SRF to lack clear links between strategic 
objectives and the suggested CRPs and impact pathways, endorsing it only as a “work in progress” 
and giving a green light to the further preparation of the two fast-tracked CRPs, GRiSP and CCAFS. As 
no CRPs had yet been approved and funded, budgeting and resource allocation in 2010 essentially 
followed the previous rules of the CGIAR. The budget envelope for 2010 was projected at $640 million.
As the bricks of reform were laid, the key architect of reform, Kathy Sierra, decided 
to retire from the World Bank, to be replaced by Inger Andersen of Denmark. Andersen was an 
experienced manager with deep understanding of sustainability issues, particularly in Africa and the 
Middle East. Sierra chaired her last Fund Council meeting in July, held in conjunction with the Funders 
Forum with Andersen participating as an observer. At the request of the Consortium, it was agreed 
that an overarching legal document, later called CGIAR Principles, should be prepared as a part of 
the package of legal documents.
By the time the Fund Council met in November under Andersen as its new chair, 
the Consortium had selected Montpellier for its headquarter and Lloyd Le Page of the United Kingdom 
as its CEO, approved the proposals for fi rst two fast-tracked CRPs for submission to the Fund Council, 
made progress in crafting the wheat and maize proposals that would follow, and agreed on how to 
handle existing CPs, which would either be blended into CRPs or provide services to them. The leader-
ship of the Fund Offi ce also changed, as Ren Wang decided to return to China to join the management 
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of the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Science. While a search for his replacement was under way, 
Fionna Douglas of Australia was appointed as the interim executive secretary. Douglas had earlier 
served in a similar capacity after the departure of Francisco Reifschneider. 
The Fund Council approved the latest versions of the CGIAR Principles, the 
document on Fund governance and the contribution agreement, paving the way for Fund donors 
to contribute to the CGIAR Fund in 2010. It approved the chair and membership of the ISPC. The 
new chair, Kenneth Cassman, was a distinguished scientist from the University of Nebraska and 
a former researcher at IRRI. GRiSP and CCAFS were approved, subject to some revisions and the 
approval of the SRF, whose completion had been postponed to 2011. These two CRP proposals, 
although not in their fi nal shape, showed how the new programs were likely to integrate closely 
related activities within the system. GRiSP’s coordination and oversight mechanisms would help 
elevate the synergy of the rice programs of IRRI, CIAT and AfricaRice, in addition to linking CGIAR 
work with that of other key global research institutions. The approved budgets of both CRPs were 
larger than those of existing Centers, on the order of $100 million annually for GRiSP and $65 
million for CCAFS. 
Making the New CGIAR Work
As a fi rst order of business in 2011, the chairs of the Fund Council and the Consor-
tium board visited key donors to seek their reaffi rmed support to the New CGIAR and ensure that 
their funding would continue uninterrupted under the new arrangements. Having received donors’ 
unequivocal support, the Fund Council and the Consortium proceeded to put the remaining pieces 
of the New CGIAR in place. The appointment of Jonathan Wadsworth as the Fund Council executive 
secretary and head of the CGIAR Fund Offi ce early in the year brought into the picture someone fully 
familiar with the entire change process.  
The top priorities for the Consortium were to bring work on the SRF to comple-
tion; identify the full complement of CRPs that would make up the CGIAR portfolio, based on exter-
nal reviews of the proposals developed by the Centers; conduct scoping studies on gender, genetic 
resources and intellectual property, which had been identifi ed as crosscutting issues; and complete 
its own establishment as an international organization. For the Fund Council, the top priorities were to 
make the CGIAR Fund operational and able to receive and disburse funds and to arm the Fund with 
suffi cient resources to meet at least current needs, which required that parties agree on all remain-
ing legal documents. 
The development of the SRF was a challenge for the Consortium because of 
the multiple demands and pressures it faced. Donors were looking for clear impact pathways 
between development outcomes and CRPs. The Centers — always competitive — were each 
trying to ensure that their planned activities were recognized as components of the SRF. Partners 
were concerned that the Centers might not fully recognize the contributions they could make. 
The SRF was finally approved at the ad hoc Funders Forum in July 2011, a year after the initial 
target date.
The development and review of each CRP proposal by external review panels, 
the Consortium board and the ISPC also took time. This was a sequential process, but the Fund 
Council found a pragmatic, systematic approach to speed their consideration. Four decision 
categories were established: (1) approval with light adjustments, (2) approval with conditions, 
(3) requested resubmission of the proposal with substantial revisions, and (4) rejection. At its 
4th meeting in Montpellier in April 2011, the Fund Council provided green lights (category 1 or 2 
approval) for three proposals on (1) dryland systems; (2) maize; and (3) forests, trees and agrofor-
estry, as well as approving stopgap funding for genebanks.
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This brought to six the number of CRPs to be fi nanced through the Fund, once 
the proposals with category 2 approval satisfi ed the conditions, including the two proposals on rice 
and climate change approved in 2010. To these were added six other CRPs at the next Fund Council 
meeting in Washington in July 2011 on (1) wheat; (2) meat, milk and fi sh; (3) aquatic agricultural 
systems; (4) policies, institutions and markets; (5) roots, tubers and bananas; and (6) agriculture for 
improved nutrition and health.
In terms of their organization, all CRPs shared a few common features: one lead 
Center, a planning and management committee involving key collaborators, and mechanisms for obtain-
ing independent scientifi c advice and resolving confl icts. This brought some uniformity to the structure 
of the programs. There were also differences among the CRPs in terms of management arrangements 
and the sharing of responsibilities as agreed during negotiations establishing each joint venture. 
While the CRPs were the main delivery mechanism for the CGIAR’s strategic outcomes, 
there were several issues and themes that cut across most or all CRPs. Rather than handling them as 
additional CRPs, the Consortium developed separate strategies for addressing them. Scoping studies 
were prepared on two: gender issues and genetic resources. On a third issue, intellectual property, 
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the Consortium prepared a paper on intellectual property principles that, after discussion by the 
Fund Council, would become part of the common operational framework between the Fund and the 
Consortium. As intellectual property is a highly controversial issue, further discussion was necessary 
before it is fi nalized.
Regarding genebanks, there was wide consensus among donors and stakehold-
ers that funding was needed to maintain them at the highest, most scientifi c level. The question was 
whether their funding should depend on ad hoc and time-bound mechanisms like CRPs or on a longer-
term or perhaps permanent arrangement. The Fund Council agreed to explore means of securing 
long-term fi nancing such as through an endowment while providing short-term fi nancing for 2011.
On the Fund front, the Joint Agreement — the last remaining legal piece — was 
approved after 10 months of intensive discussions involving all parties. This meant that funds could 
be disbursed to the Consortium for the approved CRPs from windows 1 and 2. This was an umbrella 
agreement between the Fund and the Consortium. It included as an attachment the forms for Consor-
tium performance agreements, which would govern the results-based contractual relations between 
the Fund and the Consortium. In addition, the Fund Council advanced the process of establishing 
an independent evaluation arrangement. After a study by external experts, the Fund Council and the 
Consortium agreed to have a single mechanism for evaluation in the system, instead of one dedicated 
only to the needs of the Fund Council. This entity would be staffed by a small group of professionals 
and based at FAO, preferably co-located with the ISPC Secretariat. Like the ISPC, it would report to 
the Fund Council.
With legal and administrative obstacles out of the way, donors began to contribute 
to the Fund. By November 2011, 24 donors had channeled $332 million to the Fund, with fi ve making 
multiyear contributions. Total infl ows for the year were expected to reach $425 million. 
The Remaining Agenda
The top priority for the Centers and the Consortium had been to complete the 
portfolio of CRPs that would fully operationalize the SRF. With 12 programs approved, only four 
remained for review and approval: grain legumes; dryland cereals; the humid tropics; and water, land 
and ecosystems. These four were discussed by the Fund Council at its sixth meeting in November 
2011. It approved three of the four with light adjustments or conditions but requested that the humid 
tropics be resubmitted with substantial revisions. 
The fi nalization of the CRP portfolio completed the integration of the former CPs 
into the CRP structure. Three of the fi ve active CPs had obvious, natural homes in the CRPs, with the 
Challenge Program on Water and Food integrated into the CRP Water, Land and Ecosystems; Harvest-
Plus integrated into the CRP Agriculture for Improved Nutrition and Health; and the Challenge Program 
on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security integrated into the CRP CCAFS. The basic genomic 
work of the Generation Challenge Programme on major crops was to be integrated into the appropriate 
crop CRPs and the rest to be consolidated into the Genomics and Integrated Breeding Service, which 
would be open to a broader set of users within and outside of the CGIAR. The SSA CP was the only 
CP coordinated by an entity outside the CGIAR entity and therefore lacked a natural home in a CRP. 
After some intense discussions, that CP found a home in the CRP Integrated Systems for the Humid 
Tropics in view of their substantial regional overlap. 
As the CRP portfolio was being completed, Centers, the Consortium and donors 
alike began to focus on fi nancing the full portfolio. Financial results for 2010 showed funding reach-
ing $645 million, of which $200 million, or 31% was unrestricted. The Centers had ended the year 
with an operating surplus of $39 million. The Consortium estimated that total funding for 2011 from all 
T
h
e
 C
G
IA
R
 a
t 
4
0
91
T
h
e
 N
e
w
 C
G
IA
R
 
sources would reach $706 million, some $60 million above 2010 funding. However, the funds avail-
able in windows 1 and 2 were not likely to be suffi cient to meet demand on these windows from the 
CRPs, requiring adjustments by the Fund and the Consortium. 
The possibility of commitment and funding gaps triggered a discussion of effi ciency. 
It was clear to all that the new system was still being established and some time would be required 
for all parties to adjust to the new setup. There was discomfort at the lack of clear and transparent 
information on the cost structure of the CRPs, as administrative costs seemed to very between 5% 
and 20% of CRP’s total budgets. At its 5th meeting in Washington, DC, the Fund Council agreed that 
the Consortium and the Fund Offi ce would jointly develop metrics “to measure effi ciencies in terms 
of money, productivity, outputs etc. in each of the CGIAR units.”66 In addition, the Consortium was to 
report on progress toward building “one corporate system.”
By the autumn of 2011, most of the components of the new CGIAR were in place. 
One remaining item on the agenda was to complete establishing the Consortium’s status as an inter-
national organization. The fi rst ever Group of 20 International Conference on Agriculture Research for 
Development on 12-13 September 2011 under the French presidency of the Group of 20 provided a 
perfect setting to initiate formalization. Following the conference, the French minister of cooperation, 
Henri de Raincourt, and the ambassador of Hungary, Sem Laszlo Trocsanyi, signed the agreement 
establishing the Consortium as an international organization. The agreement was now open in Paris 
for other countries and international organizations to sign before its ratifi cation.
As the institutional setting up of the new CGIAR was being completed, changes 
were taking place in its leadership. The Fund Council chair, Inger Andersen, was assigned to another 
vice presidency at the World Bank and handed responsibility over to Rachel Kyte, the incoming vice 
president of sustainable development. The resignation of the Consortium CEO Lloyd Le Page initiated 
a search for his replacement. The Consortium board established an executive committee to oversee 
the Consortium Offi ce and ensure no disruption in the functioning of the Consortium until a new CEO 
was appointed. 
As its 40th year drew to a close, the last remnant of the Consultative Group was in 
the abbreviation “CGIAR,” which its successor organization retained as it pursued the same develop-
mental mission. Similarly, its donors held the same conviction that investment in science remained 
one of the best strategies for fi ghting poverty. 
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Speaking at the 20th anniversary of the CGIAR, Derek Tribe, executive director 
of the Crawford Fund for International Agricultural Research in Australia, described how the 
founding fathers “were instrumental in creating the unique jellyfish structure.”67 Warren Baum 
expressed the same idea during his commemorative address at the 25th anniversary of the CGIAR: 
For an international activity that immediately began to function on its own, the 
organizational structure and procedures [of the CGIAR] were extraordinarily 
loose and informal. Decisions had to be made without any voting system, and 
none was ever devised; these decisions had to be binding within an organi-
zation that had no legal identity; and funds had to be pledged and commit-
ments honored without any method of cost sharing, since as is in the case of 
voting, no formula could fit so diverse a collection of international, regional, 
national, and private donors. Under other circumstances, these characteris-
tics could be a recipe for failure, but for the CGIAR they have generally been 
sources of strength.68
Principles in the Old CGIAR
The characteristics Baum was talking about served as the guiding principles of 
governance in the CGIAR for over 3 decades and enabled it to adjust to changing needs.69 These were
 ■ donor sovereignty,
 ■ center autonomy,
 ■ consensus decision-making, and
 ■ independent scientifi c advice.
Donor sovereignty. Donors were sovereign in that each was free to decide the 
amount and use of their contributions. The Consultative Group served as a forum for discussion and 
debate on priorities and ways of maintaining the health of the system and its Centers. When the Group 
approved a set of priorities or the program proposal of a Center, this was in effect a call to each and 
every donor to provide fi nancing in support of the decisions agreed by the Group. It was an indicative 
call, not an imperative one. Unrestricted funding to a Center was the easiest way a donor could support 
the Group’s decision, and several donors used it, especially in the beginning. USAID, for example, 
committed to providing up to 25% of the agreed CGIAR budget in the 1970s. This plus the World 
Bank’s funding of 10-15% provided suffi cient freedom for the system to meet its budgetary goals. If 
a donor wished to target its contributions to a specifi c project or program of a Center, this restriction 
did not distort program coherence so long as the project or program was within the agreed agenda of 
the system and unrestricted funds were suffi cient to support unfunded priority activities. If a Center 
did not have suffi cient unrestricted funds to support its program as approved by the CGIAR, for many 
years the World Bank came to the rescue as the donor of last resort or balancing donor. The bank 
discontinued the practice when it became obvious that it had become a perverse incentive allowing 
some Centers to “game” the system by showing artifi cially high funding gaps. 
Donors liked the CGIAR in part because of the sovereignty they enjoyed in the 
system. They also liked that the main overheads of the system were covered by cosponsors, with 
the World Bank paying for the Secretariat and the cosponsors collectively paying for TAC and the 
TAC Secretariat. This meant that other donor contributions went directly to supporting research.
Center autonomy. The initial Centers like IRRI and CIMMYT were established as 
autonomous organizations, accountable only to their governing bodies as defi ned in their charter, 
usually a board of trustees. This enabled them to observe signals from the CGIAR, individual donors 
and their other stakeholders when developing program proposals to submit to the Consultative 
Group for funding. As the Group itself was not a legal body, the only legal entities in the system 
were the Centers. 
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What lay behind the concept of Center autonomy was the conviction that decisions 
on science should be made as close to the scientists as possible. The system should not try to manage 
science from afar. However, the autonomy that came with decentralized management needed to be 
coupled with some form of oversight to ensure accountability. Thus, the CGIAR served as the oversight 
body, with TAC and the CGIAR Secretariat as its facilitating arms. 
Though they were autonomous, the Centers were not fully independent in that they 
depended almost exclusively on the members of the Consultative Group for funding. This meant that, as 
long as they wished to remain under the CGIAR umbrella, they needed to abide by the corporate norms 
and processes set by the CGIAR. It also meant that, although they were not formally accountable as 
organizations to any outside entity, they were expected to act as if they were accountable to the CGIAR. 
A major consequence of 20-plus years of autonomy — 40-plus years for some 
Centers — is the maturity each Center has reached as an organization and research institution. Having 
been in the business for a long time, each Center has developed and strengthened its ties with donors, 
partners, host countries and others. This has allowed them to build and nurture trust, competence 
and comparative advantage. Each Center is now not only a national asset in its host country, as Ian 
Johnson had argued, but also a global asset. 
Consensus decision-making. This principle was necessary to maintain unity within 
the Consultative Group. As indicated by Baum in the quote at the top of this section, the alternative to 
consensus decision-making was a form of voting, which would produce winners and losers and risked 
the development of factions in the Group. Though more costly in terms of time, consensus decision-
making sought win-win decisions and a satisfi ed donor constituency. 
Ismail Serageldin defi ned consensus as “a decision everyone can live with.” Consensus 
placed signifi cant responsibility on the chair and the Secretariat to canvas members’ views, clarify the 
options and, sometimes, twist arms. In the end, the Group looked to the chair to express the consen-
sus view following each discussion. More often than not, the Group agreed with the chair’s articulation 
of the consensus view. If some members remained unconvinced, taking a break in the meeting or 
postponing decision to a later date helped surmount the impasse. Although none of the decisions of 
the CGIAR were binding on members, having been a party to the decisions placed a subtle pressure 
on the representatives to take the necessary steps in their institutions to promote formal action toward 
the consensus view. The decisions of the CGIAR vis-à-vis Centers placed stronger pressure on Center 
boards because of their dependence on the members of the Group for funding. 
Independent scientifi c advice. This principle has been the glue to make the other 
three principles work. Credible, objective analysis and recommendations from TAC and then the SC 
facilitated reaching consensus in the Group. They provided the rationale for the Group’s investment 
decisions, which served as a guide and reference for individual donors. Having a technically sound 
system strategy a step up from the programs of individual Centers clarifi ed the direction the system 
was headed in the medium and long term. The agreed priorities provided strategic guidance to Centers 
and a yardstick to donors for their resource-allocation decisions. 
Having an independent advisory body meant disagreements with donors and Centers. 
When the priorities of a donor or the strategic plans of a Center confl icted with the advice given by TAC 
or the SC, which was not too uncommon, the Group had fi nal say. In these instances, political impera-
tives often trumped scientifi c and technical analysis. That the debates aired in the open CGIAR forum, 
though, refl ected the transparency that existed in the system and improved the credibility of the CGIAR. 
The extent to which this governance principle served as glue depended on the 
strength of TAC or SC relative to that of donors and Centers. The strength of TAC or the SC was a 
function of the quality of its advice, which depended on the council’s membership; its chair’s skills of 
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persuasion; and, most importantly, the incentives that backed its recommendations. That the World 
Bank served as the donor of last resort meant that at least one donor would allocate its resources 
in a way that backed TAC recommendations. When the bank changed its funding policy, there was 
a noticeable drop in the relative strength of TAC and later the SC, as the power balance that existed 
among the three major components shifted more toward donors and Centers. 
Principles in the New CGIAR
The New CGIAR is built on a new set of governance principles. Two of the original 
four principles have lost emphasis, but the other two remain essentially intact. 
Donor sovereignty. The picture is mixed regarding this principle. Bilateral donors 
continue to enjoy the same sovereignty they did in the old CGIAR, but they do not have the privilege 
to contribute to decision-making as in the old CGIAR unless they also contribute through the CGIAR 
Fund. There is no weakening of the sovereignty of Fund donors as long as window 3 remains open, 
which gives them the opportunity to contribute to the Centers of their choice in line with side agree-
ments outside the Fund structure for specifi c projects. Donors contributing to the pooled window 1, 
however, agree to leave decision-making to the Fund Council. This is seen as limiting sovereignty, albeit 
for the benefi t of generating a larger resource pool that can be used for greater impact. In short, the 
emphasis on the principle of donor sovereignty has been somewhat weakened in the New CGIAR for 
the sake of strengthening harmonization among donors.
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Broadened Agenda
For 40 years I have had the pleasure of working within the CGIAR, as an agronomist, donor 
and board chair.
The CGIAR is a remarkable phenomenon. Much has changed and much has been achieved 
since it was created. We should honor those who had the vision to create it. It has achieved 
much because of its informality, responsiveness, adaptability and mission. It has captured 
the imagination and support of successive generations of scientists and aid offi cials. People 
have made it work.
While the rhetoric has been that funding should follow science, the reality has been that 
funding and the policies of donors have always dominated the agenda. As the membership 
expanded, the agenda broadened. As aid agencies have come under mounting pressure 
to show impact toward achieving the Millennium Development Goals, they have asked that 
Centers show that their research is not only of the highest quality but has reduced hunger, 
poverty and environmental degradation.
Converting global public goods into development outcomes will require new partnerships and 
alliances. It is to be hoped that this latest reform will support the building of those partnerships 
that will produce more food for more people using fewer resources.
Andrew Bennett
Representative of United Kingdom to the CGIAR; Chair, CGIAR Oversight Commit-
tee; Board Chair, Center for International Forestry Research
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Independent scientifi c advice. An independent scientifi c advisory body still serves 
the New CGIAR but with a signifi cantly reduced mandate. Donors can continue to seek and receive 
advice from this body as and when necessary, but responsibility for developing strategies and priori-
ties for the system is transferred to the Consortium and responsibility for evaluation to a new unit. 
The ISPC has no strategic guidance and oversight responsibility vis-à-vis Centers. Its infl uence on the 
system is mainly through the advice provided to the Fund Council. 
Center autonomy. Centers are no longer accountable to a donor group (i.e., 
the Fund Council) as there is no direct relationship between that group and individual Centers. 
The Center oversight and accountability mechanisms that existed in the old CGIAR have been 
replaced with new, mainly contractual, tools. While each Center has delegated some powers to 
the Consortium, mainly in the areas of inter-Center relations and dispute resolution, the Consor-
tium is a creation of the Centers and does not possess direct oversight powers on them, except 
as prescribed in program implementation contracts. Therefore, it could be argued that, at the 
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moment, Centers perhaps have greater autonomy in managing their affairs than in the old CGIAR. 
However, the power balance between individual Centers and the Consortium is likely to evolve 
over time as the New CGIAR becomes fully operational. 
Consensus decision making. This remains the rule in the Fund Council and the 
Funders Forum, aiming, as it did in the old CGIAR, to maintain unity among donors. The Consortium 
board aims to make its decisions by consensus to the maximum extent possible but resorts to voting 
when consensus is not possible.
The governance principles that guide the New CGIAR are quite different from those 
of the old CGIAR. In addition to Center autonomy and, to a lesser extent, consensus decision making, 
three guiding points refl ect the core of the new governance principles: 
 ■ the separation of funders and doers,
 ■ the harmonization of funding and implementation, and
 ■ managing for results.
Separation of funders and doers. This is the most basic principle of governance 
in the New CGIAR. It enables the responsibilities of entities to be defi ned more clearly than in the 
old CGIAR. Funders no longer engage in managerial matters, leaving them to the Consortium. The 
Consortium represents the CGIAR and provides a single point of entry to the system. The Fund has 
only the Consortium as its counterpart. As a consequence, funders as a group have no relations with 
individual Centers, which reverses the situation in the old CGIAR.
The separation principle ushers in a new form of relationship between the Fund and 
the Consortium. The informal mode of operation of the old CGIAR is replaced with formal contracts 
and other agreements between the Fund and the Consortium that clarify mutual obligations. Program 
performance agreements clearly defi ne deliverables and provide the means of assessing research 
achievements.
Harmonization. This principle is intended to make the New CGIAR less “atomized” 
than the old CGIAR. Collective action is promoted among both doers and funders, with the Consortium 
and the Fund Council playing facilitating roles. The long-term goal is to generate culture change in 
both the donor community and among the Centers for the benefi t of the system and its benefi ciaries.
Managing for results. This principle introduces a shift of focus from setting priori-
ties to guide action to formalizing agreements to generate specifi c results on the ground. The SRF is 
intended to provide the logical framework of how outputs relate to outcomes and outputs to impacts. 
Performance is to be planned and monitored in terms of deliverables and results. The shift from insti-
tutional funding to program funding facilitates the results-orientation of the New CGIAR, and program 
performance agreements provide formal accountability reinforcing the emphasis on achieving results. 
In summary, all but one of the governance principles that guided the CGIAR for 4 
decades have been largely abandoned in favor of principles refl ecting the new institutional architec-
ture of the CGIAR. Conceptually, there is now a sharper delineation of roles and a more formal and 
prescribed relationship linking donors and Centers. The fi rst few years if implementation should tell 
how effectively the new principles are able to steer the system toward its strategic objectives. 
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Close observers of the evolution of the CGIAR often wonder why so many attempts 
to change the system have been made over its 4 decades. In retrospect, it is clear that many of 
these attempts failed to generate the intended results. Some did succeed in generating the intended 
change, but that change brought unintended consequences. In other instances an idea for change 
was loudly welcomed but never translated into action. It would be useful to examine a few change 
attempts undertaken during each decade of the CGIAR’s history and try to decipher the likely reasons 
for their success or failure. 
Two simple and related conceptual models can help with this task. The fi rst is John 
Kotter’s seminal Harvard Business Review piece on leading change, in which he argues that organiza-
tional change is not an event but a process, and that unless each stage of the process is well planned 
and managed the transformation effort is likely to fail. Kotter’s eight stages are: “(1) establish a sense 
of urgency; (2) form a powerful guiding coalition; (3) create a vision; (4) communicate the vision;
(5) empower others to act on the vision; (6) plan for and create short-term wins; (7) consolidate 
improvements and produce more change; and (8) institutionalize new approaches.”70
The second model is a formula for change (or change equation) created by Richard 
Beckhard and David Gleicher that highlights the key conditions that must exist for an organizational 
change initiative to succeed. It predicts organizational change initiatives will succeed only if D × V × 
F > R, where D stands for dissatisfaction with status quo, V for vision of what is possible, F for fi rst 
concrete steps that can be taken to move toward realizing that vision, and R for resistance to the 
change. The relationship is multiplicative because all three factors must be present in quantities as 
high as possible for the left side of the equation to be greater than existing resistance to change.71 
Change and the CGIAR
During the CGIAR’s fi rst decade, organizational change was possible because 
there was a compelling vision to build a research network. A strong TAC and, in John Crawford, TAC 
chair provided strong leadership to build that compelling vision. The status quo of there being only 
few Centers was not acceptable, and by then the CGIAR was quite experienced in setting up new 
Centers. Several donors were willing to take responsibility for the Group as the implementing agency 
for establishing new Centers, as did the IDRC, Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, GTZ and 
World Bank. In a few cases there was some resistance (e.g., against providing support to a program 
of WARDA) but not strong enough to overcome the rationale put forward by TAC. The availability of 
funding meant its lack did not pose major resistance, at least not until the end of the decade when the 
system had grown from 4 to 13 Centers. That there was stable and steady leadership of the CGIAR 
helped maintain the drive to growth. 
There was little system change, except in administrative matters, during the fi rst half 
of the second decade. But the second half of the decade saw, fi rst, an expansion of mission and focus 
from crop improvement and farming systems to sustainability and focus on poor people. As during the 
fi rst decade, this was ably led by TAC and faced little resistance from donors or Centers because of 
similar trends taking place globally in development policy. The most signifi cant organizational change 
that took place toward the end of the decade was the expansion of the CGIAR from 13 to 18 Centers. 
Here, the story was a bit different. The existing Centers were less dissatisfi ed with the status quo than 
were the donors. The donors believed that the mandate of the CGIAR had to be expanded to include 
research on forestry and took a preemptive decision in their meeting in Canberra in 1989 to broaden 
the Group’s mission, without waiting for the results of the TAC study that had been commissioned. 
They also disagreed with the TAC recommendation to have a single forestry institute. This was a telling 
sign that the balance of power in the CGIAR had begun to change.
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Positioned for Reform
In the 1990s, four forces drove CGIAR Centers toward collective action and interdepen-
dence: (1) donors’ preference for cross-Center research through systemwide and ecore-
gional programs; (2) a quest for the more effi cient delivery of scalable corporate services 
such as pension investments and insurance and support for gender and diversity equity in 
staffi ng; (3) donors’ desire for greater transparency and accountability across the CGIAR; 
and (4) the failure of some CGIAR member states to sign the 1993 Convention on Biologi-
cal Diversity, which meant that CGIAR members lacked a unifi ed position on access to the 
agricultural genetic resources held by Centers. To guarantee that all parties had fair access 
to the genetic resources they held, the Centers found they had to unite and work through 
the Food and Agriculture Organization toward the 2001 International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture.
I became the director general of ICLARM in 1994. I was a new recruit to a Center recently 
admitted to the CGIAR and the fi rst female director general. Before entering the CGIAR, 
ICLARM had suffered fi nancial and governance crises. The CGIAR provided much-needed 
stability and guidance on technical, managerial and funding matters. The new ICLARM board 
included members such as John L. Dillon and Nyle Brady, who had extensive governance 
experience in the CGIAR. Smart inter-Center cooperation became the core of ICLARM’s strategy.
In 2000, ICLARM saw that the CGIAR system needed clearer governance. ICLARM chose to 
call itself the WorldFish Center and positioned itself for eventual CGIAR reform. Real CGIAR 
change was agreed in 2008, delivering two lessons: how long reform takes and the endur-
ance of the CGIAR’s mission.
Meryl J. Williams
Director General, WorldFish Center; Executive Offi cer, Future Harvest Alliance Offi ce; Board Member, International 
Crops Research Institute for Semi-Arid Tropics
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In the fi nal tally the system expanded from 13 to 18 Centers. TAC’s recommenda-
tions on the new Centers, other than the one on forestry, were endorsed. Applying the change formula, 
dissatisfaction was high on the part of donors but not of Centers; vision was primarily donor-driven, 
strengthened by TAC’s rigorous analysis; the fi rst steps were immediately taken by bringing into the 
system four existing institutes (ICLARM, IIMI, ICRAF and INIBAP) and by commissioning the Austra-
lian Centre for International Agricultural Research to serve as implementing agency to establish CIFOR 
as the fi fth Center. Resistance from Centers was not strong enough to overcome the momentum that 
existed in the Group. However, a careful and realistic analysis of the fi nancial consequences of expan-
sion was lacking. Had there been one, it would have been clear that adding new Centers would not 
bring in new funding in proportion to the system’s expansion. 
As a result, the third decade started with a fi nancial crisis. Dissatisfaction was high 
in all quarters. The vision was to live within means, and the obvious fi rst steps were to contract the 
system by reducing the number of Centers. The lowest hanging fruits were the smallest new Center 
(INIBAP, which was actually a network) and two livestock Centers, which had been experiencing 
funding problems for some time. This change was more cosmetic than substantive as the programs 
of the merged Centers continued with little change. Only the number of administrative units under 
the CGIAR umbrella was reduced. 
The middle of the decade witnessed another reform initiative, which was dubbed 
“renewal,” during Serageldin’s chairmanship. This was renewal in that it aimed to renew the donor 
community’s commitment to the CGIAR on the heels of an expansion and fi nancial crisis. The reforms 
undertaken were mostly in the business processes of the CGIAR: a simpler mission statement, new 
research agenda and budgeting process, and new impact assessment function. Perhaps the most 
signifi cant change Serageldin initiated was opening up the system by initiating GFAR and bringing 
the voice of civil society and the private sector to the CGIAR forum. Here, the vision was the chair’s 
and it was widely shared, as there was broad recognition that concrete steps were needed toward 
strengthening partnerships with other organizations. The fi rst steps — establishing committees — 
were easy, but it was not clear that system-level committees would be able to generate behavioral 
change at the Center level. 
A second signifi cant change introduced under Serageldin was the clarifi cation of 
CGIAR policies on genetic resources, intellectual property rights and biotechnology. The mechanisms 
that were established, such as the Genetic Resources Policy Committee and several Center-level 
groups, served the CGIAR well over the years and enabled the system to stay abreast of the fast-paced 
developments in the public and private sectors.
There were two major organizational change efforts during the fourth decade, one 
at the beginning and the other at the end. Both were started following a change in CGIAR leadership. 
The fi rst, led by Ian Johnson and Francisco Reifschneider, was based on the recommendations of a 
change design and management team and initiated a shift toward a programmatic approach to funding 
research through CPs and more centralized decision-making by the Group through ExCo, which the 
CGIAR had always rejected in earlier attempts. Other reforms affected mainly business processes. 
In terms of the change formula, Centers and donors alike felt unease and dissatis-
faction over the system before the reforms. The third system review had not brought workable solutions 
to the stagnation felt in the system. Over time, the system’s mission had been expanded with each new 
dimension, such as public health and climate change, added to a research agenda that was already 
crowded. Unrestricted funding was declining, as was the outlook for ODA. As for vision, donors and 
Centers agreed that the CGIAR needed to “elevate its game” for greater global impact and streamline 
its decision-making and operations to generate effi ciency. Some of the agreed steps were relatively 
easy, such as reducing the number of CGIAR meetings from two to one per year, establishing the 
virtual System Offi ce and transforming TAC into the SC, but there was resistance on two key initiatives. 
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In the case of establishing ExCo, the original proposal for a “shareholder committee” was modifi ed to 
a “stakeholder committee” in response to strong resistance from Centers and external stakeholders. 
The proposal to move toward a programmatic approach through CPs faced strong resistance from 
Centers. To make change workable, programs were initiated on a trial basis and using only propos-
als submitted by Centers. While the original vision was to deliver half of the CGIAR research agenda 
through CPs within 5 years, the system was able to initiate in this period only four CPs, which pursued 
only a small share of the total research agenda.
Thus, the fi rst change effort of the decade failed to generate the intended shift 
toward a programmatic approach to research. But it provided a useful learning experience for the 
next reform of the decade in terms of the design and management of global programs. Most of the 
other organizational changes helped improve business processes, but two yielded mixed results. The 
virtual System Offi ce facilitated little true integration of effort among units, though it helped improve 
communication. Similarly, the transformation of TAC into the SC appeared more like a cosmetic change, 
especially as the new council had diffi culty implementing its new role to mobilize science globally for 
the benefi t of the CGIAR system and its stakeholders.
In terms of process, the most recent reform, which yielded the New CGIAR, is a 
textbook case of change management. Centers were dissatisfi ed because a great and growing majority 
of their funding was restricted. Donors were dissatisfi ed because, partly as a result of further increases 
in restricted funding, the system’s resource base was not aligned with the agreed priorities and there 
were similar mismatches between Center activities and regional priorities. Instead of having a small 
team identify the issues and generate solutions, the chair, Kathy Sierra, decided to take an inclusive 
approach and engage all major actors and stakeholders in designing the change process. She both 
established a sense of urgency, as in Kotter’s model, and formed a powerful guiding coalition to lead 
the process. This meant that there would be greater buy-in in the vision emerging from the process. 
The agreed changes were revolutionary by CGIAR standards, leaving all previous reform initiatives 
pale by comparison. A major communication effort was needed to sell the new vision and reform. This 
is where actions fell short, as the reforms were not fully understood by rank-and-fi le staff at Centers, 
at least not enough to generate changes in their mindsets. Quick steps were taken to change system 
structures: The old CGIAR was extinguished at the end of 2009, and the new CGIAR began to operate 
in 2010 with a meeting of the new Fund Council early in the year. Other pieces of new architecture, 
both legal and organizational, were put in place over time. Donors’ commitment to reform was strong, 
as evidenced by the funding they provided to the entire change effort. Reform became concrete when 
the fi rst two CRPs were approved and funding began to fl ow to them. 
Thus, in terms of its success in generating organizational change at the system 
level, the most recent initiative, which established the New CGIAR, scores the highest marks among all 
change efforts to date. The change process followed well-tested norms, and the resulting new struc-
tures are mostly in place. As change alone does not guarantee the generation of intended outcomes, 
it is too early to tell whether the reforms will be effective in terms of delivering results on the ground.
Why Some Reforms Did Not Work
The template used above to analyze the major change efforts undertaken in the 
CGIAR can provide clues why some reform attempts did not work. Some were too early or radical for 
the system to digest by building a strong guiding coalition around them, and some encountered stiff 
resistance from some or all Centers or donors. Three examples illustrate these points.
Shift to a programmatic approach. This was fi rst recommended by the Conway 
Panel in 1994. Other priorities faced by the system during the fi nancial crisis, prevented its serious 
consideration at the time. The idea was advocated again by the change design and management team 
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in 2001 and found its initial implementation through the CPs but with limited scope. Finally, the New 
CGIAR adopted it as a cornerstone of reform, and a more radical shift to program funding took place. 
Consolidation of Centers. This has been seen as a “quick fi x” in the CGIAR every 
time the system faced fi nancial diffi culty. Except for the ILCA-ILRAD and IPGRI-INIBAP mergers, 
and IFPRI’s absorption of the surviving remnants of ISNAR, no Center consolidation took place. Two 
key reasons were resistance from Centers and their supporters, as no Center wanted to be merged 
with another, and the absence of a single compelling strategic rationale or vision acceptable to most 
stakeholders. Each Center had grown strong over time and had its diehard support group within the 
CGIAR. Under consensus decision-making, it was close to impossible for the CGIAR to advance a 
proposal on a merger against stiff resistance. There had to be a do-or-die rationale for consolidation 
before Centers or donors would seriously consider it. At one such occasion in 1993, when the system 
faced a serious fi nancial crisis and TAC was asked to develop a consolidation plan, it was set aside at 
the request of the incoming chair. Twelve years later CGIAR task forces examining CGIAR operations 
in sub-Saharan Africa recommended consolidating all Centers in Africa into single corporate entity. 
While the recommendation was endorsed “in principle,” it was not clear how the system would be 
confi gured in each region, discomfi ting donors and Centers, and no action was taken. 
One or two Centers for Africa.  The history of the debates on the CGIAR’s archi-
tecture in sub-Saharan Africa presents a similar picture. For years, African regional and subregional 
agricultural research organizations argued that they did not have the capacity individually to interface 
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separately with 16 (later 15) Centers and that it would be more effi cient for them and for the Centers 
if they were able to interface with only one or two CGIAR entities. While the idea made a lot of sense to 
the CGIAR community, there were no obvious fi rst steps to make it happen. As each Center operated 
in several regions, their global architecture was an issue that could not be isolated in Africa but, rather, 
involved all regions. Finally, SSA task forces recommended a fi rst step: have one CGIAR entity in 
East and Southern Africa and a second entity in West and Central Africa. As a fi rst step, the Centers 
headquartered in West and Central Africa would form the nucleus of one of the entities by operating 
under one board. A similar arrangement would cover East and Southern Africa. Stiff resistance from 
the four Centers involved, and from the others operating in SSA, saw the recommendation and its 
eventual implementation diluted to aligning administrative services and other things that the Centers 
were comfortable with or already doing. 
Thus, the CGIAR’s endorsement of a recommended action did not always mean 
that it would be implemented. The endorsement provided a green light to proceed, but full imple-
mentation required that there be little resistance within the system; a powerful guiding coalition stand 
behind the recommendation, especially fi nancially; and everyone involved clearly understand not only 
the fi rst steps but also what would follow. Because the Centers equated CGIAR contributions with the 
unrestricted funding they received, over time the CGIAR lost its persuasive power (i.e., power of the 
purse) when unrestricted funding dropped to one-third or less of Centers’ overall funding. 
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The 40-year experience of the CGIAR in mobilizing the donor and scientifi c commu-
nities around a common development objective has presented a number of lessons for both commu-
nities. As illustrated above, the CGIAR system has had its ups and downs in coping with challenges. 
Despite the hurdles, however, it has continued to generate expanding benefi ts for food production, 
environmental sustainability and capacity building in developing countries. This is because the found-
ers of the CGIAR believed in leaving the management of science to scientists by establishing autono-
mously governed Centers rather than a top-down corporate structure. Many of the lessons that emerge 
from the CGIAR experience relate to this basic founding principle and how it has created tensions 
with other valued objectives. 
Organizational Lessons
Perhaps the biggest organizational challenge the CGIAR faced over the years was 
how to fi nd the right balance between differentiation and integration. Work supported by the CGIAR 
was differentiated among autonomous Centers. Yet the Group’s intention was that the work done in 
all Centers would be mutually reinforcing and contribute to a common goal. This required creating 
mechanisms that would facilitate integrating the efforts of all Centers. A fully differentiated system 
would mean parceling the CGIAR’s work out to separate units and leaving each unit alone to do its 
work. A fully integrated system would mean each unit working in concert with the other units. 
The donor community was interested in an integrated system, as were most of 
partner institutions in developing countries. This was partly because of the desire to create a whole 
that was greater than the sum of its parts by generating economies of scale in aspects of science 
common to the Centers and by getting Centers working in the same regions and countries to interact 
more. The CGIAR responded with several mechanisms to facilitate integration among the Centers and 
operate more like an integrated system:
 ■ Priority setting. At the system level this was done centrally with the expectation 
that each Center’s strategies should dovetail with system goal and priorities.
 ■ Operational plans of Centers. These medium-term plans were reviewed annually 
by TAC and later the SC to assess their alignment with system priorities, for 
eventual Group endorsement — meaning the issuance of a green light to have 
the donors fi nance the proposed programs.
 ■ External reviews of Centers. Conducted every 5 years, these reviews assessed, 
among other things, alignment with system priorities and programmatic linkages 
with other Centers.
 ■ Systemwide and ecoregional programs. These were created to facilitate the 
integration of Center activities where scientifi c collaboration was most needed.
 ■ Communities of practice. Scientists and administrators formed communities in 
their respective areas of practice to learn from one another and help improve 
communication and coordination.
 ■ Inter-Center committees. The CDC, CBC and Committee of Center Deputy Direc-
tors General addressed common concerns and strove to align Center policies.
 ■ Centralized program and administrative support. Mechanisms were created to 
facilitate Center operations in such areas as gender and diversity, human resources, 
intellectual property, information technology and knowledge management, and 
internal audit, as well as help harmonize Centers’ internal policy frameworks.
Thus, Centers’ freedom to operate was constrained by forces promoting greater 
integration. Although it was not designed as a corporation, the CGIAR tried to operate as if it were a 
corporation. Integrating mechanisms proliferated over time and as the system’s mission became more 
and more complex. Clearly, each new mechanism had a cost in terms of implementation and of the 
burden it imposed on each Center. Naturally, there were benefi ts to Centers and the system as well. 
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No careful analysis ever studied the impact on system productivity brought about by the cumulative 
effect of mechanisms of integration. However, judging from the reactions of the Centers to the burdens 
imposed on them by the CGIAR, particularly during the past decade, adding more integrative mecha-
nisms to generate a greater system orientation might have been counterproductive.  
Lessons on Structure
An obvious answer to the dilemma of differentiation versus integration is to minimize 
differentiation by reducing the number of Centers. As discussed in the section Drivers of Change, 
Center consolidation was attempted several times but rarely achieved. 
Observers of the CGIAR often ask if it would have the same structure if it were 
created today. The answer is a clear no because the architecture of the CGIAR evolved, rather than 
being etched on a clean slate. It started on a simple commodity axis with IRRI and CIMMYT, then added 
a second, region axis with CIAT and IITA. While these two axes accommodated some of the Centers 
that came next — CIP, ICRISAT, ICARDA, ILCA, ILRAD and WARDA — a third axis, service, was added 
with ISNAR and IBPGR; a fourth axis, policy, with IFPRI; and a fi fth axis, natural resources, with IIMI 
and CIFOR (the other Centers added — ICRAF, INIBAP and ICLARM — fi t one or another existing axis). 
An organizing framework with so many axes lies at the heart of the CGIAR’s diffi culties 
in coming up with an optimal structure. Each of the fi ve axes intersected with all other four axes because 
most of the Centers had global mandates. For example, having a policy Center did not mean that none of 
the other Centers would address policy issues, and having ICRISAT working in the semi-arid tropics did 
not mean that no other Center could work on commodity, natural resource, service, or policy concerns 
in that environment. Some overlap in Centers’ mandates was thus inevitable, which required clarifi cation 
and self-directed mutual adjustment among Centers. In a few clear-cut cases, such as CIMMYT versus 
ICARDA in wheat research in Central and West Asia & North Africa and CIMMYT versus IITA in maize 
research in sub-Saharan Africa, TAC helped clarify Centers’ respective responsibilities. 
Any reorganization of Centers required, fi rst, agreement on the axes upon 
which the new structure would be based — preferably not more than two, such as (1) commod-
ity or subject matter and (2) region. Second, agreement would be needed on how to confi gure 
each axis, such as on which commodities or commodity groups. Third, if there were two axes, 
clarifi cation would be required on how the two axes would interact, regarding, for example, the 
relationship between a commodity center and a regional center and their respective responsi-
bilities. Throughout the CGIAR’s history, many scenarios were developed on possible structural 
reconfi guration using this rationale, but none found traction because the forces favoring the status 
quo were stronger than those favoring any one scenario. 
Lessons on Funding
Center autonomy meant that each Center was responsible for its research outputs 
and impact and for raising the funds needed to conduct the required research. As the donors, or 
sources for funding, were fi nite and known to all, there was intense and sometimes fi erce competition 
among Centers for donors’ funds. The uncertainties arising from this competition were exacerbated by 
Centers each having to run long-term research programs with annual funding because that matched 
the budget cycle of most development assistance agencies. This placed enormous burdens on Center 
management and boards. Thus, when demands from the CGIAR for greater integration among the 
Centers increased, compliance with the requests became diffi cult in the absence of new and additional 
incentives. In other words, acceding to demand for integration meant each Center giving up some 
of its sovereignty, which seemed unreasonable if each Center was expected to raise its own funds. 
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One possible answer could have been to create a system fund to fi nance all such 
integrative initiatives, supported by strong, system-level fundraising capability. In fact, the fi nancing 
model of the New CGIAR does exactly this. Each CRP is integrative, bringing together inputs from all 
components of the Center system. The CGIAR Fund is designed primarily to fi nance this type of activ-
ity. Each Center gives up some sovereignty when contributing to a CRP in return for external funding 
for that activity. The autonomy of the Centers, especially in managing their science, is not otherwise 
threatened. To the extent that they are able to raise suffi cient funds from bilateral sources to carry 
out other research within their areas of responsibility, they are likely to remain viable and sustain their 
relevance for many years.  
Lessons on Accountability
The CGIAR has a strong tradition of accountability. The system’s original model 
of decentralized management and centralized oversight required balancing Center autonomy with 
appropriate means of system oversight. Initially, oversight was primarily through TAC, which bore the 
responsibility to “advise the Consultative Group on the effectiveness of specifi c existing international 
research programs.”72 TAC carried this out primarily through reviews of Center budget proposals and 
external program reviews. Added in 1983 to these quinquennial reviews of each Center were external 
management reviews commissioned by the CGIAR Secretariat. In 1991, the two were merged into a 
single EPMR, which was quite comprehensive, carried out by a panel of 5-7 experts and costing the 
CGIAR $200,000-$300,000. In addition, TAC carried out from time to time stripe reviews of activi-
ties that cut across all or most Centers, such as on plant breeding or research on farming systems or 
social science subjects.
A key reason for centrally managed EPMRs was to avoid each donor conducting its 
own review of the Centers it supported. While this worked for most donors, particularly those provid-
ing unrestricted funding, donors funding specifi c projects normally required separate evaluations to 
satisfy their own regulations. 
Review activities proliferated over time. Centers began to commission their own 
external reviews linked with EPMRs. The initiation of CPs required an EPMR system for them paral-
lel to that of Centers. In fi nance, the internal audit function strengthened over time, providing more 
robust audit data to Center boards and management. And, during the fi nal decade of the old CGIAR, 
the comprehensive Performance Measurement System was introduced, imposing substantial data-
gathering and reporting demands on Centers.
In short, Centers and their actions were increasingly placed under a microscope. 
Several attempts to streamline the systems of accountability met little success. Each new mechanism 
reinforcing accountability generated new data on performance, which many donors welcomed. As 
each evaluation required the time of Center scientists, the Centers began to question the required 
tradeoffs, especially as unrestricted funding from CGIAR donors dropped to about 30% of all funding, 
and despite donors of restricted funding benefi ting from CGIAR evaluations as well as from their own.
Thus, the key lesson on accountability from CGIAR experience is that each new 
evaluation activity should be assessed in terms of the added value of the information it would gener-
ate and weighed against the value of the research output that would be foregone. 
Lessons on Advisory Bodies
As the CGIAR’s main business was science, and as a great majority of donor agency 
representatives were not scientists, making decisions in the CGIAR forum required analysis and advice 
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from a technically authoritative body. TAC was established at the same time as the CGIAR itself to help 
guide decision-making in the Group for many years. 
But TAC was not just an advisory body; it also provided scientifi c oversight on 
behalf of the Group. When the TAC chair spoke, the Group and the Centers listened carefully. This was 
because the original TAC and a few others over the years earned the respect of the CGIAR commu-
nity by virtue of the personal stature of their members, and because TAC’s recommendations were 
backed with commensurate funding allocations by a few donors, not counting the supportive practice 
of the World Bank as the donor of last resort. During the CGIAR’s initial 2 decades, TAC was thus able 
to provide strong leadership to the system.
Notwithstanding the individuals who chaired it, the leadership role played by TAC 
and its successor SC was not the same during the past 2 decades, in part because donors and Centers 
began to be heard more strongly and Centers were not as ready or willing to work within collective 
system priorities — the latter reason a consequence of new fi nancing arrangements that no longer 
backed TAC recommendations. It could be argued that a strong technical advisory body was needed 
more during the formative years of the CGIAR than in later years when the need for technical advice 
may have ebbed as the system matured and Centers began to work better collectively toward address-
ing their common strategic concerns. Nevertheless, it is clear from the CGIAR experience that techni-
cal advice is heeded more when it is coupled with a commensurate incentive mechanism.   
Lessons on Corporate Governance
From the beginning, Centers have been primarily led by their director. The situa-
tion has not changed much over the years or across Centers. What has changed is the role played 
by Center boards. 
The initial Center boards saw themselves more as advisors to the director than as 
policy- and decision-making bodies overseeing Center operations and the director. It took over 10 years 
for the system to clarify boards’ roles, responsibilities and accountability. This was not unusual because 
best practice in the governance of nonprofi t organizations was not then systematically codifi ed even 
in advanced countries. The CGIAR system closely followed developments in thinking on corporate 
and nonprofi t governance. A series of orientation programs was conducted for new board members, 
boards shared best practice among themselves through the CBC, a set of guidelines for CGIAR boards 
was prepared to refl ect best practice, and each Center board took steps to improve its functioning. As 
a result, CGIAR Center boards gradually transformed themselves from advisory bodies into governing 
boards with full fi duciary and other responsibilities appropriate for autonomous institutions. 
Corporate governance reform is part and parcel of several transformations that have 
taken place in the CGIAR over 4 decades. It refl ects the maturity of the Centers as institutions follow-
ing the best internationally recognized practice in governance, fi nance and management. 
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Unique Strengths
The old saying “life begins at 40” comes to my mind when, at that age, a reformed CGIAR 
enters a new era. The CGIAR can look back at great achievements and step into the future 
well equipped for the grand challenges ahead in relation to poverty, food, climate change, 
energy and fi nances. The CGIAR is needed more than ever to create a better future for the 
world’s poor and, at the same time, care for the environment and mitigate the impact of 
climate change on production and people. 
The CGIAR has many unique strengths, and I would like to underline a few. First, its focus 
on the global public good, and on securing for the global South access to knowledge and 
technology, are of crucial importance in a world where others tend to privatize the results 
of research. Second is the CGIAR’s collective action and partnership mode of operation, in 
which a range of actors joins forces to contribute to making a difference through research 
and development. Third, the success of the CGIAR depends totally on motivated researchers 
with brilliant and inquisitive minds going all out to perform relevant, cutting-edge science. 
The drivers of change in food and agriculture are many and will affect the CGIAR’s future 
path and direction. What is apparent is that international willingness to fund the CGIAR in 
the next 40 years will depend upon the CGIAR’s providing convincing impact pathways and 
proven results related to its system-level objectives, as well as on the its ability to respond 
effectively to a changing world.
Ruth Haug
Representative of Norway to the CGIAR; Member, CGIAR Oversight 
Committee; Member, CGIAR Executive Council
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In terms of value for money, the CGIAR has been one of the best investments 
for international development over the past 40 years. Over this period the donor community 
invested close to $11 billion in research through the CGIAR. This is equal to the annual economic 
benefi t of CGIAR research on just rice on only one continent, Asia.73 A study in 2003 considered 
how the world would look today without CGIAR research, and eliminating CGIAR work on crop 
improvement alone has developing countries producing 7-8% less food and 13-15 million more 
children malnourished.74 
Investment in the CGIAR refl ected the confi dence that the donor community 
had on the potential of scientifi c research to address issues of food security and environmental 
sustainability in developing countries. It was also a bet on the potential of an innovative institu-
tional model. At the core of this institutional experiment was the belief that science should be 
left to scientists, and scientists left as little encumbered as possible. Research institutes were 
set up as autonomous, self-governing entities — the only legal bodies in the system. The donor 
group maintained itself as a loose informal assembly, advised by TAC and granting each donor 
the freedom to allocate its resources to Centers and their programs as they pleased. 
This model worked well when the Group was small and the number of Centers 
was relatively small at 13. Centers were able to plan and conduct their research as they pleased 
because a signifi cant share of their resources were unrestricted, and Centers heeded TAC’s advice 
because of the incentive structure reinforcing that advice. The model began to show strains as the 
Group grew, requiring new committees and other measures to facilitate decision-making. At the 
same time, the number of Centers increased and the mission of the system became increasingly 
complex, requiring new measures to ensure the integration of Center activities. Finally, the rever-
sal over time of the 70:30 ratio between unrestricted and restricted funding gradually eroded the 
authority of the Group and TAC, which had depended to a large extent on the power of the purse.
The system attempted reform several times over the past 2 decades. Practically 
all reforms were evolutionary, adjusting one aspect or another of the existing institutional model 
but not abandoning it in favor of another model. When some revolutionary suggestion was made, 
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such as the recommendation arising from the third system review to adopt a corporate model 
with a board and CEO overseeing the entire system and Centers as its operating units, pressure 
from within the system induced the Group to dismiss it. 
The New CGIAR presents a much-needed revolutionary change in the CGIAR. 
It is too early to tell whether or not this new model will succeed. Perhaps its most positive aspect 
is that, like the founders of the original CGIAR, it maintains protecting the independence of the 
scientist as a core principle and stiffens the new programmatic thrust on the backbone of the 
scientifi c network that has evolved over 40 years. These are the most valuable global assets that 
have been built and nurtured under the CGIAR umbrella over the past 4 decades.
The New CGIAR model faces a number of serious challenges. First among 
them is perhaps uncertainty about how donors will respond to harmonization. If contributions 
to the unrestricted windows 1 and 2 of the CGIAR Fund remain low, the system could continue 
to experience the same ills as it did under the old CGIAR when the ratio of unrestricted to 
restricted funding fell to 30:70. Another hurdle is the bureaucratization and formalism that 
will undoubtedly accompany the new form of results-based contractual relationships for CRPs 
between the Fund and the Consortium, the Consortium and the lead Center, and the lead Center 
and its partnering institutions. A third unknown is how the relationship between the Consortium 
and the Centers will evolve over time, especially regarding oversight and accountability. This 
is a new institutional experiment, in which the Consortium reports to the Centers, as it is their 
creation, while it controls the flow of funds from the CGIAR Fund to the Centers, and thus has 
some limited authority over the Centers. 
The story of the CGIAR’s evolution over the past 40 years refl ects evolution in think-
ing on international development, as well as evolution in science, science management and partner-
ships. The legacy of the CGIAR is as much in the impacts of the research it fi nanced as it is on the 
scientifi c institutions and networks it has created. These are robust global, regional and national assets 
that have the potential to serve the global community for many years to come. 
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ANNEX 1
CGIAR’s Evolution in Figures
FIGURE 1.1. CGIAR FUNDING AND NUMBER OF MEMBERS BY DECADE
FIGURE 1.2. CGIAR TOTAL FUNDING TRENDS
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FIGURE 1.5. CGIAR’S EVOLVING RESEARCH AGENDA
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FIGURE 1.7. CHANGES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF CGIAR 
INVESTMENTS BY REGION, 1992 AND 2010
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1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010
1 United States 134.7  United States 428.8  World Bank 437.5  United States 608.2 
2 World Bank 54.9  World Bank 258.3  United States 389.4  World Bank 494.9 
3 Canada 46.2  Japan 144.1  Japan 333.4  United Kingdom 374.5 
4 Germany 44.0  Canada 111.5  European 
Commission 
166.1  European Commission 315.3 
5 IDB 36.0  IDB  92.5  Switzerland 158.6  Canada 286.8 
6 United Kingdom 30.5  Germany  88.6  Germany 145.6  Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation1
218.7 
7 UNDP 23.9  United Kingdom  82.9  Canada 139.6  Switzerland 180.2 
8 Rockefeller 
Foundation 
22.8  European 
Commission 
 78.2  Netherlands 117.0  Netherlands 172.0 
9 Ford Foundation 21.6  UNDP  73.8  United Kingdom 112.9  Germany 160.5 
10 Japan 20.3  Switzerland  65.4  Denmark 110.1  Japan 149.3 
IDB = Inter-American Development Bank, UNDP = United Nations Development Programme.
1 Began contributing in 2004.
FIGURE 1.8. TOP 10 DONORS TO THE CGIAR BY DECADE
(nominal $ million)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
International Other International Other International Other International Other International Other
AfricaRice  49  151  45  197  47  237  56  249  58  270 
Bioversity  69  179  71  187  71  187  70  180  60  156 
CIAT  96  640  87  683  82  645  92  643  95  692 
CIFOR  41  137  37  132  43  138  40  131  52  131 
CIMMYT  83  437  72  534  77  521  85  521  101  542 
CIP  60  493  59  473  59  456  64  483  62  520 
ICARDA  104  397  95  413  93  426  93  432  91  515 
ICRISAT  59  873  59 1,015  64 1,099  73 1,031  82 1,108 
IFPRI  89  121  107  114  107  125  118  228  132  245 
IITA  107 1,128  111 1,007  103  968  97  882  100  857 
ILRI  81  693  92  680  83  617  110  573  102  546 
IRRI  73  832  74  831  149  827  134  921  131  998 
IWMI  115  259  95  235  86  178  91  174  97  185 
World 
Agroforestry  45  421  49  235  50  259  72  259  78  307 
WorldFish  44  278  43  250  49  221  43  215  37  209 
Total  1,115 7,039  1,096 6,986  1,163 6,904  1,238 6,922  1,278 7,281 
FIGURE 1.9. STAFF SIZE BY CENTER, 2006-2010
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CGIAR Fund Council Chairs, 
2010-
Rachel Kyte, 2011-
Inger Andersen, 2010-2011
Katherine Sierra, 2010
CGIAR Chairs, 1971-2009
Katherine Sierra, 2006-2009
Ian Johnson, 2000-2006
Ismail Serageldin, 1994-2000
V. Rajagopalan, 1991-1993
Wilfried Thalwitz, 1990-1991
W. David Hopper, 1987-1990
S. Shahid Hussain, 1984-1987
Warren Baum, 1974-1983
Richard H. Demuth, 1971-1974
Executive Secretary of the 
CGIAR Fund Council and Head 
of the Fund Offi ce 2010-
Jonathan Wadsworth, 2011-
Ren Wang, 2010
CGIAR Directors, 2001-2009
Ren Wang, 2007-2009
Francisco J.B. Reifschneider, 2001-2007
CGIAR Executive Secretaries, 
1972-2001
Alexander von der Osten, 1989-2001
Curtis Farrar, 1982-1989
Michael Lejeune, 1975-1982
Harold Graves, 1972-1975
Independent Science and 
Partnership Council Chair, 
2010-
Kenneth Cassman, 2011-
Roelof (Rudy) Rabbinge, 2010
Independent Science 
and Partnership Council 
Executive Director, 2010-
Peter Gardiner, 2010-
Science Council Chairs, 
2004-2009
Roelof (Rudy) Rabbinge, 2007-2009
Per Pinstrup-Andersen, 2004-2006
Science Council Executive 
Director, 2004-2009
Ruben Echeverria, 2004-2009
Interim Science Council 
Chair, 2002-2003
Emil Q. Javier, 2002-2003
Technical Advisory Committee 
Chairs, 1971-2001
Emil Q. Javier, 2000-2001
Donald Winkelmann, 1994-1999
Alex McCalla, 1988-1994
Guy Camus, 1982-1987
Ralph Cummings, 1977-1982
Sir John Crawford, 1971-1976
Technical Advisory Committee 
Executive Secretaries, 
1971-2003
Shellemiah Keya, 1996-2003
Guido Gryseels, 1995-1996
John Monyo, 1985-1994
Alexander von der Osten, 1982-1985
Philippe Mahler, 1976-1982
Peter Oram, 1971-1976
CGIAR Fund Council 
Composition, 2011
Chair: Inger Andersen
Executive Secretary: Jonathan Wadsworth
DONOR COUNTRIES 
Europe: European Commission (Marc Debois), 
Sweden (Philip Chiverton), Switzerland (Carmen 
Thoennissen), United Kingdom (Alan Tollervey)
North America: Canada (Kimberley 
Bowlin), USA (Robert Bertram)
Asia: Japan (Kenichiro Tanaka)
Pacifi c: Australia (Nick Austin)
ANNEX 2
Who’s Who in the CGIAR, 1971-2011
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DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND 
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Sub-Saharan Africa: Kenya (Romano 
Kiome), Nigeria (B.Y. Abubakar)
Asia: China (Ye Anping), India (S. Ayyappan)
Pacifi c: Papua New Guinea 
(Raghunath Ghodake)
Central and West Asia and North 
Africa: Egypt (Adel El Beltagy)
Latin America and the Caribbean: 
Brazil (Luciano Nass)
Regional fora: Association of Agricultural 
Research Institutions in the Near East 
and North Africa (Ahmed N Al-Bakry)
MULTILATERAL AND GLOBAL 
ORGANIZATIONS
World Bank: Juergen Voegele
International Fund for Agricultural 
Development: Rodney Cooke
Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations: Xiangjun Yao
Global Forum on Agricultural 
Research: Monty Jones
FOUNDATIONS 
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation: 
Prabhu Pingali
International Development 
Research Centre: Jean Lebel
CGIAR Fund Offi ce
Executive Secretary of the 
Fund Council and Head of the 
Fund Offi ce: Jonathan Wadsworth 
CGIAR Trustee
World Bank: Pamela Crivelli 
Independent Science and 
Partnership Council (ISPC)
ISPC Chair: Kenneth Cassman
ISPC Executive Director: Peter Gardiner
ISPC Members: Derek Byerlee, Vibha 
Dhawan, Margaret Gill, Rashid Hassan, 
Marcio de Miranda Santos, Jeffrey Sayer
Consortium of International 
Agricultural Research Centers
CONSORTIUM BOARD COMPOSITION
Carlos Pérez del Castillo (Chair)
 Carl Hausmann (Vice Chair)
 Tom Arnold
Mo hammed Ait-Kadi
G anesan Balachander 
Ge bisa Ejeta
Ia n Goldin
Lynn Haight
Lloyd Le Page (CEO ex-offi cio board 
member until Sep 2011)
CONSORTIUM OFFICE
Lloyd Le Page, Chief Executive 
Offi cer (until Sep 2011)
Research Centers
AFRICA RICE CENTER
Getachew Engida, Board Chair
Papa Abdoulaye Seck, Director General
BIOVERSITY INTERNATIONAL
Paul Zuckerman, Board Chair
Emile Frison, Director General
INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR 
TROPICAL AGRICULTURE (CIAT)
Juan Lucas Restrepo, Board Chair
Ruben Echeverria, Director General
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL 
FORESTRY RESEARCH (CIFOR)
Andrew Bennett, Board Chair
Frances Seymour, Director General
INTERNATIONAL MAIZE AND WHEAT 
IMPROVEMENT CENTER (CIMMYT)
Sara Boettiger, Board Chair
Thomas Lumpkin, Director General
INTERNATIONAL POTATO CENTER (CIP)
Peter Van der Zaag, Board Chair
Pamela Anderson, Director General
INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR 
AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH IN 
THE DRY AREAS (ICARDA)
Henri Carsalade, Board Chair
Mahmoud Solh, Director General
INTERNATIONAL CROPS RESEARCH 
INSTITUTE FOR THE SEMI-ARID 
TROPICS (ICRISAT)
Nigel Poole, Board Chair
William Dar, Director General
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InternatIonal Food PolIcy 
research InstItute (IFPrI)
Fawzi Al-Sultan, Board Chair
Shenggen Fan, Director General
InternatIonal InstItute oF 
troPIcal agrIculture (IIta)
Bryan Harvey, Board Chair
P. Hartmann, Director General (until Oct 2011)
Nteranya Sanginga, Director General (from Nov 2011)
InternatIonal lIvestock 
research InstItute (IlrI)
Knut Hove, Board Chair
Carlos Seré, Director General (until Sep 2011)
Jimmy Smith, Director General (from Nov 2011)
InternatIonal rIce  
research InstItute (IrrI)
Emerlinda Roman, Board Chair
Robert Zeigler, Director General
InternatIonal Water  
ManageMent InstItute (IWMI)
John Skerritt, Board Chair
Colin Chartres, Director General
World agroForestry centre
Eric Tollens, Board Chair
Tony Simons, Director General
WorldFIsh center
Remo Gautschi, Board Chair
Stephen Hall, Director General
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ACIAR Australian Centre for International 
Agricultural Research
AGM annual general meeting
AVRDC Asian Vegetable Research 
and Development Center 
CBC Committee of Board Chairs 
CCAFS CGIAR Research Program on 
Climate Change, Agriculture 
and Food Security
CDC Center Directors Committee
CDMT Change Design and 
Management Team
CGIAR Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research
CIAT Centro Internacional de Agricultura 
Tropical (International Center for 
Tropical Agriculture), Colombia
CIFOR Center for International Forestry 
Research, Indonesia
CIMMYT Centro Internacional de 
Mejoramiento de Maiz y Trigo 
(International Maize and Wheat 
Improvement Center), Mexico
CIP Centro Internacional de la Papa 
(International Potato Center), Peru
CRP CGIAR Research Program
CSO civil society organization
Embrapa Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa 
Agropecuária (Brazilian Agricultural 
Research Corporation)
EPMR external program and 
management review 
ExCo Executive Council of the CGIAR
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
GFAR Global Forum on 
Agricultural Research
GRiSP Global Rice Science Partnership
GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
(German Agency for 
International Cooperation) 
HIV/AIDS human immunodefi ciency 
virus/acquired immune 
defi ciency syndrome 
IAEG Impact Assessment and 
Evaluation Group 
IARC international agricul-
tural research center
ICARDA International Center for Agricultural 
Research in the Dry Areas, Syria
ICIPE International Center for Insect 
Physiology and Ecology
ICLARM International Center for 
Living Aquatic Resources 
Management, Malaysia
ICRISAT  International Crops 
Research Institute for the 
Semi-Arid Tropics, India
IDRC International Development 
Research Centre
IFAD International Fund for 
Agricultural Development
IFDC International Fertilizer 
Development Center
IFPRI International Food Policy 
Research Institute, USA
IIMI International Irrigation 
Management Institute
IITA  International Institute of 
Tropical Agriculture, Nigeria
ILCA International Livestock 
Center for Africa
ILRAD International Laboratory on 
Research on Animal Diseases
ILRI  International Livestock 
Research Institute, Kenya
INIBAP International Network 
for the Improvement of 
Banana and Plantain
IRRI  International Rice Research 
Institute, Philippines
IWMI  International Water Management 
Institute, Sri Lanka
M&E monitoring and evaluation
NARS national agricultural 
research system(s)
NERICA New Rice for Africa
NGO nongovernment organization
ODA offi cial development assistance
PARC Public Awareness and 
Resources Committee 
PGRFA plant genetic resources for 
food and agriculture
TAC Technical Advisory Committee 
TMT transition management team
UNDP United Nations Development 
Programme
USAID United States Agency for 
International Development
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